Flag state performance and the implementation of port state control in the European Union - A mixed methods approach by Graziano, Armando
World Maritime University 
The Maritime Commons: Digital Repository of the World Maritime 
University 
World Maritime University Ph.D. Dissertations Dissertations 
11-11-2018 
Flag state performance and the implementation of port state 
control in the European Union - A mixed methods approach 
Armando Graziano 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.wmu.se/phd_dissertations 
 Part of the Infrastructure Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the 
Transportation Commons 
This Thesis is brought to you courtesy of Maritime Commons. Open Access items may be downloaded for non-
commercial, fair use academic purposes. No items may be hosted on another server or web site without express 
written permission from the World Maritime University. For more information, please contact library@wmu.se. 
World Maritime University 
The Maritime Commons: Digital Repository of the World Maritime 
University 
World Maritime University Ph.D. Dissertations Dissertations 
11-11-2018 
Flag state performance and the implementation of port state 
control in the European Union - A mixed methods approach 
Armando Graziano 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.wmu.se/phd_dissertations 
 Part of the Infrastructure Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the 
Transportation Commons 
This Thesis is brought to you courtesy of Maritime Commons. Open Access items may be downloaded for non-
commercial, fair use academic purposes. No items may be hosted on another server or web site without express 

















   
   

























FLAG STATE PERFORMANCE AND THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PORT STATE CONTROL IN 










WMU RESEARCH REPORT SERIES 
No. 10, July 2018 
 
 
 						                           Flag State Perform
ance and the Im
plem





                           Port State Control in the European Union             
10	
 						                           Flag State Perform
ance and the Im
plem






























































































Flag state performance and the implementation  






WMU RESEARCH REPORT SERIES 
No. 10, July 2018 
 
SERIES EDITORS: 
Maximo Q. Mejia, Jr. 
Jens-Uwe Schröder Hinrichs 
 
 
The aim of the WMU Research Report Series is to publish essays, monographs, 
articles, policy papers, occasional papers, reports, and PhD dissertations to 
promote academic research and publication among resident colleagues at the 
World Maritime University as well as other scholars associated with it. 
Publications in this series will be published in moderately priced limited offset 
editions. 
Short excerpts from this publication may be reproduced without authorization, on 
condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation, 
application should be made to – 
The Editors, WMU Research Report Series 
World Maritime University 
P.O. Box 500 
201 24 Malmö 





Flag State Performance and the 
Implementation of Port State Control 
in the European Union 












A dissertation submitted to the World Maritime University in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in Maritime Affairs 
WMU RESEARCH REPORT SERIES 









Cover photo by Marielle Sauvage 
Copyright pp 1-78 (Armando Graziano) 
Paper I © Brill  
Paper II © Elsevier  
Paper III © by the Authors (unpublished manuscript) 
Paper IV © Elsevier  
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the 
view or policy of his/her/their employer(s,) organization(s), WMU Publications, 
or the World Maritime University.  WMU Publications and the Series Editors, 
while exercising the greatest care in this publication, do not hold themselves 
responsible for the consequences arising from any inaccuracies therein. 
All rights reserved. Except for quotation of short passages for the purposes of 
criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced without full 
attribution to the author(s) or the prior written permission of the Publisher. 
 
ISBN 978-91-984226-7-2 
Published in Sweden in 2018  





PO Box 500 
201 24 Malmö, Sweden 
Suggested Citation: 
Graziano A (2018). Flag state performance and the implementation of port state 








A mio padre e mia madre 
  
8 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgement ........................................................................................ 10 
Abstract ........................................................................................................ 12 
List of figures ............................................................................................... 13 
List of tables ................................................................................................. 13 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 15 
1.1. Historical Background........................................................................... 15 
1.2. Problem Statement and Research Questions ......................................... 17 
1.3. Limitations ............................................................................................ 21 
1.4. Summary of the Papers ......................................................................... 22 
2. Literature Review ............................................................................................... 25 
2.1. Flag State Performance ......................................................................... 25 
2.2. Evaluating Flag State Performance ....................................................... 27 
2.3. Harmonisation ....................................................................................... 31 
2.4. Port State Control .................................................................................. 32 
2.5. Harmonisation and Port State Control in the European Union ............. 36 
2.6. Discrepancies in Harmonisation ............................................................ 37 
3. Methodology....................................................................................................... 41 
3.1. Philosophical bent ................................................................................. 41 
3.2. The European Union scenario, a lesson for a critical case study? ......... 42 
3.3. Research Approach ............................................................................... 43 
3.3.1. Focus Groups ............................................................................. 44 
3.3.2. Elite Interviews .......................................................................... 46 
3.3.3. Analysis of Reports and frequencies of the findings ................. 46 




4. Results ................................................................................................................ 49 
4.1. Two sides of the same coin. Flag State Performance as a  
       combination of administrative and fleet performance ........................... 50 
4.2. Adequacy and Inadequacy of Port State Control in the  
       European Union .................................................................................... 52 
4.2.1. Interview Study ......................................................................... 52 
4.2.2. Analysis of Reports and frequencies of the findings ................. 53 
4.2.3. Analysis of the inspections’ results ........................................... 54 
5. Discussion .......................................................................................................... 57 
5.1. General considerations .......................................................................... 58 
5.2. The background ..................................................................................... 62 
5.3. Teams .................................................................................................... 64 
5.4. Differences across EU Member States .................................................. 65 
5.5. Policy Considerations ............................................................................ 67 
6. Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 71 
7. References .......................................................................................................... 73 





The day I ended my master’s degree, I promised myself I would never walk into a 
University ever again. Three years later, there I was at the World Maritime 
University to begin the hardest endeavour I would ever undertake in my whole life.  
Starting and finishing my Ph.D. path has been challenging, hard, sometimes 
demotivating, often frustrating. A very good friend of mine warned me before 
starting: “You do not need to be smart to finish a Ph.D. but organised, motivated 
and relentless. In the end, you are the only one who cares about this project”. She 
was right, it has been a journey of self-discovery, it has taught me how to proceed 
full speed towards a goal I was the only one I could see, it has provided me skills I 
did not believe I possessed. However, I am deeply convinced that I would have 
never manage to conclude this challenge if two aspects were not fully taken into 
account. Firstly, I had to have the strength to tell myself, and humbly acknowledge, 
that the majority of what I thought I knew was not as important as I believed: I knew 
nothing, or just very little. Secondly, and most importantly, when I found myself in 
desperate need of help, either professionally, academically or on a personal and 
human level, I had to embrace that fear of unknown and seek for help. In the end, 
this is all of what this acknowledgment is about. It is thanking those who have 
helped me, whether I asked or not. I tell all of you, from the bottom of my heart: 
This would have never happened without your help, support and understanding. 
To my father, who was the greatest follower and sponsor for my entire life. He 
would have loved to be here, I can see his proud smile wherever he is now. To my 
mother, who has pushed my boundaries since I was a child and taught me never to 
settle. To my boyfriend, Israel, who has been the major source of strength I could 
have ever asked for, who has silently carried me through until the end. To Gesa 
Praetorius for opening my “academic mind” and for showing me the way.  To 
Mauro, my never-ending friend. 
To my supervisors, Jens-Uwe and Max, for the unfailing support and all those 
years spent together, sometimes as colleagues, sometimes as professor and student. 
It has been a profound pleasure to work with you.  
To Madame President Cleo, for believing in me all the way through.  
To the European Commission and the European Maritime Safety Agency for 
believing in my research project and interest. Thank you for sparing time, efforts 
and knowledge to me. Many thanks to Dr. Berg, Mr. Burke and Mr. Terling from 
the European Commission and Ms. Tomassini and Mr. Christofi from EMSA.  
A big thank you to my two mentors since I was a young trainee, to Frank and 
Gerard. To my first supervisor and the person to whom I owe much of my 
professionalism, to Dr. Ranieri Guerra.  
11 
To all EMSA staff who has assisted me in my research journey, thank you for 
sharing your time, opinions and experience with me. I wish I could name you all, if 
that did not break confidentiality  
To all my friends from Malmö who have made my life in Sweden much easier 
than initially envisioned and helped me to navigate through this journey: To Fabio, 
Megan, Kim, Tiago, Maggie, Susanna, Alma, Lyndell, Anna, Ursula, Chris, Carla, 
Magdalena, Eva, Leo, Ben, Aditi and everyone else from WMU.  
To the WMU faculty which has been a source of inspiration and support.  
To Ricardo, because without him, my social life in Malmö would have been pretty 
much non-existent but more importantly thank you to be my friend. To Dimitri for 
always listening to my research madness especially regarding our “common friend”. 
To Rodrigo, Maelle, Pamela, Tommy and Ivan for the time spent together. 
To my friends from Washington which are always in my thoughts and I just 
cannot let go.  To all my friends from Lisbon which have seen me going back and 
forth too many times: Ashank, Roberto, Sofia, Andrea and Betty. To my great 
friends Vasilis and David, because I could have never managed without your 
encouragement since we first met, long ago…  
To all those friends who have at least tried to understand what I was doing and 
why I was doing it but especially to those who understood how seeing a familiar 
face, there “beyond the wall”, important it was to me: Giuseppe, Francesca, Bruno, 
Emiliano, Irene, Antonella, Stefania, Alessio and Fabiana.  
To all my EMSA colleagues who have lived the last “Ph.D. moments” with me. 
Thank you, Giuseppe, the two Andrea, Fabrizio, Paolo, Albena, Marielle, Francesco 
and many others.  
To all the people who have participated in my study and have shared all they 
could for the advancement of knowledge in the maritime domain. This is for you. 




The implementation and enforcement of international maritime safety standards by 
Member States has always represented a key objective for both the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the European Commission (EC). In spite of a 
strong global legal framework for safety at sea, harmonisation has always been a 
challenge. Two points are relevant here: firstly, the level of implementation and 
enforcement with international regulations varies significantly among countries; 
secondly, it is a challenge to determine and/or quantify this level of compliance.  
Several attempts have been made by the maritime industry, academic studies and 
policy-makers to develop an appropriate set of criteria and/or measurements to 
benchmark the performance of Flag States. Currently, the White, Grey and Black 
list (WGB) list of the Tokyo and Paris Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) on Port 
State Control are the most widely used indicators. While the list was initially 
developed solely for targeting purposes, it has been recently criticised in recent 
academic publications and by the industry for being unsuitable to benchmarking 
Flag States with a small fleet and to be susceptible to a lack of harmonisation. 
Moreover, the author argues that, given the way the list has been used, it reduces 
the overall concept of Flag State Performance (FSP) to an overly simplified 
detention/inspection ratio.  
This dissertation begins with an investigation and examination of Flag State 
Performance by looking into its underlying concept and connected components. The 
main aim is to contribute to the general knowledge on the performance of complex 
systems according to policymakers. Subsequently, this dissertation makes an 
assessment of an inspection’s results as a tool to evaluate the performance, 
shortcomings and benefits of the complex system under examination. Four research 
questions have therefore been formulated: (1) What is Flag State Performance? (2) 
What are the contemporary issues of Port State Control (PSC)? (3) How do 
discrepancies in the Port State Control regime affect the inspection output? (4) To 
what extent is Port State Control a suitable instrument to measure Flag State 
Performance? 
The dissertation is divided into two main parts. Part I presents the main research 
questions, the methodological and theoretical discussion, the main findings; and a 
round-up discussion. Part II contains the four research papers based on data gathered 
throughout the study. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Historical Background 
The implementation and enforcement of international standards by Member States 
has always been a concern for the International Maritime Organisation and the 
European Commission (Özçayır, 2009). While some states have a robust 
administrative structure that supports an effective implementation and a strong 
enforcement mechanism, others seem to be lacking in that respect. Accidents, such 
as the Amoco Cadiz (1978), Aegean Sea (1992), Braer (1993), Erika (1999), 
Prestige (2002), among others, caused a strong political and public outcry which 
fostered the perception of the inability of some registries to maintain a functioning 
administration and a legal framework in order to meet their implementation and 
enforcement obligations under international law (Kovats, 2006).  
The IMO Member States’ initial response was to adopt a resolution regulating, 
among other maritime tasks, the delegation of authority (IMO, 1993) to so-called 
recognized organizations. Over the years more guidelines were adopted leading to 
a more comprehensive approach, which was a self-assessment of the performance 
of a Flag State (IMO, 1999). Unfortunately, this voluntary approach did not elicit 
the anticipated response among Flag States given that as at November 2003 only 18 
self-assessment forms were received (Mansell, 2009b, pp. 141-143). It was 
therefore necessary to shift the effort towards harmonised implementation and 
enforcement provisions to a higher level. This was achieved with the adoption of 
the first version of the Code for the Implementation of the IMO Instruments (III 
Code) in 2005 (IMO, 2005), which was amended several times until it was made 
mandatory in 2013 (IMO, 2013), with an expected effect on compliance and 
harmonisation from 2016 onwards, when it became mandatory.  
In parallel, the European Union (EU) was always supportive of any development 
related to the implementation and enforcement of maritime safety standards. 
However, the extended periods of time that it took to discuss developments in IMO 
have always been of concern to EU Member States (Nengye & Maes, 2012). 
Maritime safety regulations1 had first been established in EEC at the end of the 
                                                     
1 In response to the oil spill cause by the Amoco Cadiz in 1978, the Council adopted Resolution OJ 
C162 of 08/07/1978, setting up an action programme on the control and reduction of pollution 
caused by hydrocarbons discharged at sea.  On 21 December 1978, the Council also adopted 
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1970s, although more effectively in the 1990s, thereby strongly encouraging EU 
Member States to ratify outstanding IMO conventions. The focus of the EU changed 
after the Erika (1999) and Prestige (2002) accidents when the EC, with the ERIKA 
packages2, started to work more proactively and more independently from the 
regulatory trends in the IMO. Since then important decisions have been taken, such 
as the development of a dedicated European Maritime Safety Agency (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2002). 
However, the main initiative intended to fill the vacuum left by Flag States and 
the industry in ensuring proper monitoring and control of their fleet, was the 
emergence of the various regional agreements on Port State Control, an inspection 
of foreign-flagged vessels in national ports to ensure that safety, pollution 
prevention and labour standards are met. The precursor of this initiative was the 
Hague Memorandum of Understanding that was signed in 1978 by eight North 
European States. They decided that the recently adopted International Labour 
Organization (ILO) 147 Convention3 deserved a proper follow-up (Özçayır, 2009).  
The ink on the Hague Memorandum had hardly dried when the Amoco Cadiz ran 
aground off the coast of France, spilling more than 200,000 tons of oil. This made 
it loud and clear that the shipping industry had failed to cope with new challenges 
and, more importantly, in self-controlling its vessels (David Anderson, 1998; Bell, 
1993; Mansell, 2009b; Vorbach, 2001; Özçayır, 2004). It was at the Ministerial 
Conference held in Paris in 1982 that 14 European states conceived of the first 
regional-coordinated system of ship inspections by signing the Paris Memorandum 
of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU) in the attempt to stem the 
proliferation of substandard shipping.  
The efforts of the Paris MoU continued almost in isolation until the beginning of 
the nineties when the International Maritime Organization, first adopted Resolution 
A.682 (17) on “Regional co-operation in the control of ships and discharges” (IMO, 
1991). This measure caused governments to sign regional agreements on Port State 
Control, and, secondly, to set up the Flag State Implementation Committee, dealing 
with common criteria and inspection standards, among other tasks (Bell, 1993). 
Henceforth, nine regional agreements on PSC have been signed, with different 
degrees of success. Nonetheless, the Paris MoU is not only the first of the regional 
                                                     
Directive 79/115/EEC regulating compulsory high-sea pilotage in sensitive maritime areas, such 
as the English Channel and the North Sea.  
2 Following the Erika accident off the Atlantic coast in December 1999, on 21 March 2000 the 
European Commission adopted a first set of proposals (the ERIKA I package) which was 
followed by a second set of measures in December 200 (the ERIKA II package). 
3 The 147 Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention (C147) was adopted in 1976 during 
at the 62nd ILO Conference, Geneva. The Convention encompasses 12 Articles and, among 
various provisions, aims at inspecting foreign-flagged vessels entering port. The C147 was 
updated by Protocol 147 to the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 
(P147) which was adopted in 1996 during the 64th ILO Conference, Geneva 
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agreements aimed at fighting substandard shipping, it also enjoys a special “status” 
within the borders of the EU. While MoUs are administrative procedures, ipso facto 
non-binding gentlemen’s agreements, since 1995 Port State Control became an EU 
initiative with the implementation of Directive 1995/21/EC (Council of the 
European Union, 1995). This made the Paris MoU system mandatory for EU 
Member States. The Directive is the predecessor of the current legislative 
instrument in force since 1 January 2011 and introduces the New Inspection Regime 
(NIR): Directive 2009/16/EC (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a), as 
amended by Directive 2013/38/EU (European Parliament and the Council, 2013). 
The directive updated the earlier Port State Control system by introducing new 
provisions for the targeting/selection of ships, regional commitments, ship-risk 
profiles, among others.  
1.2. Problem Statement and Research Questions 
The nature of the shipping industry is inherently international. Vessels engaged in 
commercial activities far away from their Port of Registry have throughout the years 
sometimes shown a missing “link” between the vessel and the Flag State4. The MV 
Erika, which sank during heavy weather in the Gulf of Biscay in 1999 for example, 
was flying the flag of Malta, managed by an Italian company and chartered by a 
French one. The fact that the vessel was carrying the required certificates and had 
been inspected several times by Port States, Flag States and Classification Society 
(Özçayır, 2009) did not prevent the ship from slipping through the various safety 
nets and from spilling heavy fuel oil along the coast of France.  
Since the beginning of the nineties with the establishment of the Flag State 
Implementation Subcommittee5, the IMO acknowledged that two challenges facing 
the organisation was the development of new policies and regulations and the need 
to guarantee that the already existing ones were seriously taken into account and 
correctly implemented and enforced (Mansell, 2009b). These fundamental 
challenges remain today. The different levels of compliance with international 
standards are not a mystery; indeed, some of the differences became even more 
evident after the first round of the Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme 
                                                     
4 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Article 91, refers to the 
“genuine link” between owner and Flag States.  
5 As of July 2014, The FSI Subcommittee has been renamed the III (Implementation of IMO 
Instruments) Subcommittee.  
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(VIMSAS)6 and the White, Grey and Black list (European Commission, 2010) of 
the Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU.  
Measuring and benchmarking IMO Member States performance when it comes 
to implementation and enforcement of international standards has recently become 
mandatory under the III Code (IMO, 2013) which entered into force on 1 January 
2016. Through Part II (Flag State) paragraph 42 and 43, the Code point out that: 
A Flag State should, on a periodic basis, evaluate its performance with respect to the 
implementation of administrative processes, procedures and resources necessary to 
meet its obligations as required by the international instruments to which it is a party. 
Measures to evaluate the performance of flag States should include, inter alia, Port 
State Control detention rates, flag State inspection results, casualty statistics, 
communication and information processes, annual loss statistics (excluding 
constructive total losses (CTLs)) and other performance indicators as may be 
appropriate, in order to determine whether staffing, resources and administrative 
procedures are adequate to meet its Flag State obligations. 
Shipping professionals, involved in maritime operations for years, have already 
developed their own qualitative indicators on where Flag States stand with their 
performance (Corres & Pallis, 2008). The turning point was the development of 
quantitative indicators that would allow operators and administrators to have a clear 
picture of their performance. 
Currently, two main initiatives are broadly utilized to measure Flag State 
Performance: 
1. The International Chamber of Shipping Flag State Performance Table. 
2. The White, Grey and Black list, published by the Paris MoU and the 
Tokyo MoU. 
The former (Figure 1), is an attempt developed by the industry that represents a 
qualitative performance table which evaluates Flag State Performance in terms of 
Port State Control performance, ratification of international conventions, a fleet’s 
average age, the STCW White List7 and ILO reporting and attendance at IMO 
meetings (ICS, 2016). Beside the flawed assumption that ratification implies 
effective implementation and enforcement (Mansell, 2009b), the extent to which 
these categories exhaust all elements in effectively assessing Flag State 
Performance was questioned given that they do not cover the various characteristics 
of Flag State Performance (Corres & Pallis, 2008). In addition, the table gives only 
                                                     
6 Since 1 January 2016, the IMO Member State Audit Scheme has become mandatory with the entry 
into force of the III Code.  
7 The International Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) 
Convention.  
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a binary quantification of performance since each category can either be green (well 
performing) or red (bad performing).  
 
 
The latter, the White, Grey and Black list, represents policy-makers' attempt to 
measure Flag State Performance in the context of Port State Control. Each year ship 
registries are classified into three groups (black, grey and white) according to the 
numbers of detentions incurred (ParisMoU, 2015). In the past years, the formula 
utilized to determine the White, Grey and Black list has been severely criticized by 
the industry and by several academic publications (Degré, 2007, 2008; Perepelkin, 
Knapp, Perepelkin, & de Pooter, 2010; Özçayır, 2009) due to the following reasons: 
• It is unable to handle a small sample size. 
• It does not take into account other meaningful factors (e.g. number 
of deficiencies, severity of deficiencies). 
• It is susceptible to lack harmonisation criteria (deficiency 
assessment criteria, detention criteria, inspection procedures). 
In addition, two considerations need to be taken into account. Firstly, the initial 
purpose of the White, Grey and Black list was to determine weighting points for the 
Figure 1 –  
Extract from the Shipping Industry Flag State Performance Table 2015/2016 (www.ics-shipping.org) 
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selection criteria of vessels to be inspected by the interested port state authority. The 
wider use of the list to determine Flag State Performance, and even rank Flag States, 
does not fall into the initial scope of the list. Secondly, the overall determination of 
this concept is based on the ratio between detentions and inspection of a specific 
country. While this may be of great interest for a port state authority during the 
process of targeting vessels, it is the author’s contention that the concept is much 
broader and complex in scope.  
This dissertation has a threefold aim. In the first part of the study, an answer to 
the following research question is sought: What is and what constitutes the concept 
of Flag State Performance? This exploratory part of the study aims at developing a 
clear understanding of the features and components underpinning this concept. New 
qualitative indicators which comprise Flag State Performance are investigated. In 
other words, the author determines what to measure before attempting to measure 
it.  
Given the fact that Port State Control is the most widely used indicator to 
determine Flag State Performance, the second part of the study investigates both the 
adequacies as well as inadequacies of Port State Control. This phase aims at the 
following: (1) Determining the main inconsistencies, if any, of this regime in the 
EU region; (2) determining the causes for these inconsistencies; and (3) providing 
evidence of these inconsistencies. The third and last section summarizes and 
combines the results of the previous two parts and gives recommendations on how 
Port State Control results may affect Flag State Performance. 
To investigate the three factors identified above, four research questions were 
formulated: 
1. What is and what constitutes Flag State Performance? 
2. What are the contemporary issues of Port State Control in Europe? 
3. How do discrepancies in Port State Control affect the inspection 
output? 
4. To what extent is Port State Control a suitable instrument to 




Within this section, the author discusses the three main limitations of his research. 
Several have largely to do with the sharp focus of the topic addressed. The three 
main limitations are: 
• Time frame 
• Geographic area 
• Corruption 
In terms of the time frame, the inspection data to be analysed and collected were 
selected in the time frame 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015. This choice is 
justified by the entry into force of the European Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended, 
on Port State Control on the 1 January 2011. As part of the Third Maritime Safety 
Package, the Directive introduced the so-called New Inspection Regime across 
European coastal waters, as well as the above-mentioned formula to determine Flag 
State Performance. Since the New Inspection Regime introduced the new targeting 
criteria by classifying vessels as High, Standard and Low-risk vessels and as a new 
rationale for the Member States’ commitment8 to inspection, it was considered 
suitable to use information from inspections only from that date onwards. This 
strategy would allow comparison among findings, since all the inspection’s 
activities before the 1 January 2011 were performed under a different legal 
framework (e.g. different procedures, inspection quotas, a vessel’s priority, inter 
alia).  
The second main limitation to the study was identified by considering a restricted 
geographic area for the Port State Control inspection regime. Why is the Paris MoU 
unique? The fact that the Paris MoU regime is mandatory for EU Member States, 
which need to abide by the rules of Directive 2009/16/EC as amended, makes it the 
ideal candidate to be treated for critical case sampling. Critical cases are those that 
have particular relevance for the topic under analysis and where results can be easily 
generalised (Flyvbjerg, 2006). In other words, critical cases follow the philosophy 
“if it happens there, it will happen anywhere” or “if it doesn’t happen here, it won’t 
happen anywhere” (Patton, 2015, p.275).  
This methodology, successfully used by Goldthorpe et al. (1969) in a famous 
study on the sociology of different workers, has demonstrated its efficiency in cases 
where resource constraints (e.g. economics, time) (Patton, 2015, p.276) could affect 
the generalisation of results. The rationale behind this choice is to eventually 
produce logical deductions following the line of thought: if it does not work where 
a legal binding framework is present, it will probably not work where only a 
                                                     
8 This mechanism, namely “fair-share", was set up to determine each country quota to the overall 
inspection regime in a year (Lagoni et al., 2010, p.83). 
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gentlemen’s agreement is in place. A more extensive discussion on this approach 
will be given in the methodological section of this dissertation.  
The third main criticism made relates to the topic of corruption. Although many 
episodes of corruption have been reported within Port State Control in general, 
however, hitherto few charges of corruption have been levelled against the Paris 
MoU. In order to cover this aspect, specific questions pertaining to episodes of 
corruption within the EU were put to the participants of the interview study that was 
conducted with policy-makers, maritime industry officials and seafarers’ 
representatives. As a result of this inquiry, the author concluded that all data 
findings, which have been collected and discussed, do not reveal any episode of 
corruption in Europe. Thus, corruption does not seem to be an issue for the Paris 
MoU.  
1.4. Summary of the Papers 
Paper I focuses on findings and answers to the first research question and on 
determining the so-called Whats, Whys and How’s of Flag State Performance. In 
other words, the paper aims to explore the perceptual construction of this concept 
as articulated by EU policy-makers through two Focus Groups. The findings of two 
focus groups (n=13) involving officials of the European Maritime Safety Agency 
are presented. The general results of the study suggest that Flag State Performance 
appears to be multidimensional in nature and encompasses a wide range of elements 
pertaining to both vessel and administrative performance. While Port State Control 
still represents the only currently available and transparent indicator, which 
determines Flag State Performance, the White, Grey and Black list alone seems too 
narrow to determine the full spectrum of the concept under examination. Moreover, 
a need to address factors that led to uncertainty in respect of Port State Control 
results had arisen.  
Paper II seeks answers to the second research question and builds upon some of 
the results found in the first part of the study and on relevant literature. This paper 
examines the point of view of key maritime stakeholders with regard to the Port 
State Control regime in the European Union aiming at determining factors leading 
to the difference in treatment among EU Member States. Elite interviews (n=14) 
were conducted with subject-matter experts ranging from policy-makers, to industry 
and seafarers’ representatives. While the paper concludes that Port State Control in 
Europe seems to be the most efficient and reliable of the regional agreements on this 
regime, some discrepancies that were identified during the inspection process and 
the outcome can be highlighted as being due to differences at the inspector and 
Member State level. 
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Paper III focuses on the implementation and enforcement of Port State Control 
among EU Member States. This study collected and analysed 25 reports compiled 
by the European Maritime Safety Agency at the end of statutory visits to determine 
the level of implementation of Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended, in the various 
Member States. This paper summarizes the main shortcomings and observations, as 
identified in the inspection reports, and concludes that while the Directive has been 
properly implemented by the Member States, there are areas where harmonisation 
is yet to be achieved. Those include areas such as Inspection 
Commitment/Information, Quality of Inspections and Training of port state control 
officers.  
Paper IV focuses on the ramifications of an inspector’s number and background 
on the inspection outcomes. The study is based on a set of data set which covers all 
inspections carried out from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015 within the EU.  
Overall, the sample comprises 32,206 Port State Control of inspections. On the 
Member State level, the study identified that differences in detecting at least one 
deficiency and/or detaining a vessel are significant across countries. On the 
operational level, the results have shown that team composition and background 
have an influence on the inspection outcome. The former correlates to the number 
of deficiencies and detentions and the latter correlates to detecting a certain type of 
deficiencies according to the specific inspector’s backgrounds. However, the 





2. Literature Review 
This chapter introduces the literature pertaining to the framework of the topic under 
investigation. A definition of performance and Flag State Performance is given. 
Moreover, relevant literature pertaining to Port State Control, the concept of 
harmonisation and the highlighted discrepancies in the regime will be discussed.  
2.1. Flag State Performance 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has always 
placed the Flag State at the centre of the implementation and enforcement of the 
international maritime regulations and, by extension, as the core of the whole 
maritime industry. As the holder of rights and duties, the Flag State has to ensure 
the effective exercise of its jurisdiction and control over ships to which it has granted 
its flags. By registering the ship, the State grants to the ship a nationality, which is 
required before any maritime navigation takes place. In return, it must ensure its 
jurisdiction and control over those ships flying its flag. While the word “effectively” 
of Article 94 can be interpreted as a direct link to the concept of performance, Flag 
State performance is never visibly mentioned in the Law of the Sea 
There is no shortage of literature covering the topic of performance in the 
shipping industry. However, determining what performance for a Flag State 
comprises is a challenging task. That is mainly due to the complexity of the system 
under analysis. While common criteria to determine the efforts and performance of 
a Flag are scarce (Ji, Brinkhuis, & Knapp, 2015), criteria for port performance 
(Brooks & Pallis, 2008; Brooks & Schellinck, 2015; Da Cruz, Ferreira, & Azevedo, 
2013; De & Ghosh, 2003; Dragović, Park, & Radmilović, 2006; Lin & Tseng, 2007; 
Pantouvakis & Dimas, 2010; Schellinck & Brooks, 2014; Turner, 2000), and 
shipping companies performance (Chou & Liang, 2001; Giannakopoulou, 
Thalassinos, & Stamatopoulos, 2016; Jenssen & Randøy, 2006; Lagoudis, Lalwani, 
& Naim, 2006; Lirn, Lin, & Shang, 2014; Lun, Lai, Wong, & Cheng, 2014; 
Pantouvakis & Karakasnaki, 2016; Rialland, Nesheim, Norbeck, & Rødseth, 2014; 
Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2011; Triantafylli & Ballas, 2010; Valdez Banda, 
Hänninen, Lappalainen, Kujala, & Goerlandt, 2016; Yuen, Thai, & Wong, 2016), 
in terms of business, environmental, financial, operational, organizational, quality 
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and safety criteria, are abundant. A definition of performance, however, is still 
missing.  
According to the Oxford Dictionary, performance is associated with “the action 
or process of performing a task or function” or “a task or operation seen in terms of 
how successful it is performed”. Furthermore, according to the Oxford Advanced 
Learner’s Dictionary, it also means “how well or badly you do something; how well 
or badly something works”. Since a task can be defined as the activity or work that 
is deemed necessary to achieve a specific goal (Bye, Brendeford, Hollnagel, 
Hoffmann, & Mohn, 1998; Hollnagel, 2012a, 2012b; Stanton, 2006), one can infer 
that system performance depends on the goal the system wants to achieve. A similar 
conclusion can be reached through the literature on port and company performance. 
In general, the author has identified two main streams characterizing the concept 
of performance, which may be useful to determine what underpins the concept of 
Flag State Performance: efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency measures relate to 
the “physical quantities” of products or services (e.g. time, income, throughput, 
production, inter alia), while effectiveness measures relate to how well the system 
(whether a company, port, or state) uses its strategies and resources to meet its 
mission and goals and ultimately satisfy the end-user (Brooks & Pallis, 2008). 
If the Flag State is the system subject of our inquiry, the goal and/or objective 
will be defined in order to define the performance associated with it. The 
International Commission on Shipping of 2000, (Mansell, 2009b, p.3) refers to 
“demands for nations registering ships to be held more accountable in performance 
of their responsibilities” thereby indicating how performance is a concept 
underpinned by the responsibilities of a Flag State. For this purpose, the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 1982) helps us to 
delineate the main responsibilities of the Flag State. In general, Article 91 of 
UNCLOS defines a Flag State as “the state in whose territory a ship is registered”. 
Regardless of the concepts of nationality and sovereignty linked to the definition, 
the Convention requires Flag States to “effectively exercise jurisdiction and control 
in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying their flag” (United 
Nations 1982, Art.94). The word “effectively” in Article 94 can be interpreted as a 
direct link to the idea of Flag State Performance (Brooks & Pallis, 2008) if related 
to the goal of ensuring that water transport of goods and/or people does not pose 
any hazard to safety, environment and health by executing at its best the task of 
“control and jurisdiction”. Therefore, the following definition for Flag State 
Performance will be used throughout the dissertation: 
How effectively a Flag State uses its resources, whether human or financial, to ensure 
safety, environmental protection and proper labour conditions on board its vessels 
via the exercise of its obligations, as established by the international legal framework 
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2.2. Evaluating Flag State Performance 
As outlined above, the body of literature focusing on Member States is, to the best 
of the authors’ knowledge, limited, and the number of publications identifying 
possible indicators is equally scarce. Measuring and benchmarking IMO Member 
States performance when it comes to implementation and enforcement of 
international standards has recently become mandatory under the III Code (IMO, 
2013) which entered into force on 1 January 2016.  
In the academic domain, several attempts to determine Flag State performance 
have been made. Takei (2013) and Mansell (2009b) suggested that the concept of 
performance should be grounded in the legal responsibilities of Flag States. These 
encompass exercising jurisdiction and control over administrative, technical and 
social matters; fisheries; security; and underwater cultural heritage. However, many 
of these obligations do not require the Flag State to achieve a prescribed goal, rather 
to exercise its best possible effort (Takei, 2013). Thus, quantification might be 
difficult.   
An initial attempt to determine Flag States’ capacity to effectively implement and 
enforce relevant maritime legislation was performed by Alderton & Winchester 
(2002) which created an index (FLASCI) based on the weighting of several factors, 
grouped into seven categories: 
1. The fleet  
2. Administrative capacity 
3. Maritime law 
4. Seafarers’ safety and welfare 
5. Trade union law 
6. Corruption 
7. Company and corporate practice 
 
In parallel, the industry developed its own qualitative performance table by 
evaluating Flag State Performance in terms of Port State Control performance, the 
ratification of international conventions, fleet average age, the International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers 
and International Labour Organization reporting and attendance of International 
Maritime Organization meetings (ICS, 2016). Beside the flawed assumption that 
ratification implies effective implementation and enforcement (Mansell, 2009b), the 
extent to which these categories exhaust all elements needed to properly assess Flag 
State Performance was examined by Corres & Pallis (2008) who added subjective 
weighting factors to quantitatively rank countries.  
From an EU perspective, the measurement of this concept was first adopted in 
the context of Port State Control. Each year ship registries are classified into three 
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groups (black, grey and white) - according to the numbers of detentions incurred – 
in the so called White, Grey and Black list (ParisMoU, 2015). Inspired by the White, 
Grey and Black list, Perepelkin et al. (2010) proposed a new methodology, which 
incorporates new factors other than detentions, such as deficiencies and casualties, 
in order to overcome the shortcomings of the list. A similar approach was also 
followed by Ji et al. (2015). 
Using a different methodology than that suggested by Alderton & Winchester 
(2002), Corres & Pallis (2008) and Takei (2013) with regard to the White, Grey and 
Black list, Perepelkin et al. (2010) merge the concept of Flag State Performance 
with that of vessel performance, discarding the characteristics of maritime 
administrations. While one could argue that the quality of the fleet is the output of 
the quality of its maritime administration, the reader should be aware that the ship-
owner is responsible for the application of international law.  
It is true that shipping professionals, who have been involved in maritime 
operations for years, have already developed their own qualitative indicators on 
where Flag States stand with their performance. The turning point was the 
development of quantitative indicators, which would allow operators and 
administrators to have a clear picture of their performance. The Baltic and 
International Maritime Council Shipping key performance indicator, for example, 
was developed to propose a global shipping industry standard for defining, 
measuring and monitoring information on ships operational performance by 
operators. 
Currently, two main initiatives are broadly utilized to measure Flag State 
Performance: 
• The Ship Industry Flag Performance Table, published by the 
International Chamber of Shipping. 
• The White, Grey and Black list, published by the Paris MoU and 
the Tokyo MoU. 
The former, is an industry attempt that shows a qualitative performance table used 
to evaluate Flag State Performance in terms of the following criteria (ICS, 2016): 
Port State Control 
• Paris MoU White List 
• Not on Paris MoU Black List 
• Tokyo MoU White List 
• Not on Tokyo MoU Black List 
• United States Coast Guard quality shipping for the 21st century 
(USCG QUALSHIP 21) 
• Not on USCG Target List (Safety) 
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Ratification of Conventions 
• 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS 74) (and 88 Protocol) 
• International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL) Including Annexes I-II 
• MARPOL Including Annexes III-VI 
• International Convention on Load Lines 66 (and 88 Protocol) 
• The International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers (STCW) 78 
• ILO Maritime Labour Convention (2006) 
• 1992 Fund Convention and Supplementary Fund Protocol 
A 739 
• Recognized Organizations 
Age 
• Age of the Fleet 
Reports 
• STCW 95 White List 
• Completed ILO Reports 
IMO 
• IMO Meetings Attendance 
The table is an initial attempt to attribute six different areas to the concept of Flag 
State Performance. The International Chamber of Shipping links this concept to 
fleet performance under the Port State Control regime in the Tokyo and Paris MoUs 
and the United States Coast Guard. In the area of Ratification of Conventions, the 
table reports whether the Flag State has ratified the main relevant international 
conventions. Under A 739 the table refers to IMO Resolution A.739 (18) (IMO, 
1993), amended by IMO Resolution MSC.208 (81) (IMO, 2006), which requires 
Flag States to establish control over EU Recognized Organizations.  
Since the Paris and Tokyo MoUs submit a report entitled “Performance of Flag 
Administrations and Recognized Organizations” annually, the table positively list 
those Flag States which do not appear on the list and have submitted the EU 
Recognized Organizatioin data to the Global Integrated Shipping Information 
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System. Under Age, the International Chamber of Shipping positively indicates “the 
90 per cent of flags whose ships have the lowest average age, among those listed, in 
terms of ship numbers’ (ICS, 2016). With Reports the table indicates those Flag 
States which comply with ILO reporting obligations and those Flag States included 
in the STCW “White List”. Lastly, under IMO, the table positively indicates those 
Flag States which generally attend the main IMO meetings, such as the Maritime 
Safety Committee, the Marine Environment Protection Committee and the Legal 
Committee. 
As mentioned in the problem statement, various academic publications (Degré, 
2007, 2008; Perepelkin et al., 2010; Özçayır, 2009) and industry operators have 
criticized the formula. Beside the technical issues affecting the formula (points 1 
and 2 highlighted in the introduction), this research study focuses on issues in 
harmonisation, that is, point 3 highlighted in the introduction). If issues in 
harmonisation exist, then there is uncertainty on the inspection outcomes 
(detentions) which are the building blocks for the White, Grey and Black list. This 
means that the formula may not give the same measurement on the same situation 
when it uses data collected by different inspectors in different countries. If the list 
of requirements for measurement instruments in science is recalled, as developed 
by Hale (2009), then the WBG list formula has issues of reliability. According to 
the author, a performance indicator is reliable if it answers the following question 
in the affirmative: 
Does it give the same measurement when used by different people on the same 
situation, or on different occasions by one person on that same situation? (Hale, 2009) 
While there is no discussion as to whether Port State Control helps to spot 
substandard shipping, the question remains if this current system is effective and 
reliable in portraying Flag State Performance through the White, Grey and Black 
list. However, before detailing the Port State Control regime and the issues in 
harmonisation found in the literature, a definition of “harmonisation” in EU law is 




The concept of harmonisation is widely used in the context of the EU, and especially 
when drafting EU Community Law. In general terms, harmonisation can be defined 
as a: 
… process in which diverse elements are combined or adapted to each other so as to 
form a coherent whole while retaining their individuality. In its relative sense, 
harmonisation is the creation of a relationship between diverse things. Its absolute 
and most common meaning, however, implies the creation of a relationship of accord 
or consonance (Boodman, 1991).  
When discussing European Community law, the meaning of harmonisation is rather 
imprecise and, in some measure, undefined, which leaves a fluid and complex 
notion (Lohse, 2011). In the legal text of the European Union, “approximation”, 
“coordination” and “harmonisation” are used synonymously and generally to 
determine the process of developing rules and standards for the internal market 
(Kurcz, 2001; Lohse, 2011). This approach generates more confusion when trying 
to develop a uniform definition. A thorough review on the current available 
literature shows that harmonisation is referred to by several aspects of European 
Community law, such as taxation (Trandafir, 2013), food (Terlicka & Jukes, 2014), 
copyright (Hugenholtz, 2012); immigration (Givens & Luedtke, 2004); internal 
market (Dougan, 2000; Dzabirova, 2009); customs (Dmitriy, 2013); among others. 
However, while a definition suitable for this research work will be elaborated in the 
following section, the different forms of harmonisations, such as minimum, total, 
partial, optional, horizontal, soft, hard or mutual, will not be investigated.  
Due to the complexity, heterogeneity and enlargement of the EU as an 
aggregation of States, the approach of recent policies has involved a flexible 
development and application of Community law which would ensure “community” 
and “autonomy” (Scharpf, 1994 as cited by Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp, & Leiber, 
2005) or, paraphrasing Kurcz (2001), “integration” measures. Given that we are 
pursuing a definition suitable to the research project, one should keep in mind that 
harmonisation was considered a prime goal for the achievement of a common 
market whereas “differences in the legal orders are seen as obstacles to the free 
movement of product factors” (Lohse, 2011). When unveiling the functioning of the 
common market, Kurcz (2001) assigns to harmonisation a double objective: To 
eliminate any eventual differences among Member States in order to promote the 
common market and free movement and to avoid distortion of competition. These 
two points will be further discussed when debating the need for a harmonized Port 
State Control regime across Europe.  
Briefly, harmonisation can be considered as an “act” of EU legislation which aims 
to set a common European standard, also known as “Euro-Standard”, and modify or 
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replace domestic law accordingly. Furthermore, this standard-setting process is not 
carried out only at the European level since it demands a direct involvement of 
Member States which have to implement and enforce those standards (Lohse, 2011). 
It is a multistage process which involves decision-making, implementation 
(transposition and enforcement), application and monitoring (Falkner et al., 2005, 
p.32). 
In simple terms, harmonisation is a process expected to set a “common floor of 
standards” (Falkner et al., 2005, p.2) and is a path towards integration. It is a task 
usually achieved through the adoption of Directives (Twigg-Flesner, 2011). 
By means of Directives, EU Community law takes the form of a binding legal 
instrument which lays out certain results (stage one) to be achieved by Member 
States that are free to choose how to pursue implementation (stage two). This 
twofold approach represents an advantage for some authors (Kurcz, 2001), while 
being a disadvantage for others (Twigg-Flesner, 2011). In this sense, on the one 
hand the use of Directives gives flexibility to Member States as to the forms and 
methods through which they intend to achieve the prescribed results. On the other, 
it gives them considerable freedom in the process of transposing EU community law 
into national law which could lead to different implementation and enforcement 
patterns among Member States. This is an issue that was emphasized in recent years 
by the European Court of Justice in several of its rulings (Lohse, 2011). 
In this sense, a more homogeneous implementation could be solved by means of 
Regulations, since they bring the “advantages of clarity, predictability and 
effectiveness” (Monti, 2010). This is a strategy which is slowly being used when 
legal acts entail the single market. Furthermore, another effective strategy pertains 
to the adoption of Directives containing “detailed and sometimes quite technical 
rules” (Twigg-Flesner, 2011) which makes it difficult for individual Member States 
to modify the text during the transposition phase (Lohse, 2011). 
In conclusion, harmonisation may represent both a soft approach to ensure a 
common set of criteria among fragmented approaches and the path to creating a 
single unique, sometimes rigid, standard. According to Terpan (2015), transport, 
together with the internal market, trade, agriculture, fisheries, inter alia, belongs to 
the class of policies where hard law applies. In this sense, the author adopts the latter 
of the two-abovementioned perspective and will try to isolate harmonisation within 
the Port State Control Directive context. 
2.4. Port State Control 
The body of literature covering Port State Control is quite broad and encompasses 
various elements from law, effectiveness, international policy, implementation, 
discrepancies in implementation, jurisdiction, among others. In order to use a 
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consistent meaning throughout the text, the definition given by Özçayır (2009) 
defines Port State Control as “the control of foreign flagged ships in national ports 
by Port State Control Officers” will be used. Port State Control contributes to 
ensuring compliance with international regulatory efforts (Ademuni-Odeke, 1997; 
Bell, 1993; McDorman, 2000; Molenaar, 2007; Payoyo, 1994); to increase safety 
standards (Li & Zheng, 2008; van Leeuwen, 2015); and to prevent pollution (Bang, 
2008; Cuttler, 1995).  
 
Figure 2  
Author’s own graphical visualization of Port State Control 
The inspection of foreign flagged vessels in national ports is not a novel exercise. 
Provisions for the inspection or control of foreign vessels by port states have been 
a feature of enforcement since the 1929 International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS)  (Article 54); the 1930 International Load Line Convention 
(Article 16); the 1960 International Load Line Convention (Article 21); the 1975 
IMO Resolution A.321(IX) “Procedures for the Control of Ships”; and the Protocol 
of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL 1978 Protocol) which included control provisions in Annex 
I, Annex II, Annex III, Annex IV and Annex V.  
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Moreover, provisions of control were also included in UNCLOS under Article 
218 “Enforcement by Port States” (United Nations, 1982). The difference between 
Port State Jurisdiction and Port State Control is that Port State Jurisdiction entails 
the prosecution of the vessels in case of alleged breach of international applicable 
legislation, while Port State Control is limited to the administrative measure of 
control until various corrective measures have been taken before allowing the ship 
to sail again (Bang, 2008, 2009, 2013; Bang & Jang, 2012). However, it is not until 
the emergence of a regional agreement on Port State Control that such an exercise 
became a common practice in the maritime domain. As mentioned by Özçayır 
(2004, p.1): “the powers used by port state control officers are not new; it is the 
willingness to use the power which is new”. 
The range of action of Port State Control was largely enhanced in the aftermath 
of the serious ship accidents9 that occurred in the last decades as they caused a strong 
political and public outcry for more stringent regulations regarding the safety of 
ships, protection of the maritime environment and living and working conditions 
(Özçayır, 2004, 2009). According to many authors, these accidents showed the 
inability of some Flag States in discharging their obligations on vessels flying their 
flag which left an enforcement vacuum (Ademuni-Odeke, 1997; David Anderson, 
1998; Bell, 1993; Bloor, Datta, Gilinskiy, & Horlick-Jones, 2006; Molenaar, 2007; 
van Leeuwen, 2015; Özçayır, 2009).  
In response to the appeal from the civil society and given the diverse (and often 
unsatisfactory) degree of enforcement of certain maritime administrations (Bell, 
1993), eight North European states signed the Hague Memorandum of 
Understanding in 1978. The main aim of the MoU was to ensure proper 
implementation of the ILO 147, SOLAS 66 & 74 and Load Line 66 through regional 
organisations and harmonisation. On a formal level, an MoU is not a treaty (Bang 
& Jang, 2012; Vorbach, 2001) but an administrative agreement (Bang & Jang, 2012; 
Özçayır, 2009). In this way, States Parties of the MoU establish a regional regime 
for information-sharing on vessels without the delays and implementation 
difficulties that would characterize a formal treaty negotiation (Vorbach, 2001).  
Only two weeks after the Hague Memorandum, the Amoco Cadiz ran aground off 
the coast of France spilling more than 200,000 tons of oil making it clear that the 
shipping industry had failed in dealing with new challenges, and, more importantly, 
in self-controlling its vessels (David Anderson, 1998; Bell, 1993; Mansell, 2009a; 
Mansell, 2009b; Vorbach, 2001; Özçayır, 2004). It was at the Ministerial 
Conference held in Paris in 1982 that 14 European states conceived of the first 
regional coordinated system of ship inspections by signing the Paris Memorandum 
of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU, 2017b) in the attempt to stem 
the proliferation of substandard shipping.  
                                                     
9  The Amoco Cadiz (1978), Aegean Sea (1992), Braer (1993), Estonia (1994), Erika (1999) and 
Prestige (2002), among others. 
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However, it was not until 1995 that Port State Control was integrated within the 
European Union framework with the implementation of Directive 1995/21/EC 
(Council of the European Union, 1995) on Port State Control which made the Paris 
MoU system mandatory for EU Member States. The development of this Directive 
directly followed the adoption in 1993 of the European Union’s A Common Policy 
on Safe Seas which included a “coherent action programme on priority measures to 
be taken by the Community and its Member States to enhance maritime safety and 
pollution prevention” (Council of the European Communities, 1993b). With this 
policy, the European Commission decided to approve a series of legislation aimed 
at improving the safety level of ships sailing across European waters and calling at 
European ports. One of the key pieces of legislation was Directive 95/21/EC 
(Council of the European Union, 1995) that established a common set of criteria for 
the control of ships calling in EU ports and harmonized procedures for their 
inspection and detention, Directive95/21/EC has been recast several times, the latest 
version being Directive 2009/16/EC (European Parliament and the Council, 
2009a)10, in force since 1 January 2011 and a key element of this dissertation. 
At the global level, the introduction of the Paris MoU received tepid support by 
the international community with some international actors even considering the 
Paris MoU as “discriminatory enforcement” of the IMO Convention (Blanco-
Bazán, 2004). However, in the early nineties the IMO recognised the success of 
such a regional approach and adopted Resolution A.682 (17) on Regional Co-
Operation in the Control of Ships and Discharges.  
Firstly, the resolution invited governments to conclude regional agreements on 
the application of Port State Control measures, and recognised the contribution of 
the Paris MoU to maritime safety and pollution prevention (Molenaar & Pons, 1996; 
Vorbach, 2001). Secondly, in 1993 the IMO set up the Flag State Implementation 
Subcommittee, dealing with common criteria and inspection standards, among other 
tasks (Bell, 1993). Henceforth, nine regional agreements on PSC have been signed: 
Europe and the North Atlantic (Paris MoU); Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MoU); 
Latin America (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar); Caribbean (Caribbean MoU); West and 
Central Africa (Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region (Black Sea MoU); the 
Mediterranean (Mediterranean MoU); the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU); and 
the Riyadh MoU. 
The main aim of the Memorandums of Understanding on Port State Control is the 
elimination of substandard ships, which may represent a threat to safety, security 
and the environment, by using harmonised procedures for targeting and detection 
(European Parliament and the Council, 2009a). Two of the main reasons to develop 
regional cooperation for PSC were undoubtedly the need for sharing information 
between states about the safety records of vessels and to avoid the inspection of a 
                                                     
10 The Directive was amended by Directive 2013/38/EU to accommodate the Maritime Labour 
Convention provisions for Port State Control.  
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vessel at every port within a same region (Hare, 1997). This was underpinned by 
providing harmonised rules and standards for targeting and inspection procedures.  
PSC is transparent through the name and shame policy and system of peer-review 
(Bloor et al., 2006; Sampson & Bloor, 2007). This makes non-compliance with 
international legislation by shipowners not as economically advantageous as before 
since deficiencies and detentions are publicly available (Özçayır, 2009). 
2.5. Harmonisation and Port State Control in the 
European Union 
When it comes to Port State Control, the Directive 2009/16/EC on Port State 
Control, as amended by Directive 2013/38/EU, uses the term “harmonised” seven 
times in the overall text.  
Harmonisation is used specifically when pertaining to the “training and 
assessment of competences of Port State Control inspectors” in title 10, 25 and 
Article 22.7 suggesting that Member States, the European Maritime Safety Agency 
and the EU Commission, shall work together to promote and develop a “harmonised 
Community scheme” for training.  Article 18(a).7 and 23.5, however, introduced 
with the amendment of 2013, touches upon conferring implementing powers to the 
European Commission to set up “harmonised procedures for … follow-up actions 
taken by Member States.” The articles are strictly related to the correct 
implementation of the rate provision under the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006.  
In a different approach, Recital (7), awaits that “a harmonised approach to the 
effective enforcement of (these) international standards by Member States in respect 
of ships sailing in the waters under their jurisdiction and using their ports should 
avoid distortion of competition” and, continuing, Recital (16) states further that “the 
rules and procedures for Port State Control inspections, including criteria for 
detention of ships, should be harmonised to ensure consistent effectiveness in all 
ports (…).” Lastly, in article 1 (b), it is clearly stated that one the three key objectives 
of the Directive is “establishing common criteria for control of ships and 
harmonising procedures on inspections and detention, ….”  
To conclude, harmonisation in Port State Control can be characterised by a three-
dimensional concept (Figure 4) delimited by: training, inspections and detention. 
Moreover, the operationalization of the concept should take into account that the 
purpose is as follows:  studying and analysing the level of harmonisation as to how 
the procedures on training, inspection and detention of vessels are followed among 
the actors asked to interpret the standards set by the Directive above (Member States 
and port state control officers). The purpose of such operationalization just referred 
to was not intended as the harmonisation of law as a high-level objective of the 
European Union, as explained in paragraph 2.5). Although PSC has been introduced 
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for several years as a second line of defence against substandard vessels, though 
some even argue that it is the fourth line of defence (Mejia Jr., 2005), the 
harmonisation of such activities is still paramount. In fact, policy-makers strive to 
achieve harmonisation due to the different degree of application of procedures and 
activities across the various regimes (Özçayır, 2009). Despite the introduction of 
single international (or regional) standards for inspections, the variety of countries 
belonging to a single MoU may lead to different interpretations of such standards 
(Özçayır, 2009) which results in lack of harmonisation and effectiveness when it 
comes to identifying substandard vessels.  
 
Figure 3  
Graphic Representation of Harmonisation in Port State Control as Reported in the Text of Directive 2009/16/EC as 
Amended 
2.6. Discrepancies in Harmonisation 
In the years following the emergence of the Paris MoU, several scholars investigated 
the effectiveness of Port State Control (Darryl Anderson, 2002; Bang, 2008; Bell, 
1993; Bijwaard & Knapp, 2009; Bloor et al., 2006; Cariou, Mejia, & Wolff, 2007, 
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2008; Cariou & Wolff, 2011; Cuttler, 1995; Heij, Bijwaard, & Knapp, 2011; Knapp 
& Franses, 2007c, 2008; Mansell, 2009a; Payoyo, 1994; Plaza, 1994; Özçayır, 
2009) and its legal foundation (Bang, 2008, 2009, 2013; Churchill, 2016; Keselj, 
1999; McDorman, 1997; Molenaar, 2007; Ryngaert & Ringbom, 2016). While 
criticisms in this sphere still appear, it is “conventional wisdom” (Bang, 2008) that 
Port State Control plays a critical role in ensuring safety, pollution prevention and 
labour conditions on board a vessel. 
Despite the positive reputation of Port State Control gained over the years and its 
positive effects, which have been highlighted above by many authors, issues in 
harmonisation have been observed since the early stages of the various MoUs. 
According to the literature, there are inconsistencies between regions (Bloor et al., 
2006; Cariou, Mejia, & Wolff, 2009; Keselj, 1999; Knapp & Franses, 2007b; Knapp 
& van de Velden, 2009; Knudsen & Hassler, 2011; Mansell, 2009a; Sampson & 
Bloor, 2007) and sometimes even within the same MoU (Özçayır, 2009). 
Given the main objective of guaranteeing harmonized rules and a level playing 
field in the region, discrepancies in the inspection practices and outcomes can have 
a profound impact on the credibility of the regional MoUs on Port State Control. By 
setting a common standard, an MoU’s goal is to avoid unilateral and arbitrary action 
by Port States which could have a negative impact on the neighbourhood ports 
within the same region, reducing their commercial attractiveness (McDorman, 
2000; Molenaar, 2007) and distorting the market (Knapp & Franses, 2007c). An 
outcome of such behaviour is the so-called “port-shopping”, a strategic practice by 
some operators who choose certain ports and/or regions (Bang & Jang, 2012; 
Knudsen & Hassler, 2011; McDorman, 2000) over others because of their less 
stringent safety enforcement standards.  
The reason for differences in Port State Control enforcement practices may be 
endemic to a region, a country or be of a more operational nature. For example, 
some studies recognize cross-regional differences. Knapp & Franses (2007a) and 
Knapp & van de Velden (2009) investigated differences across the Paris MoU, 
Tokyo MoU, Caribbean MoU, the Viña del Mar Agreement, Australian Maritime 
Safety Agency and the United States Coast Guard.  
Other authors dedicated their studies to cross-national rather than cross-regional 
discrepancies. This is the case of Mansell (2009b) who highlighted issues and 
challenges within the Tokyo MoU. Bloor et al. (2006) and Sampson & Bloor (2007) 
instead identified differences between India, Russia and the United Kingdom, while 
Cariou et al. (2009) focused on differences across Australia, India, South Africa and 
Russia.  
As far as the underlying conditions of why discrepancies may appear, Darryl 
Anderson (2002) suggests that at the regional level some MoUs face several 
challenges in terms of lack of resources, which many countries encounter, and in 
ensuring the equal and active participation of all members within the same region. 
This suggests that “substandard vessels trading in the poor regions of the world have 
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a significantly lower chance of being detained by Port State Control” (Darryl 
Anderson, 2002). The scarcity of resources (whether financial or human), as a 
contributory factor, is also reinforced by Özçayır (2009) and Knudsen & Hassler 
(2011). For Bang & Jang (2012), the issue is more multifaceted given that some 
regions lack the infrastructure, technology, financial capacity and action plans or 
policies necessary for the effective operation of regional MoUs.  
On a more operational level, Mansell (2009b) found that some countries in the 
Tokyo MoU, for example, refused to accept inspections carried out by other states 
“due to known widely varying standards of Port State Control inspections among 
members,” while others refrained from conducting follow-up inspections to close 
out issued deficiencies by other countries. Similarly, Knapp & Franses (2007b) 
found that certain deficiencies weigh more in the detention process in some regimes 
compared to others. This was explained either by a different country philosophy 
(Knapp & Franses, 2007b), or differing priorities (Bloor et al., 2006) in enforcing 
certain regulations rather than others. In that way, only certain deficiencies were 
recorded.  
As far as inspection practices are concerned, Bloor et al. (2006) found the root of 
all evil in the subjectivity of the Port State Control regime itself, which is regarded 
as a discretionary system, given its reliance on the “professional judgment” of the 
port state control officer (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a; Paris MoU, 
2017a). The definition suggested by Coles (2002) states that professional judgment 
is exercised when a practitioner, in this case the port state control officer, makes 
judgment calls in an uncertain situation. Discretion, subjectivity, individuality, 
professional judgment and other equivalent concepts have broadly been interpreted 
as one of the circumstances leading to differences in treatment across countries and 
ports (Bloor et al., 2006; Sampson & Bloor, 2007; Özçayır, 2009): 
While the flexibility of discretion can be valuable in individualizing the application 
of the law, its subjectivism can also be the cause of inconsistency in decision 
outcomes: apparently similar cases may not be treated in the same way by decision-
makers . . . An obvious corollary . . . is that discretion can impose similar outcomes 
on apparently different cases (Keith Hawkins, 1992, pp. 15-16, as cited by Bloor et 
al., 2006) 
Although procedures on detention and inspection practices are clearly defined in the 
international legal framework (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a; IMO, 
2011; Paris MoU, 2017a), making the harmonisation exercise dependent upon the 
professional judgment of port state control officers may lead to discrepancies due to 
subjective factors. Among these, their background (Knapp & Franses, 2007a; Ravira 
& Piniella, 2016), their number on board (Ravira & Piniella, 2016) and the quality 






The following chapter explains the research strategy adopted to seek answers to the 
four research questions. One must keep in mind that “the thesis is problem driven 
and not methodologically driven in the way that it uses the methods that will provide 
the best help to answer the research question” (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
1. What is and what constitutes Flag State Performance? 
2. What are the contemporary issues of Port State Control in Europe? 
3. How do discrepancies in the Port State Control regime affect the 
inspection output? 
4. To what extent is Port State Control a suitable instrument to measure 
Flag State Performance? 
3.1. Philosophical bent 
The researcher holds the assumption that to explore and solve a contemporary and 
practical issue, the emphasis should be put on the research problem and the available 
data collection techniques rather than focus only on method (J.W. Creswell, 2014, 
p.9). In the same vein the author has no intention of engaging in the controversial 
debate on the effectiveness of one data collection technique over another. On 
another level, the researcher strongly believes that the integration of qualitative and 
quantitative methods in a single study reflects the need to construct knowledge and 
enhance the research results (Rossman & Wilson, 1985). Lund (2012) characterises 
mixed methods as a practical/pragmatic attitude through which the “research 
questions in empirical studies are given high priority, not the philosophy of science, 
and in that quest qualitative and quantitative methods are used in combination with 
answering such questions”. In other words, following the definition given by 
Creswell, Clark, Gutmann and Hanson (2003, as cited by Lund, 2012, p.212): 
A mixed method study involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a single study, in which the data are collected concurrently or 
sequentially. They, are given priority, and involve the integration of the data at one 
or more stages in the process of research. 
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Since the author strives for an integration of both research strategies, neither of 
the two opposite or traditional paradigms could be embraced as absolute 
worldviews.  Furthermore, it is the author’s personal belief that even if an objective 
reality was attainable, personal views, experiences and background can shape 
knowledge and views in a constellation of truths that is worth investigating. The 
practical nature of the research questions and its day-to-day implications, coupled 
with the desire to portray the objective of this research from multiple angles, 
strongly influenced the philosophical bent and the methodology adopted.  
(…), Pragmatism, is typically associated with mixed methods research. The focus is 
on the consequences of research, on the primary importance of the question asked 
rather than methods, and on the use of multiple methods of data collection to inform 
the problems under study. Thus, it is pluralistic and oriented towards ‘what works’ 
and practice. (John W. Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p.46) 
One of the philosophical perspectives underpinning the use of a mixed method is 
called pragmatism. It was adopted to support the current research design given the 
striving towards real-world practice. 
3.2. The European Union scenario, a lesson for a critical 
case study?  
The reason for the focus of this dissertation on the European Union lies in the 
idiosyncratic nature of the region which makes it arguably a “critical case” scenario 
(Goldthorpe, 1968). On their study on whether empirical evidence would support 
the emergence of the notion of embourgeoisement, the authors designed the most 
favourable setting. They argued that should embourgeoisement not to be found in 
the most favourable setting, it would be safe to say that it would be unlikely to occur 
in less favourable settings. In other words, “if it happens here, it will happen 
anywhere” or “if it doesn’t happen here, it won’t happen anywhere” (Patton, 2015; 
p.275).  
Similarly, the nature of the Paris MoU itself suggests that the regime constitutes 
a critical case study for four main reasons: 
1. Since the Paris MoU is the first regional agreement on Port State 
Control, signed in 1982, the level of experience and maturity is more 
extensive than in other more recently signed MoUs. 
2. While MoUs are, ipso facto, gentlemen’s agreements, the Paris MoU is 
supported by the EU Directive 2009/16/EC as amended, which is legally 
binding for all the EU Member States.  
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3. Lastly, the Paris MoU benefits from a set of tools, such as a targeting 
database system (THETIS), an online distance-learning programme, an 
inspection support software (RuleCheck) and others, which have only 
recently been adopted by some other MoUs.  
4. All other MoUs have observer status in the Paris MoU meetings and 
trainings, and routinely receive information on all instructions, 
guidelines and other information. Although these arrangements are 
reciprocal, they are highly conducive to the dissemination of the Paris 
MoU way of working. 
Recalling the discrepancies in inspection practices highlighted by Plaza (1994), 
when discussing the European Union region, the author mentioned that: 
Indeed, the establishment of the various regional Port State Control regimes above, 
essential as it is, is only the beginning. Problems already identified within the 
European MOU, which after all is composed of quite homogeneous maritime 
administrations, will be accentuated in other regions where European conformity and 
affinity does not exist. (Plaza, 1994) 
For the four main reasons highlighted above, one can assume that if discrepancies 
can be found in the EU region, they are more likely to be found in more recent MoUs 
with less homogeneous political settings. 
3.3. Research Approach 
As shown in the introduction, the study was divided into four main research 
questions. For every question, a three-tier approach was followed (Kumar, 2011, 
p.39): 
1. Deciding – “What do I want to find?”; 
2. Planning – “How do I find information?” 
3. Undertaking – “Collecting needed information” 
However, the study was divided in a first exploratory phase (first research question), 
which then led to the emergence of the following research questions and to 
embracing a mixed method approach duly honed to provide answers to the inquiry. 
On a more practical level, when the researcher selects a mixed method design, some 
key factors need to be taken into account: weighting/priority, timing and approach 
to mixing the two strands (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p.80; Creswell, 2009, p. 
206).  
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When considering the weighting, in other words which method to prioritize, the 
researcher should always bear in mind the worldview, the resources available and 
the audience for the research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p.82). In this research, 
neither the qualitative nor quantitative strands prevailed over the other. In other 
words, the two strands were equally important in seeking an answer to the research 
questions. In terms of timing, the research adopted a sequential course of actions 
towards data collection and analysis. Lastly, among the three main strategies11 used 
to mix the two data types, the author has chosen to merge the data set during the 
interpretation phase rather than during the data analysis phase.  
To conclude, this research adopted a design which John W. Creswell & Plano 
Clark (2011, p.71) term an Exploratory Sequential Design, one which first 
prioritises qualitative data and then builds from the exploratory results of the initial 
phase through a second quantitative phase to generalize and confirm the initial 
results. In fact, in the first two questions, the author is mainly interested in beliefs, 
understandings, perceptions and meaning pertaining to two very broad topics (Flag 
State Performance and Port State Control) which are collected through inductive 
reasoning (Trochim and Donnelly, 2008, p.17). Subsequently, the results of the 
initial phase are confirmed through quantitative data. An overall overview of the 
research methodology can be found in Figure 4. 
While the overall research project involves both the use of quantitative and 
qualitative data, the four different research questions do not always use a mixed 
method of inquiry. In brief, questions 1 and 2 utilize exclusively qualitative data, 
questions 3 and 4 quantitative data. More details can be found below.  
3.3.1. Focus Groups 
Question one, for example, has the primary aim of identifying the main definition 
of Flag State Performance, a topic with a dearth of literature; determining the most 
optimum indicators; and how to improve the existing ones. This question is 
exploratory in nature (since little is known of this particular subject), but it is also 
akin to a descriptive study, since the Flag State Performance’s state of the art will 
also be investigated together with available data.  
A focus group can be defined as a moderated group interview, which generally 
involves a small group of individuals with similar backgrounds and experiences 
focusing on a specific topic (Lavrakas, 2008, p.643; Patton, 2015, p.284). The main 
motivation for using focus groups to define Flag State Performance is to explore the 
perceptions, understandings and experiences of a specific group of people. Focus 
groups are extensively used to create a broad framework for additional discussion 
                                                     
11 1. Merging a data set; 2. Embedding data at the design level; and 3. Connecting from data 
analysis to data collection. 
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and they represent the baseline for this research study. By gathering first-hand 
information on the topic of Flag State Performance, the researcher aims to introduce 




The participants of the two groups were chosen by taking into account their 
respective memberships to a specifically selected sector of the Agency dealing 
mainly with Flag States responsibilities. Although focus groups can be difficult to 
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steer, they provide several insights on the attitudes, thoughts, perceptions, ideas and 
feelings of the participants on a specific topic (Krueger & Casey, 2009, p.20). 
3.3.2. Elite Interviews 
Question two aims to systematically determine the contemporary issues of Port State 
Control, an approach that could be easily related to explanatory studies (e.g. using 
literature), but also to exploratory studies (e.g. interviews). Interviews were chosen 
to conduct in-depth inquiries on the topic and to more closely examine this complex 
issue (Kumar, 2011; Patton, 2015; Trochim & Donnelly, 2006). Due to the 
explanatory nature of the research question, an interview study was considered more 
suitable as its starting point.  
More specifically, the researcher used elite interviews, a type of interview mainly 
used in political science to understand hidden elements of policies and/or legislation 
by interviewing high-officials or people holding a prestigious role in society (for 
example, politicians, civil servants, legislators) (Boucher, Maboob, & Dutcher, 
2013 citing Dexter 1970; Richards, 1996). For this reason, “elite interview samples 
tend to be a lot smaller” (Richards, 1996) than other types of interviews. Therefore, 
a purposive sampling was deemed appropriate for this study due to the narrow 
research focus and the specific and unique context/case (Miles, Huberman, & 
Saldaña, 2013). 
3.3.3. Analysis of Reports and frequencies of the findings 
The documents examined in this research project consist of 25 reports from visits 
and inspections conducted by the European Maritime Safety Agency in EU Member 
States. These visits are conducted under the framework of Article 3.1 of Regulation 
(EC) No. 1406/2002 which states that: 
in order to perform the tasks entrusted to it and to assist the Commission in fulfilling 
its duties under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in 
particular the assessment of the effective implementation of relevant Union law, the 
Agency shall carry out visits to Member States in accordance with the methodology 
established by the Administrative Board. 
The reports analysed were drafted between March 2012 and April 2016 and 
summarize the level of implementation of the provisions of Directive 2009/16/EC 
in the EU Member States. The author used document analysis to analyse the 
inspection reports provided in this study. Following Bowen (2009), the analysis 
procedure included a selection, aggregation and interpretation of the data. These 
data included amount and type of shortcomings and observations. While the analysis 
of content, frequency and meaning of words was excluded by the methodology, the 
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author was attentive to the textual structure of the reports (Coffey, 2014). All 
shortcomings and observations were aggregated into a table and commented by 
themes.  
3.3.4. Statistical Analysis 
For the last research question, the author employed a linear probability model to 
determine whether differences exist across Member States in terms of any 
deficiencies and any detentions. Moreover, in order to determine the number of 
deficiencies and apply linear model estimated, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
method was used. That means that it is assumed that it exists a linear relationship 
between the amount of deficiencies observed and the covariate explaining such 
number of deficiencies. OLS was then used to find the best relationship in the 
knowledge that the main aim was to minimize the distance between the line and real 






The main initial driver for this endeavour was the exploration and operationalization 
of the concept of Flag State Performance. However, like in many inductive-inspired 
studies, the subject slowly transitioned towards verifying the adequacy of Port State 
Control as an indicator to determine Flag State Performance. The framework of this 
study was presented in Figure 4 to address the four main research questions. In 
addition, Table 1 reports the main focus of each paper. 
Paper I presents findings from an exploratory study on the conceptualisation of 
Flag State Performance and it highlights the initial shortcomings of Port State 
Control. Paper II reports on the findings of the elite interview study on the 
challenges of European Port State Control. Paper III reports on the implementation 
of the EU Directive 2009/16/EC on Port State Control, as amended, across EU 
Member States based on European Maritime Safety Agency visit’s reports. Lastly, 
Paper IV builds upon EU Port State Control inspections’ reports and reports the 
results on the analysis of such inspection reports from EU and verifies the impact of 
the inspector’s numbers and background.  
Table 1 
Overview of the publication encosed in this Thesis.  
 Paper I Paper II Paper III Paper IV 
Main aim of 
the paper 
Explore concept 
of Flag State 
Performance 
Overall perception 
on Port State 







EU Member States 
and the impact of 
inspectors’ number 
and background 
Data 2 Focus Groups 14 Interviewees 25 Reports 
140, 000 
inspections’ results 
Method Focus Groups Elite Interviews 
Document Analysis 
and frequency of the 
findings 
Binary Regression 
Methodology Qualitative Qualitative Quantitative Quantitative 
Inquiry 




What are the 
discrepancies, if 
any, in the EU Port 
State Control? 
What discrepancies 








Entry point of 
the research 
Explorative phase 











4.1. Two sides of the same coin. Flag State Performance 
as a combination of administrative and fleet performance 
Paper I sets the tone of the whole inquiry. It presents the results of two focus groups 
held at the European Maritime Safety Agency in Portugal involving 13 EU policy-
makers. The aim of the study was to define the concept of Flag State Performance 
by establishing what it represents in the eyes of the participants; how should it be 
measured; and why is it important.  
Figure 5 presents the main result of the study by breaking down the concept of 
Flag State Performance into two tangible vertical regions, Administration and 
Fleet, and three conceptual horizontal regions which depict why the topic under 
inquiry should be investigated (Why?), what comprises Flag State Performance 
(What?) and, ultimately, how to measure it (How?). 
 
Figure 5 
Conceptualization of Flag State Performance as a Result of the Focus Groups. 
The majority of the respondents believed that Flag State Performance should be 
perceived and treated as a bidimensional concept, which suggests a strong 
interdependence between administration and fleet performance. While the 
individual components of both administration and fleet performance are extensively 
discussed in Paper I, the game-changing finding, which shifted the focus of this 
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study towards Port State Control, was the evaluation of how to measure the two 
performances. It is clear that both an internal/external assessment would be 
beneficial to ensure a certain degree of independence, but at the same time the 
commitment by the maritime administration bears scrutiny. Moreover, the 
transparency of such instruments is somehow questionable. 
In reality, the results from internal assessments conducted by the member states 
on their maritime administrations and fleet (e.g. Flag State inspections) are not 
publicly available.  This is also the case for the external assessments on maritime 
administrations, such as those conducted by the IMO in the context of the IMO 
Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS), since only a handful of member states 
publish their results.  
However, external assessments are performed on the fleets of Flag States, such 
as those conducted by the Port State Authorities across the world. Since the 
emergence of the regional MoUs on Port State Control, in fact, the “name and 
shame” approach to assessment gives public visibility to vessels with poor safety 
records making it easier to determine their performance.  
The participants of the focus groups deemed Port State Control as the only 
publicly available and transparent indicator, which is an indicator on the fleet 
performance of a Flag State. Table 2 summarizes the positive and negative aspects 
of Port State Control according to the participants.  
Table 2 
Positive and Negative Aspects of Port State Control. 
Positive Aspects Negative Aspects 
It is the most practical indicator 
It is a “safety net” against substandard vessels 
It is a defensive line which sorts the bad from the 
very bad 
It is a good output to understand how vessels 
perform 
It is almost the only indicator we have 
It is not the best indicator, but it is effective to 
measure Flag State Performance 
It is a proactive measure 
It is transparent 
It is independent (external) 
It is not multifaceted enough to verify compliance 
It is subjective and relies too much on expert judgment 
It has a limited coverage as not all vessels are subject 
to Port State Control 
There is lack of harmonisation in Port State Control 
implementation 
There are different levels of inspection quality among 
Port State Control regimes 
It is a reactive measure 
It is fallible 
It lacks effectiveness 
It is a sample inspection, it does not inspect all vessels 
It does not cover domestic vessels 
It underestimates detentions for Flags with a large 
fleet 
It should have more subcategories, not only White, 
Grey and Black  
It is static and should be updated every week and be 
dynamic 
It was created for targeting purposes, not to determine 
performance 
It does not consider the number, nature and severity 
of the deficiencies 
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A cursory examination of Table 2 indicates that the negative aspects of Port State 
Control clearly outnumber the positive ones. Some of those, such as lack of 
harmonisation, subjectivity, among others, seem to question the foundation of Port 
State Control as the third “safety net” of shipping. For this reason and given the 
discrepancies highlighted by the literature of the past 30 years, the bulk of the 
dissertation has focused on the adequacy of this mechanism.  
4.2. Adequacy and Inadequacy of Port State Control in 
the European Union  
The assessment of EU Port State Control has been conducted through three different 
methods of research: interviews, document analysis and quantitative analysis of 
inspection reports. This section of Chapter IV highlights the main results of this 
inquiry. 
4.2.1. Interview Study 
The results of the interview study are described in Paper II and outline the main 
discrepancies of EU Port State Control according to 14 participants associated with 
three main stakeholder groups: policy-makers, maritime industry officials and 
seafarers.  
Figure 6 illustrates the main findings. In general, the interviewees pointed out that 
the main discrepancies could emerge either at the Member States level or at the 
Inspector level. Those circumstances, if deemed relevant, may compromise the Ship 
Inspection operations and, ultimately, influence the procedures and/or the output of 
a Port State Control. Given the goal of developing a harmonised system of Port State 
Control across Europe, some of those dissimilarities were further highlighted by the 
interviewees. In particular, the diversity in the quota of port state control officers 
used during Port State Control inspections and in the number of hours allocated for 
their training was significant at the Member State level. In parallel, the diversity in 
the background of port state control officers across countries and the reliance on 
professional judgment were flagged at the Inspector level.   
When looking into the group of countries as a whole, slight differences were 
observed among EU countries from the North and from the South in what has been 
called the “north-south” slope. As a rule of thumb, some participants have portrayed 
the southern countries of Europe as the keenest on detaining ships while in the 
northern Europe, Member States tend to perform an inspection less strictly. This is 
mainly due to the background of the inspectors employed by the maritime 
administrations. While port state control officers with a seafaring background 
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mainly employed in the north EU countries have a less stringent approach towards 
rules and procedures; their technical knowledge seems more robust. Conversely, 
port state control officers with different backgrounds, mainly employed in the south 
EU countries, seem stricter in terms of applying inspection rules and procedures, 
but lack solid technical knowledge. Hence, the approach towards inspection and the 
inspection’s output, whether involving detentions or the type or number of 
deficiencies, may vary from Member State to Member State. 
4.2.2. Analysis of Reports and frequencies of the findings 
The results of the document analysis are shown in     Table 3. These results are 
mainly related to the discrepancies at the Member State level and it summarizes the 
number of shortcomings (S) and observations (O) for each of the articles of 
Directive 2009/16/EC for each of the Member States. Shortcomings are represented 
in red, while observations are in orange; where neither shortcomings nor 
observations were found, the cell is left green. In circumstances where two or more 
findings were recorded, the number logged in the cell indicates the total. 
Figure 6 
Summary of the findings of Elite Interviews. 
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The analysis clearly shows areas of the Directive where Member States have 
struggled and may be struggling with its implementation. Those articles were 
underlined in the table and grouped into three main areas of interest: 
• Inspection Commitment/Information: Article 5, Article 8 and 
Article 24 
• Quality of Inspections: Article 15.1, Article 15.2 and Article 14 
• Training of port state control officers: Article 22 
As already emerged through the interview study, the quality of inspections in terms 
of procedures and the training of port state control officers have been highlighted as 
one of the issues in the harmonisation process. Issues in inspection 
commitment/information may appear to be of a more organizational nature, while 
in reality they have a steady impact on the allocation of inspections across the region 
and could influence the inspection burden on some Member States.  
4.2.3. Analysis of the inspections’ results 
Lastly, the outcomes of the previous data collection have been triangulated through 
an econometric analysis of the effect of the inspectors’ teams, their members’ 
profiles and their background on the output of Port State Control inspections.  
On a Member States level, the results of the analysis made it clear that there were 
significant variations among them as to detecting at least one deficiency and/or 
detaining a vessel. Significantly, some Member States showed a 40 per cent lower 
probability of reporting zero deficiencies compared to others. The results also 
emphasized that differences in Port State Control outcomes were much more 
important within each Member States than, on average, between them.  
Regardless of the characteristics of the vessel, considerable differences emerge 
when the composition of the team carrying out an inspection on board a vessel 
varies. Moreover, the probability of finding deficiencies on board and/or detaining 
a vessel is higher when three inspectors are on board rather than one or two. The 
probability of finding any deficiencies is 8.8 percentage points higher when there 
are two inspectors rather than one. The figure rises to 13.4 per cent with three 
inspectors. Similarly, the probability of having a vessel detained is 3.8 percentage 
points higher with two inspectors rather than one, and 14.0 percentage points with 
three inspectors.  
The results were not always consistent as regards the extent to which an 
inspector’s particular professional background helped him to detect certain type of 
deficiencies. However, it was clear that some professional backgrounds were more 
likely to detect these (e.g. inspectors with a seagoing (engine) background were 




























































































This chapter summarizes the significance of the research carried out and its impact 
on day-to-day policy and maritime operations. 
The findings of the literature highlighted in Chapter 2 together with the results of 
the explorative part of this study lead one to ask whether Port State Control 
represents a valid, independent and reliable tool to determine Flag State 
Performance.  
As mentioned earlier, the exploratory approach to this research study initially 
aimed at identifying performance indicators for Flag State Performance. Given the 
strong ties between Flag State Performance and ship safety inspections, the research 
efforts quickly shifted towards a holistic analysis of Port State Control within the 
European Union. While Paper I sets the ground for questioning the European Port 
State Control regime as a suitable tool to determine Flag State Performance, Paper 
II, Paper III and Paper IV identified important discrepancies in the Port State Control 
harmonisation process (either at the implementation and operational level) by using 
different methods and data. Elite interviews, document analysis and regression 
methods were used to this end. The main purpose for using a triangulation of 
methods and data, both qualitative and quantitative, was to make raw data more 
informative through stakeholders’ perceptions, and at the same time to make points 
of view and opinions more robust through statistical evaluations. An overall 
summary of the findings in the implementation and operation of Port State Control 
can be found in Figure 7. 
Some issues in the harmonisation process were already obtained in Paper I as one 
of the results of the two focus groups conducted with policy-makers. However, it is 
through the elite interviews of Paper II that the main points of controversy were 
identified, although the EU regions are still deemed to be the most reliable regional 
agreements on Port State Control. While the literature and practice have extensively 
highlighted endemic issues in the regional agreement on Port State Control, the 
differences in the EU region comprise key elements in the elaboration of this project.  
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The binding nature of an EU Directive for its Member States and the EC 
enforcement power suggests a higher effectiveness of the EU Port State Control 
compared to the other MoUs (van Leeuwen, 2015). If the critical case study 
approach is followed (Goldthorpe, 1968), discrepancies in harmonisation found in 
an ideal setting, such as in the EU region, are also likely to be found in less 
favourable contexts.  
5.1. General considerations 
The elite interviews represented the entry point for this investigation. Overall, it 
appears that the maritime industry remains more positive towards the current Port 
State Control regime in Europe than policy-makers. Some even suggested that the 
quality of Port State Control has decreased over the years, while the regime still 
enjoys a solid reputation which keeps it functioning. 
  
Figure 7 
Summary of the Findings in Implementation and Operation of Port State Control in the EU 
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I think the Paris MoU today is still regarded as the most effective in the region, but I 
do not think this is the case. What we have created is an area around us, a maritime 
area, where there is a high level of self-control by shipping companies, by Flag States, 
by ships in general because of the reputation of the Paris MoU. So that is the indirect 
effect of the reputation of the Paris MoU. Nevertheless, ships get away with issues 
because the inspectors have become more relaxed in dealing with problems 
Paper II summarizes the results of the elite interview study. The outcome of the 
analysis (Figure 6) shows two main areas which can lead to differences in 
inspection’s procedures and inspection output: the Inspector and the Member 
State. At the inspector level, background, cultural influence, professional judgment 
and attitude/approach on board can impact the inspection process and its output. In 
parallel, the use of teams on board, human and financial resources, local/national 
legislation, training of port state control officers, internal administrative structures 
and political influence/support are factors at the Member State level which can 
influence the inspection process and its output.    
While specific considerations on inspectors’ numbers and background will be 
postponed in 5.2 and 5.3, general considerations on Port State Control as a 
discretionary system are addressed here. As it is currently envisioned by the 
international maritime system, Port State Control is subject to the professional 
judgment of the port state control officers. The instructions found in the Paris MoU 
and the IMO procedures for Port State Control refer to the use of professional 
judgment as a key element in the inspection process. The latter states that the port 
state control officers should use professional judgement “in carrying out all duties 
and consider consulting with others as deemed appropriate” (2.3.1), but also that a 
port state control officers should “determine whether to detain the ship until any 
noted deficiencies are corrected or to permit a vessel to sail with deficiencies” (4.1) 
(IMO, 2011).  
Similarly, the former says that port state control officers should “exercise 
professional judgment in determining whether to detain the ship until the 
deficiencies are rectified or to allow it to sail with certain deficiencies without 
unreasonable danger to the safety, health, or the environment, having regard to the 
particular circumstances of the intended voyage.” (Paris MoU, 2017a). In the EU 
legislation on Port State Control, professional judgment is used throughout the 
Directive in regard to different situations. In article 13, for example, the inspector’s 
professional judgment is the key to determine whether during an initial inspection 
there are clear grounds that warrant a more detailed inspection. (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2009a, Article 11) state in Article 11 of 2009 that: 
“Clear grounds shall exist when the inspector finds evidence which in his 
professional judgment warrants a more detailed inspection of the ship, its equipment 
or its crew.”  
Article 19 recalls the text of the Paris MoU and the IMO on vessels’ detention: 
“When exercising his professional judgment as to whether or not a ship is to be 
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detained, the inspector shall apply the criteria set out in Annex X” (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2009a, Article 19). In Annex I Section II.2, the 
Directive refers to professional judgment when discussing additional inspections: 
“Ships, to which the following overriding or unexpected factors apply, are subject 
to an inspection regardless of the period since their last periodic inspection. 
However, the need to undertake an additional inspection on the basis of unexpected 
factors is left to the professional judgment of the inspector” (European Parliament 
and the Council, 2009a, Annex I).  
Still in Annex I, Section II.3B (c), the Directive states that in case of an 
unexpected factor: “A more detailed or an expanded inspection, according to the 
professional judgment of the inspector, shall be carried out on any ship with a high-
risk profile and on any passenger ship, oil tanker, gas or chemical tanker or bulk 
carrier, older than 12 years of age” (European Parliament and the Council, 2009a, 
Annex I). Although the procedures are clearly outlined in the texts cited above, 
professional judgment and its intrinsic subjectivity in the decision-making process 
is crucial to determine the seriousness of the deficiencies (Bloor et al., 2006).  
In their analysis on the Port State Control system, Bloor et al. (2006) regard it as 
a discretionary system as opposed to a binding system. In his discussion on strategic 
spatial planning, Albrechts (2004) outlines the difference between the two systems 
given that “whereas in the binding system the focus is on legal certainty, there is a 
notable absence of certainty in the discretionary system”. Binding/regulatory/fixed 
systems and discretionary systems are widely described in the academic literature: 
the first is underpinned by the “desire to maximise certainty” and the second by “the 
desire to allow maximum flexibility” (Booth, 1995). Binding systems are inherently 
rigid and tend to provide consistent and predictable decisions (Murphy, 1991) 
although they have difficulties in adapting to unforeseen scenarios (Booth, 1995). 
A regulatory system of control gives the least possible opportunity for decisions to 
be made according to whim, chance, or political expediency. (Booth, 1995) 
In contrast, discretionary systems are extremely flexible but support vague and 
indeterminate standards, which make room for arbitrary and sometimes 
discriminatory decisions (Bloor et al., 2006; Booth, 1995; Murphy, 1991). 
According to Murphy (1991), for example, reliance on a discretionary approach in 
family law led to a series of unjust decisions which ultimately increased costs of 
divorces and settlements.  
Despite both systems having a plethora of weaknesses and strengths, the key 
factor deciding which of the two approaches one selects is whether the system aims 
at certainty or flexibility. In this context, the regional Port State Control remains 
hostage to the desire of granting a certain degree of freedom to the Member States 
and the need for harmonised rules and implementation to guarantee a level playing 
field within the EU. While port state control officers have to follow a framework of 
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rules and procedures, their decisions are left partially unconstrained which leaves 
room for inconsistencies in decision outcomes. For example, a decision could be 
biased by cultural influences and professional background, as mentioned above.  
Here, the question arises as to why such strategy is adopted if its limitations are 
well known. As far as the experts involved in the study are concerned, some have 
argued that using fixed checklists, including a strict step-by-step approach, could 
solve any issue of subjectivism in the decision-making process. Others have argued 
that some flexibility is needed when dealing with a complex socio-technical system 
such as a ship. However, all experts agreed that properly trained port state control 
officers are less prone to subjectivity and “hobby-horses.”  
Going back to the results of the elite interviews, the interviewees have concurred 
that the training of port state control officers at the Member State level represents a 
crucial aspect influencing the inspections’ outcome. Article 22, Recital 7 of 
Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended, requires the Commission to develop and 
promote, in collaboration with the Member States, a “harmonised Community 
scheme for the training and assessment of competences of port state control 
inspectors by Member States”. Ultimately, the scheme was developed by the Paris 
MoU Task Force 34 under the name “Paris MoU Policy on the training of the new 
entrant port state control officers and the professional development scheme for port 
state control officers” (Paris MoU, 2017c) which establishes a training policy for 
both new and experienced such officers and specific activities for maintaining their 
port state control officer qualifications.  
These activities translate into points. In order to complete the Professional 
Development Scheme, the port state control officers “must gain a minimum of 30 
points within a 5-year period” (Paris MoU, 2017c, page 20). Among these activities, 
the policy proposes attending European Maritime Safety Agency/Paris MoU 
Seminars, National Seminars on Port State Control, completing the Paris MoU 
Distance Learning Modules and undertaking Port State Control inspections, inter 
alia. With regard to the content of the training scheme, the Paris MoU policy clearly 
outlines the learning objectives and the syllabus of competency for new entrants. 
However, it neither specifies how to conduct the training nor the number of hours 
required to complete the syllabus.  
The implementation of the training policy, as also noted by several policy-
makers, is still a Member State’s responsibility, which allows the latter to decide the 
extent to which the policy is implemented and the learning objectives achieved. As 
pointed out in Paper II and Paper III, the training procedures among EU Member 
States are not harmonised. In Paper II, some of the participants considered the 
training policy of the different Member States a “black hole”, while others pointed 
to the clear-cut differences between those countries with developed training 
schemes and those with a “training on the job” policy.  
Similarly, Paper III clearly shows that national training efforts are not consistent 
across the 25 Member States analysed, with some countries focusing more on 
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theoretical trainings than on practical ones and other countries doing the reverse. 
Overall, with the exception of some Member States, the majority invest less than 
500 hours in training for entry-level port state control officers. The interviewees, for 
examples, agreed that a harmonised training policy is paramount to ensure a 
consistent and fair treatment across the region. Trainings, in fact, are deemed vital 
to instil knowledge and a methodological approach to ship inspections.  
For many experts, the training policy is connected to the port state control 
officers’ background. Some interviewees, for example, expressed the view that 
inspectors with a seagoing background needed less training hours compared to 
inspectors with a different background. While this may be valid for maritime-related 
subjects, the author disagrees with this rationale since procedures and inspection 
methods are unknown to new port state control officers regardless of whether they 
have a seagoing background or not.  
5.2. The background 
Many authors dealing with the Port State Control domain have already emphasised 
that training of port state control officers and their background may influence the 
outcome of a Port State Control inspection procedures (Bloor et al., 2006; Knapp & 
Franses, 2007a; Ravira & Piniella, 2016).  
On a more qualitative level, the results of Paper II show that the interviewees did 
not share a common position on the approach on board a ship and the inspection’s 
outcome based on whether the port state control officers have had seagoing 
experience or not. It appears that inspectors with no seagoing background were more 
inclined to follow the inspection procedures by the rules, preferring less technical 
rules and procedures and operational knowledge yet a very good knowledge of the 
inspection procedures of their MoU. In contrast, ex-seafarers tended to be more 
empathetic with the crew and therefore more indulgent in case of a deficiency and 
trusting in their abilities to solve a problem.  
This attitude could be related to their past experience on board when facing a 
deficiency, or worse a detention – factors that would promote a stressful 
environment on board and tension with the company. While such a difference in 
approach may easily explain the lack of harmonisation within the EU, it also fuels 
a deeper divergence of views of the overall system of Port State Control as a control 
strategy. By being more permissive with the crew, port state control officers with a 
seagoing background tend to verify whether the vessel is seaworthy, therefore minor 
deficiencies that are not an immediate threat to life or the marine environment could 
be overlooked.  
In contrast, port state control officers who tend to rigidly follow inspection 
procedures and protocols, appear stricter in the eyes of the crew. However, in point 
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of fact they are determining compliance of foreign flagged vessels with applicable 
international standards. Following the same rationale, experts have also concluded 
that the type of deficiencies found on board is probably dependent on the 
professional/academic background of the port state control officers performing the 
inspection. As an empirical proposition, the interviewees pointed out the plausibility 
that, since an engineer finds himself/herself more comfortable in the Engine Room, 
a Captain on the Bridge and a Naval Architect with the ship’s structure, the 
inspections and eventual deficiencies identified would very likely reflect their 
proficiency in these areas when performing an inspection on board a ship.  
On a more quantitative level, Paper IV tries to verify the conclusions mentioned 
above based on actual inspection data. The results showed that whether one takes 
the average number of deficiencies or of detentions identified by port state control 
officers, there is little variation in the inspectors’ backgrounds. However, as far as 
the average percentage of detentions is concerned, inspectors listed under “other 
university” background (e.g. law, economics) have a slightly higher probability of 
being part of an inspection leading to a detention. However, for all outcomes, the 
background of an inspector overall has an inconsiderable effect on the final Port 
State Control outcome.  
As to the whether the background of the port state control officers is related to 
the type of deficiencies recorded, the analysis shows a certain dependence on the 
two variables. For instance, inspectors with either a seagoing (deck) or seagoing 
(engine) background more often report deficiencies related to safety or navigation. 
The reverse pattern is found for inspectors who are either architects, engineers or 
with another university diploma. Architects or engineers more often report 
deficiencies related to labour conditions, while inspectors from other university 
backgrounds more often report deficiencies related to certification and 
documentation.  However, when the analysis moves towards linear probability 
models to take into account a vessel’s characteristics, the results are less significant.  
The only results, which are consistent across the different analyses, are those 
related to fire safety-related deficiencies. These are less likely to be identified by 
inspectors with a university degree. Deficiencies in labour conditions are less likely 
to be identified by inspectors with a nautical background. However, both groups are 
more likely to identify deficiencies relating to living and working conditions-related 
deficiencies. Lastly, as mentioned by the participants in Paper II, inspectors with a 
seagoing (engine) background are more likely to detect propulsion and auxiliary 
machinery-related deficiencies.   
However, while the statistical analysis performed in Paper IV could not confirm 
the hypothesis of the elite interviewees, it is clear that a certain dependency exists 
between the port state control officers’ background and the type of deficiencies 
recorded after an inspection. This is also reflected by the fact that the Member State 
itself, if used as a controller, has an influence on the type of inspection detected. 
Overall, other factors should be taken into consideration, such as, but not limited to, 
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cultural influence, training and traffic in the port. However, gathering certain type 
of data may be too complex a task and therefore a complete analysis was difficult 
to undertake. 
5.3. Teams 
Ravira & Piniella (2016) were among the first authors to transpose many 
practitioners’ voices into an academic premise: the number of inspectors on board 
during an inspection has an influence on the type and quality of the inspection’s 
outcome. Reducing the concept to a simple scenario, one can consider a vessel due 
for inspection entering into port. If a single inspector is selected to perform a generic 
inspection which is supposed to last approximately X hours, the port state control 
officer will verify all the items related to that inspection by him/herself.  
Instead, if two inspectors are selected, they might share the areas to be inspected 
and conduct a more thorough inspection given the allocated X hours. Moreover, 
recalling the discussion above, by adding the variable of having a port state control 
officer with a marine engineering background and one with a nautical background, 
the respective areas of proficiency may be different and the inspection would be 
more complete rather than if conducted by a single inspector. The elite experts in 
Paper II have pointed to such a scenario, adding that assigning two or more such 
officers on board also has a twofold behavioural consequence on the individuals. 
First, the crew and captain are less prone to challenge two port state control officers 
who, inspecting as a team are more self-assured than when proceeding alone. 
Secondly, an additional professional performing the inspection may work as a peer-
review tool and encourage positive competition and thoroughness. In Paper IV, the 
analysis has shown that regardless of the type of inspection (whether initial, more 
detailed or expanded), inspections with two or more inspectors are more likely to 
detect more deficiencies and result in a detention than those with a single port state 
control officer. Detailed results per type of inspection confirm the positive 
correlation between the number of inspectors and the Port State Control outcomes, 
with large marginal effects for detention. 
However, the decision to utilize one or more port state control officer during an 
inspection remains a full prerogative of the Member State and it is subject to several 
factors. These include but are not limited to the distance from the Port State Control 
headquarters to the port of inspection, the length of the coastline and associated 
allocation of resources on the territory and overall financial and human resources. 
Although there is no fixed rule pertaining to the number of inspector to allocate for 
a particular type of inspection, experts have recommended that for certain type of 
inspections the presence of two or more inspectors is paramount to adequately 
perform the activity. 
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This is the case for expanded inspections given that the following areas shall be 
inspected, according to Regulation No. 428/2010 Implementing Article 14 of 
Directive 2009/16/EC (European Commission, 2010), as amended: Documentation, 
structural condition, watertight/weather tight condition, emergency systems, radio 
communication, fire safety, alarms, living and working conditions, lifesaving 
appliances, pollution prevention and cargo operations. Such inspections not only 
require several hours to be performed, but the support of multidisciplinary teams 
would ensure the adequate coverage of all areas. 
5.4. Differences across EU Member States 
The principal objective of the second phase of this research is to see whether 
differences between Member States exist. The above sections have mainly 
addressed the possible causes and underlying factors leading to differences across 
Member States following the evidence of the analysis. However, the questions 
remain as to whether evidence of dissimilarities exists within the EU region. To 
address such an inquiry, Paper II, Paper III and Paper IV have attempted to address 
discrepancies in harmonisation among Member States on different levels and areas 
of the implementation process. 
On a subjective basis, elite interviewees have described the existence of a so-
called “North-South” slope within the EU. Given that northern countries tend to 
employ ex-seafarers as port state control officers, the latter have sound maritime 
knowledge, although, at the same time, they lack the more robust approach towards 
inspection’s procedures and guidelines of their counterparts in southern countries. 
However, port state control officers in southern countries of the EU are criticised 
for their inadequate seafaring experience, although they are respected for their 
adherence to the common rules and procedures of the Paris MoU and the EU. 
Nevertheless, such quality perception is reversed between industry and policy-
makers. Recalling the “divergence of views” briefly explained in Section 5.2, the 
underlying objective of Port State Control can be perceived differently according to 
stakeholders’ group. On the one hand, the industry tends to regard this concept as 
an instrument to verify the seaworthiness of the vessel and avoid harm to humans 
and the marine environment. On the other hand, policy-makers consider it as the 
tool to verify compliance of foreign flagged vessels with applicable international 
standards, as envisaged by the international legal framework.  
On a more supranational level, the horizontal analysis of Directive 2009/16/EC, 
as amended, has shown several discrepancies at the implementation level of the 
Directive. According to the number of observations and shortcomings recorded by 
the European Maritime Safety Agency team which were analysed in this study, the 
areas of Inspection, Commitment/Information, Quality of Inspections, and Training 
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of port state control officers still lack harmonisation. The amount of missing 
information reported under Article 24 of the Directive, for example, has a significant 
impact on the overall prediction of the fair share of the region. This is due to the fact 
that the fair share is calculated by taking the average number of inspections required 
in the previous 3 years in consideration. While this may appear a technicality, not 
only same states could face unjustified costs related to additional inspections, but 
also the Port State Control regime’s reputation would face extreme criticisms by the 
industry for excess inspections. In addition, the high number of shortcomings and 
observations in the area of quality of inspections has revealed that many Member 
States tend to apply inspection procedures in an inconsistent manner which 
contradicts the overall objective of achieving common practices in the region. This 
was valid especially for the Safety and Security Guidelines procedures and the 
procedures for expanded inspections.  
Lastly, the analysis of the training policy of the various Member States for new 
entrants and refresher port state control officers found that national training efforts 
were not consistent across the region. This finding is concerning given that the Port 
State Control system depends on their professional judgment, therefore a 
harmonised training policy is the principle strategy to ensure a common application 
of rules and procedures.  
On a quantitative level, the analysis carried out in Paper IV demonstrated 
noticeable discrepancies at the operational level. Overall, the analysis showed 
dissimilarities in the likelihood of vessels’ being detained and the number of 
deficiencies being recorded across the board. Although other authors had previously 
shown the effect of vessels’ characteristics (such as age, type, flag) on the outcome 
of the inspection process, the inconsistencies shown in Paper IV persist regardless 
of the characteristics of the vessel. However, a ship’s characteristics are still the 
most important factor explaining the Port State Control outcomes.  
By taking Member State 1 as a reference, the disparity between this point of 
reference and the other Member States is generally noteworthy and even remarkable 
for certain ones. Some demonstrate the probability of their ships recording zero 
deficiencies that reach -40% compared to Member State 1. Similar results are also 
found in terms of number of deficiencies. Compared to MS1, inspections completed 
in MS3, MS6, MS7, MS12, MS18 or MS24 are associated with less deficiencies 
(with a gap exceeding 2.5 deficiencies per vessel). Lastly, the inquiry also verified 
whether differences inside a country might appear. The results showed substantial 
heterogeneity in the Port State Control outcomes within each country of inspection, 
which requires further investigation by including information on ports as a variable.  
In conclusion, the results of the different and parallel investigations have shown 
inconsistencies at various levels of EU Port State Control. While Paper II has given 
regional consideration to the EU Member State, according to elite interviewees, 
Papers III and IV have extended the inquiry into both the areas of implementation 
and operation. Initially, the outcomes of Paper III have shown a lack of 
67 
harmonisation in the implementation of the cornerstone of EU Port State Control, 
namely Directive 2009/16/EC. As already mentioned above, the results of Paper IV 
have portrayed clear deviations in the inspections’ outcome across the EU in terms 
of detentions and the number of deficiencies.  
5.5. Policy Considerations 
In terms of policy considerations, the results yield several useful outcomes. The first 
main outcome concerns the suitability of Port State Control as a tool/indicator to 
ascertain Flag State Performance. The second main outcome relates to the exercise 
of Port State Control and its current implementation in the EU.  
While this study has found it incontrovertible that in its 40 years of 
implementation regional Port State Control has improved safety, pollution 
prevention and labour conditions on board vessels, its application as an indicator to 
measure Flag State Performance is a subject to be treated separately. The definition 
and characterisation of the theoretical and practical framework underpinning this 
concept has been tangentially broached in this research. Surprisingly, the majority 
of the experts involved in the first phase of the research distanced themselves from 
the current practice of tying Flag State Performance exclusively to the performance 
of a fleet.  
By keeping in mind the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development distinction between input, output and performance indicators (OECD, 
2014), clearly the experts considered that the performance of a complex system like 
the Flag State could be reduced solely to performance of its expected output, but 
rather to the performance of its resources, activities, actions and controls producing 
that output. Although the 360° implementation of Port State Control makes it a 
transparent and continuous exercise to verify ships’ performance, the enormous 
amount of data obtained annually through the inspection database THETIS pertains 
only to some Flag States activities. Moreover, they do not specify areas of the Flag 
State administration where improvements are needed.   
Most of these activities are plainly identified in the international legal framework 
and the III Code (IMO, 2013) and include delegation of authority, fleet monitoring, 
training of staff, monitoring of EU Recognized Organizations, ratification and 
implementation of international conventions, follow-up procedures, among others. 
By using the White, Grey and Black list, which relies on the total number of 
detentions compared to the total number of inspections, to define Flag State 
Performance, all the information pertaining the various Flag States’ activities are 
missed. Moreover, performance not only loses its all-encompassing attribute but, in 
the end, may be inaccurate. For this reason, the distinction between fleet 
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performance and administrative performance came to the forefront of our 
investigation as key determinative elements. 
This proposal proposed considering Flag State Performance as a multifaceted 
concept resting on two inclusive pillars: the performance of the Administration, the 
entity executing the activities to achieve performance, and the Fleet performance, 
the tangible outcome of the administration’s activities. Consequently, the 
development of a more complete set of Flag State Performance indicators which 
includes, but is not limited to, Port State Control is strongly advocated, in light of 
the policy instruments review, such as Directive 2009/21/EC on compliance with 
Flag States requirements (European Parliament and the Council, 2009b). 
The above considerations are relevant to the debate on the accurateness of the 
White, Grey and Black list and its formula. Academia and the maritime industry 
have strongly criticised it, as well as the reliability of Port State Control as a whole. 
In the debate on Flag State Performance, many experts questioned the latter concept, 
not on the basis of whether it is enough to portray the complexity of Flag State as a 
system, but rather on the operational issues of Port State Control, namely, the lack 
of harmonisation among regions and often within the same region.  
These points were a caveat that resulted in a wide range of queries on whether 
this concept was adequate to measure Flag State Performance or not. Since the 
introduction of the Hague Memorandum in 1978, the regional MoUs on Port State 
Control have faced similar obstacles in the implementation of their provisions. As 
said, this was due to the differences between regions in terms of resources and 
efforts, but also to the administrative nature of such agreements.  
Given the compulsory nature of EU law, one would expect these issues to have 
been overridden. However, this research has unveiled several aspects of the 
harmonisation process that are in line with future policy debates. In the area of 
implementation, for example, the results from the study have shown issues in the 
current application of Directive 2009/16/EC as amended in some key areas. These 
include Inspection commitment/information (Article 5, Article 8 and Article 24), 
Quality of inspection (Article 15.1, Article 15.2 and Article 14) and Training of port 
state control officers (Article 22).  
While the first of the three may qualify as more administrative in nature and also 
involve organizational issues (Article 9), the other two have strong repercussions on 
the Port State Control operations, the reputation of the regime and the overall 
objective of developing a level playing field in the region. Notably, the substantial 
inconsistencies in the training policies of EU Member States should be highlighted 
in future policy debates due to the direct link to two main aspects of an inspection, 
which is a process that is openly reliant on the professional judgment of the port 
state control officers. Firstly, their training expands their knowledge of the regional 
procedures on Port State Control. Secondly, a port state control officer’s training 
influences the quality of their professional judgment, hence the quality and 
thoroughness of their inspections and decision-making.  
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This conclusion is closely associated with the different numbers of detentions and 
deficiencies, which vary according to the number of port state control officers taking 
part in the inspection. This point has been highlighted in the analysis of the 
inspection data from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2015. Moreover, the same 
analysis also showed wide diversities in the number of detentions and deficiencies, 
according to the Member State where the inspection was conducted.  
Although the Paris MoU and the EU Port State Control are regarded as one of the 
most effective such regimes around the globe, the path towards harmonisation is yet 
to be completely achieved. By recalling the three main objectives of harmonisation 
as mentioned by Directive 2009/16/EC (training, inspections and detentions – see 
Figure 3) the research has shown that these are not entirely met. On a higher level, 
the development of a harmonised system of inspection and targeting procedures is 
one of the most important goals of Port State Control regional agreements. Thus, 
the existence of different standards for inspection can represent a failure of the 
system as a whole.  
On another level, the essence of the problem can be both technical and economic. 
From a technical point of view, differences can undermine the targeting system, 
based on previous inspection’s results and weaken the effective implementation of 
international regulations. From an economics point of view, discrepancies may 
promote the so-called “port shopping”. In every case, issues related to 
harmonisation negatively impact the reputation of any regional system of Port State 
Control.  
Lastly, one last provocative question is whether this concept is a suitable indicator 
for Flag State Performance. No one would expect a clear-cut answer to this complex 
topic. It is true that issues in harmonisation, whether regarding the number and types 
of deficiencies or of detentions, have an impact on the reliability of Port State 
Control as an indicator. However, it is a 360 degrees instrument, which, even if it 
lacks the thoroughness of a more targeted survey, works 24/7 and produces an 
incredible amount of data and information on the well-being of vessels entering 
European waters.  
Despite the fact that some improvements are advocated, if paired with other 
indicators coverings aspects of Flag States, which are not exclusively fleet-related, 
Port State Control remains one of the most effective tools in terms of completeness 






After years of research, investigation and interpretation of data, then the question 
“what is next?” arises. In other words, what can effectively be done after taking into 
account the results of this work.  
The initial aim of this dissertation was to formulate a new framework for Flag 
State Performance. It can be said that both industry and policy makers should 
acknowledge the necessity for more comprehensive performance instruments. 
These should embrace the more encompassing role of Flag States. Overall, the 
obsolete characterisation of Flag State Performance as the mirror of fleet 
performance was abandoned and substituted with a more comprehensive and 
inclusive framework, one which takes into account the multifaceted activities of 
Flag States. By relinquishing the overreliance on fleet performance, actors such as 
administrators, industry and policy makers can therefore address activities and 
responsibilities of Flag States which are otherwise overlooked and left unanswered 
by traditional Flag State Performance instruments. In addition, the additional focus 
on administrative-related aspects mitigates the conundrum of whether poor vessel’s 
conditions are to be attributed to the shipowner, which is responsible to maintain 
vessels in compliance with the international legal framework, or the Flag State, 
which is responsible to monitor that the vessel is in compliance with the 
international legal framework.  
Given the wide use of Port State Control to determine Flag State Performance, 
the objective of the research slowly shifted to investigating the adequacy or 
inadequacy of this instrument in an effort to determine its challenges and successes 
after 40 years of implementation within EU waters. For this purpose, an analysis of 
Port State Control was undertaken to determine if it was suitable to measure Flag 
State Performance and to ascertain whether issues arise within this concept as a 
system. In this regard, this research has shown that a series of inconsistencies in 
implementation and enforcement of Port State Control activities, both at the 
Member State and port state control officers level, arise within the EU region. The 
findings, especially those in the training policy and inspection outcomes, are 
paramount to highlight areas of further improvement at different levels but mainly 
for policy makers and the harmonised implementation of the Directive 2009/16/EC, 
as amended. More specifically, these inconsistencies may lead the way for a revision 
and/or recast of this piece of legislation with the objective of enhancing even further 
the process of harmonisation of Port State Control activities in the EU. 
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A last source of reflection is given by the prospect of transferring the lessons 
learnt from this work to other MoUs and regions in the World. As often advocated 
in the text, the EU has been regarded as the most favourable region where 
harmonisation of Port State Control activities may be achieved. Such conclusion is 
based on a series of positive circumstances such as the binding nature of the 
legislative framework, the level of maturity of Port State Control activities, the IT 
support, amongst others. According to the critical case sampling strategy, through 
which “if it does not work here, it does not work anywhere”, the results of this 
research can be transferred to younger MoUs on Port State Control and foster further 
cooperation and harmonisation.  
In conclusion, it was made clear that Port State Control in the European Union is 
still regarded as the most advanced and reliable of the MoUs. While it is true that 
discrepancies in the inspection outcome can impair the reliability of Port State 
Control as a suitable indicator for Flag State Performance, it still maintains its 
continuous and transparent attributes which makes it easy to include in the 
framework for Flag State Performance. Although it is unequivocal that Port State 
Control has to be coupled with other indicators to provide a full picture of Flag State 
Performance, policy makers should foster a culture of transparency in the shipping 
industry and the maritime administrations. Instruments such as the IMSAS, Flag 
State inspections, internal audits, level of delegations to Recognised Organisations, 
near-misses, accidents, among others, would represent a richer source of 
information to determine Flag State Performance compared to Port State Control 
alone, if made publicly available. For this reason, the author does not only strongly 
advocate for the development of multiple performance indicators to capture the 
complexity of Flag State activities and responsibilities, but also for the transparency 
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 Introduction
Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 
defĳines a flag State as “the state in whose territory a ship is registered.” 
 Regardless of the concepts of nationality and sovereignty linked to the defĳini-
tion, Article 94 of UNCLOS requires flag States to “efffectively exercise juris-
diction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 United Nations 
Treaty Series 3 [UNCLOS].
* The authors wish to thank the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the mari-
time experts involved in the study for their support and invaluable contribution. This work 
was supported by the European Commission and SAFEPEC project under Grant [number 
605081]. The views presented in this article are the authors’ own opinions. Responsibility for 
the information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the authors.
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 flying their flag.” In this article, the word “efffectively” is treated as the degree 
to which something is successful in producing a desired result. It is interpreted 
as a  direct link to the idea of performance and takes into account multiple 
components in the same manner as exemplifĳied by Brooks and Pallis2 in the 
context of ports.
The importance of such a concept is directly connected to the need for 
coastal or port States to prevent or minimize undue risks in their waters pre-
sented by substandard shipping. Such concerns are typically manifested in 
the follow-up to accidents resulting in severe marine pollution, such as the 
Amoco Cadiz (1978), Estonia (1994), Erika (1999), and Prestige (2002) to name 
only a few prominent examples. Issues that arise in the discussions follow-
ing such accidents often relate to a perceived inability of some flag States to 
maintain a functioning administration and a legal framework in order to meet 
their implementation and enforcement obligations under international law.3 
The weakness in performance highlighted by some of the above-mentioned 
accidents pushed the maritime community to develop proactive measures to 
determine the extent to which flag States and their vessels comply with in-
ternational maritime safety and marine environmental pollution prevention 
standards.4
This article explores the perceptual construction of flag State performance 
(FSP) as articulated by European Union (EU) policy-makers through two focus 
groups at the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). It must be noted that 
when performing qualitative inquiries in a domain dominated by quantitative 
studies, “the temptation of stakeholders and practitioners to summarize com-
plex and sometime elusive processes (e.g., sustainability or a single- market 
policy) into a single fĳigure to benchmark country performance for policy 
consumption seems likewise irresistible.”5 The reader must be aware that the 
study does not contribute to the literature promoting the concept of indica-
tors, whether leading or lagging, outcome or activity, output or input, process 
2 M.R. Brooks and A.A. Pallis, “Assessing port governance models: Process and performance 
components,” Maritime Policy & Management 35, no. 4 (2008): 411–432.
3 L.J. Kovats, “How flag states lost the plot over shipping’s governance: Does a ship need a sov-
ereign?,” Maritime Policy & Management 33, no. 1 (2006): 75–81; J. Kuronen and U. Tapaninen, 
“Evaluation of maritime safety policy instruments,” WMU Journal of Maritime Afffairs 9, no. 1 
(2010): 45–61.
4 J.N.K. Mansell, Flag State Responsibility: Historical Development and Contemporary Issues 
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2009).
5 M. Saisana, A. Saltelli and S. Tarantola, “Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis techniques as 
tools for the quality assessment of composite indicators,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Soci-
ety Series A 168, no. 2 (2005): 307–323.
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or personnel among others.6 Rather, this inductive, inspired study contributes 
to the body of research concerning the performance of maritime adminis-
trations and aims to build a clear understanding of the phenomenon to be 
measured and its subcomponents. In other words, knowing what to measure 
 before attempting to measure it.7
 Literature Review
There is no shortage of literature covering the topic of performance in the 
shipping industry. While common criteria to determine the effforts and perfor-
mance of a flag State are scarce,8 criteria for port performance9 and shipping 
companies’ performance,10 in terms of business, environmental, fĳinancial, op-
erational, organizational, quality, security, and safety abound.
6 A. Hale, “Why safety performance indicators?,” Safety Science 47 (2009): 479–480; 
A.   Hopkins, “Thinking about process safety indicators,” Safety Science 47 (2009): 460–
465; K. Øien, I.B. Utne, and I.A. Herrera, “Building safety indicators: Part 1—Theoretical 
 foundation,” Safety Science 49 (2011): 148–161; K. Øien et al., “Building safety indicators: 
Part 2—Application, practices and results,” Safety Science 49 (2011): 162–171; J. Wreathall, 
“Leading? Lagging? Whatever!,” Safety Science 47, no. 4 (2009): 493–494.
7 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Handbook on Con-
structing Composite Indicators. Methodology and User Guide (Paris: OECD, 2008).
8 X. Ji, J. Brinkhuis and S. Knapp, “A method to measure enforcement efffort in shipping with 
incomplete information,” Marine Policy 60 (2015): 162–170.
9 See n. 2 above; M.R. Brooks and T. Schellinck, “Measuring port efffectiveness: What really 
determines cargo interests’ evaluations of port service delivery?,” Maritime Policy & Man-
agement 42, no. 7 (2015): 699–711; T. Schellinck and M.R. Brooks, “Improving port efffective-
ness through determinance/performance gap analysis,” Maritime Policy & Management 
41, no. 4 (2014): 328–345; R.P. Da Cruz, J.J.M. Ferreira, and S.G. Azevedo, “Logistics resourc-
es in seaport performance: Multi-criteria analysis,” Maritime Policy & Management 40, no. 
6 (2013): 588–613; B. Dragović, N.K. Park and Z. Radmilović, “Ship-berth link performance 
evaluation: Simulation and analytical approaches,” Maritime Policy & Management 33, 
no. 3 (2006): 281–299; L.C. Lin and C.C. Tseng, “Operational performance evaluation of 
major container ports in the Asia-Pacifĳic region,” Maritime Policy & Management 34, no. 6 
(2007): 535–551; A. Pantouvakis and A. Dimas, “Does ISO 9000 series certifĳication matter 
for the fĳinancial performance of ports? Some preliminary fĳindings from Europe,” Mari-
time Policy & Management 37, no. 5 (2010): 505–522; J. Mileski, M.Q. Mejia Jr. and T. Ferrell, 
“Making lemonade out of lemons: Port operators’ perceptions of their port security regu-
lation compliance,” wmu Journal of Maritime Afffairs 14, no. 1 (2015): 93–108.
10 T.-Y. Chou and G.-S. Liang, “Application of a fuzzy multi-criteria decision-making mod-
el for shipping company performance evaluation,” Maritime Policy & Management 28, 
no.  4 (2001): 375–392; E.N. Giannakopoulou, E.I. Thalassinos, and T.V. Stamatopoulos, 
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According to the Oxford Dictionary, “performance” is associated with “the 
action or process of performing a task or function,” or “a task or operation seen 
in terms of how successful it is performed.”11 Since a task can be defĳined as the 
activity or work that is deemed to achieve a specifĳic goal,12 it can be  inferred 
that the performance of a system is dependent upon the goal the system as-
pires to achieve. A similar conclusion can be achieved through the literature 
on port and company performance. The authors have identifĳied two main 
streams characterizing the concept of performance, which may be useful to 
determine what underpins the concept of FSP: efffĳiciency and efffectiveness. 
 Efffĳiciency measures relate to the physical quantities of products or services 
(e.g., time, income, throughput, and production, etc.), while efffectiveness mea-
sures relate to how well the system (whether a company, port, or state) uses its 
strategies and resources to meet its mission and goals and ultimately satisfy 
the end-user.13 According to these defĳinitions and recalling the word “efffective” 
in Article 94 of UNCLOS, evaluating the performance of a flag State is know-
ing what a flag State is supposed to do (the goal) and evaluating how well this 
is carried out.
As outlined above, the body of literature focusing on FSP is, to the best of 
the authors’ knowledge, limited; equally scarce is the number of publications 
“ Corporate governance in shipping: An overview,” Maritime Policy & Management 43, no. 1 
(2016): 19–38; J.I. Jenssen and T. Randøy, “The performance efffect of innovation in ship-
ping companies,” Maritime Policy & Management 33, no. 4 (2006): 327–343; I.N. Lagoudis, 
C.S. Lalwani, and M.M. Naim, “Ranking of factors contributing to higher performance in 
the ocean transportation industry: A multi-attribute utility theory approach,” Maritime 
Policy & Management 33, no. 4 (2006): 345–369; A. Pantouvakis and M. Karakasnaki, “An 
empirical assessment of ISM Code efffectiveness on performance: The role of ISO certifĳi-
cation,” Maritime Policy & Management 43, no. 7 (2016): 874–886; K.F. Yuen, V.V. Thai, and 
Y.D. Wong, “The efffect of continuous improvement capacity on the relationship between 
of corporate social performance and business performance in maritime transport in 
Singapore,” Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 95 (2016): 
62–75.
11 “Performance,” Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd ed., ed. K. Barber (Don Mills, Ontario: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 1156.
12 A. Bye et al., Human-Machine Function Allocation by Functional Modelling—Fame—
a Framework for Systems Design (Halden, Norway: Institutt for energiteknikk, 1998); 
E. Hollnagel, Fram: The Functional Resonance Analysis Method: Modelling Complex 
Socio-Technical Systems (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2012); “Task Analysis: Why, 
What and How,” in Handbook of Human Factors & Ergonomics, ed. S. Gavriel (Hoboken, 
NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012); N.A. Stanton, “Hierarchical task analysis: Develop-
ments, applications, and extensions,” Applied Ergonomics 37 (2006): 55–79.
13 See n. 2 above.
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identifying possible indicators. Takei,14 for example, suggests that the concept 
of performance should be grounded in the legal responsibilities of flag States. 
These encompass exercising jurisdiction and control over administrative, 
technical and social matters, as well as fĳisheries, security, and underwater cul-
tural heritage. However, many of these obligations do not require the flag State 
to achieve a prescribed goal, but rather to exercise its best possible efffort;15 
quantifĳication thus becomes a challenge.
An initial attempt to determine flag States’ capacity to efffectively imple-
ment and enforce relevant maritime legislation was performed by Alderton 
and Winchester16 by determining a flag State conformance index (FLASCI) 




4. Seafarers’ safety and welfare
5. Trade union law
6. Corruption
7. Company and corporate practice
In parallel, the industry developed its own qualitative performance table by 
evaluating FSP in terms of performance of port State control (PSC), ratifĳi-
cation of international conventions, average fleet age, STCW (standards of 
training, certifĳication and watchkeeping for seafarers), and ILO (International 
 Labour Organization) reporting and attendance at IMO meetings.17 Besides 
the flawed assumption that ratifĳication implies efffective implementation 
and enforcement,18 the extent to which these categories exhaust all elements 
assessing FSP was questioned by Corres and Pallis, who added subjective 
14 Y. Takei, “Assessing flag state performance in legal terms: Clarifĳications of the mar-
gin of discretion,” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 28, no. 1 (2013): 
97–133.
15 Y. Takei, “International legal responses to the flag state in breach of its duties: Possibilities 
for other states to take action against the flag state,” Nordic Journal of International Law 82, 
no. 2 (2013): 283–315.
16 T. Alderton and N. Winchester, “Globalisation and de-regulation in the maritime indus-
try,” Marine Policy 26 (2002): 35–43.
17 International Chamber of Shipping, “Shipping Industry Flag State Performance Table 
2015/2016” (2016).
18 See n. 3 above.
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 weighting factors to quantitatively rank countries.19 From an EU perspective, 
the measurement of FSP was fĳirst adopted in the context of PSC. Each year 
ship registries are classifĳied into three groups, white, black, and grey (the so-
called WBG list), according to the numbers of detentions incurred.20 Inspired 
by the WBG list, some authors proposed a new methodology, which incorpo-
rates new factors other than detentions, such as defĳiciencies and casualties, to 
overcome the shortcomings of the list.21
Diffferent from the overarching methodology suggested by Alderton and 
Winchester, Corres and Pallis, and Takei,22 the author Perepelkin et al., as 
well as the list published by the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on 
Port State Control (Paris MoU), merge the concept of FSP with that of ves-
sel performance,23 discarding the characteristics of maritime administrations. 
This article contributes to the body of literature identifying performance in 
terms of efffectiveness and aims at supplementing the measurability of FSP in 
future research.
 Methodology Used in the Study
The following section introduces the overall methodological approach em-
ployed in this study. The exploratory nature of the study called for a type of 
group interview covering a very specifĳic and defĳined topic, but using an un-
structured design to allow participants to freely interact and describe their 
thoughts and perceptions. In addition, this approach allowed people who 
worked in the same organization, but in diffferent sectors, to challenge each 
other’s views and reach a collective understanding and defĳinition, and enrich 
the quality of the data at the same time.
 Methodological Tools
Two focus group sessions were conducted. A focus group is defĳined as a 
group interview with a predetermined topic that is aimed at collecting 
views,  perceptions, and experiences by fostering interactions between the 
19 A.-J.E. Corres and A.A. Pallis, “Flag state performance: An empirical analysis,” wmu Jour-
nal of Maritime Afffairs 7 (2008): 241–261.
20 Paris MoU, Port State Control: Adjusting Course Annual Report 2014 (The Hague, 2015).
21 M. Perepelkin et al., “An improved methodology to measure flag performance for the ship-
ping industry,” Marine Policy 34 (2010): 395–405; X. Ji, J. Brinkhuis and S. Knapp, “A method 
to measure enforcement efffort in shipping with incomplete information,” Marine Policy 
60 (2015): 162–170.
22 See n. 14, n. 16, and n. 19 above.
23 See n. 20 and n. 21 above.
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 participants.24 The two focus groups were held at the premises of EMSA, in 
Lisbon, Portugal, for approximately two hours each.
 Participants of the Focus Groups
Thirteen maritime professionals participated in the study. The choice of the 
participants was driven by the aim to decompose maritime administrations 
into their multifaceted obligations and tasks. All participants in the study are 
involved with diffferent tasks and obligations of the EU maritime administra-
tions, which vary according to the sector to which they belong in EMSA. The 
participant demographics are given in Table 18.1. Each participant (P) was 
24 M.Q. Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and Prac-
tice, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2015).
Table 18.1 Demographics.
FG P Age Sector in EMSA Years of 
experience




I P1 35–44 Accident Investigation 11–20 Public 
Administration
N Y FSC, PSC
I P2 35–44 Ship Safety & Marine 
Equipment
11–20 Naval Architect N N None
I P3 45–54 Classifĳication Societies 21–30 Naval Architect Y N Class.
I P4 45–54 Classifĳication Societies 11–20 Naval Architect Y N Class.
I P5 45–54 Standards for Seafarers 21–30 Nautical Sciences N Y FSC, PSC
I P6 45–54 PSC 31–40 Nautical Sciences N Y FSC, PSC
I P7 35–44 Marine Environment 11–20 Naval Architect –  
Mechanical 
Engineer
Y Y FSC, PSC, 
Class.
II P1 45–54 Accident Investigation 21–30 Naval Architect N Y FSC, PSC
II P2 55–64 Classifĳication Societies >40 Marine Engineer –  
Mechanical 
Engineer
N Y FSC, PSC
II P3 55–64 Classifĳication Societies >40 Nautical Sciences N Y FSC, PSC





II P5 45–54 PSC 11–20 Coast Guard N Y FSC, PSC
II P6 55–64 Standards for Seafarers >40 Nautical Sciences N Y None
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numbered by 1 to N according to the Focus Group (FG) they were involved in, 
either FG I or FG II. Table 18.1 also identifĳies the sector to which they belong in 
EMSA, their years of experience, their background, whether they have worked 
for a classifĳication society or not (Class.), whether they have worked for a mari-
time administration or not (Mar. Adm.), and what type of inspection experi-
ence they have (port State control, flag State control (FSC), class, or none).
 Procedure
The focus group was moderated by a researcher and began with a presentation 
of the overall scope of the study. Participants were informed of their rights 
prior to being asked to sign a consent form and complete the demographics 
sheet. Both focus groups were recorded with the participants’ permission and 
were organized to provide perceptions and opinions on three main questions:
1. How would you defĳine the whats, whys, and hows of FSP? (60 minutes)
2. What elements would you consider to develop an indicator for FSP? 
(30 minutes)
3. How would you consider PSC as an indicator to measure FSP? (30 
minutes)
All questions were posed in plenary in chronological order. Question 2 was 
fĳirst answered individually and then discussed in plenary. In order to explore 
elements that should be taken into consideration for the determination of 
FSP,  respondents were engaged with the K-J method, also known as “ afffĳinity 
 diagram.” This method helps participants of focus groups in brainstorming 
and/or organizing random ideas in natural categories.25 Participants were 
asked to work individually for approximately fĳifteen minutes and list all the 
variables they considered necessary for determining FSP. The notes were then 
shared on a white board and categorized and debated. At the end of each ques-
tion, the moderator summarized the main conclusions to the participants. All 
the notes were collected at the end of each session to support transcription 
and further analysis of the collected data.
 Data Analysis of the Results of the Focus Groups
All recordings were transcribed verbatim. Next, the collected data were ana-
lyzed by three researchers individually. Then concepts for FSP indicators and 
25 W. Widjaja et al., “Discusys: Multiple user real-time digital sticky-note afffĳinity-diagram 
brainstorming system,” Procedia Computer Science 22 (2013): 113–122.
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interactions with the various components were developed iteratively based on 
the individual analyses.
 Results of the Study
This section presents the results of this study. It starts by examining what con-
stitutes FSP in the eyes of the participants, how should it be measured, and 
why is it important. Further, the results of the afffĳinity diagram are presented. 
Finally, an evaluation of PSC in the context of FSP is presented.
 The Whats, Whys, and Hows of FSP
Figure 18.1 encompasses the participants’ perspectives and considerations on 
the topic of FSP. In general, the fĳigure is organized into three horizontal levels 
depicting, from the top, why FSP should be deemed a topic worth investigating 
(Why?), what constitutes FSP (What?), and ultimately how to measure FSP 
(How?). Moreover, the fĳigure is further arranged into two vertical regions: ad-
ministration and fleet. The outer box suggests that every discussion pertaining 
to FSP must be embedded in a political and economic context. Finally, the 

























Figure 18.1 The whats, whys and hows of FSP.
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dashed lines indicate a simple influence (indirect) of one element on the oth-
er, while the solid line represents a direct relationship between the elements.
Conceptually, FSP is perceived to be a bi-dimensional concept characterized 
by two main components: administration (on the left) and fleet (on the right). 
This sharp categorization was suggested by the majority of the respondents in 
order to highlight that a single measure, such as PSC, may not be sufffĳicient to 
fully comprehend the complexity of FSP. It is the combined performance of 
the two domains that leads to the overall FSP. At the same time, the lower part 
of Figure 18.1 suggests that the performance of the two components is evalu-
ated by means of external and internal assessments. For fleet performance, the 
internal assessment would be conducted by the administration through flag 
State inspections. In contrast, external assessments would be conducted by 
third parties, such as PSC. Similarly, for administrative performance, the inter-
nal assessment would be conducted by the administration via internal audits 
while the external assessments would be conducted by third parties through 
IMO audits.
The extent to which fleet performance is a component of FSP was strongly 
debated in the two focus groups. In Focus Group I (FG I), participants did 
not correlate unsatisfactory vessel performance with a lack of enforcement 
by flag States since PSC defĳiciencies and detentions, casualties, and incidents 
were perceived to result from factors related to negligent shipowners and/or 
insufffĳicient recognized organization (RO) activities. In contrast, a participant 
in  Focus Group II (FG II) noted, “On the majority of the ships, the port State 
control fĳigures, detentions, inspections, defĳiciencies are not measuring the flag 
State actions. We are measuring the RO actions and the company-crew ac-
tions. And then we are extrapolating to the Flag State.” Generally, FG II partici-
pants conceded that poor FSP erodes the performance of the vessels; the same 
participant indicated that this was “because the work of the administration is 
shown through the fleet situation.”
Regarding Figure 18.1, the upper part shows potential consequences of a 
positive/negative FSP. The moderator of the focus groups concluded that the 
administrators involved in the study did not feel that they would be able to 
fully influence the fleet performance as there may be too many factors beyond 
their control that could result in a negative fleet performance, despite good 
administrative arrangements.
 Elements for FSP
Table 18.2 provides a summary of the afffĳinity diagram exercise with respect to 
the necessary measures to construct FSP and the relationships between the 
diffferent measures. The table is organized in two main sections. The fĳirst three 
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Table 18.2 Afffĳinity diagram results.
Category Sub-Category Element Freq. Imp.
Fleet 
Performance
PSC Performance (2) Number of defĳiciencies/inspections 6 7
Number of detentions/inspections 6 6
FSC Number of ISM defĳiciencies 1 2
Number of defĳiciencies 1
Accidents Number of accidents compared to the fleet 3 2
Characteristics Crewing considerations 1
Nationality of the crew on board 1
General age of the fleet compared to the 
ship types
1




RO Delegation & 
 Monitoring (5)
Communication procedures with ROs 1 1
Tools for RO monitoring 1 1
Grade of delegation 1
Number of authorized RO 1
International Association of Classifĳication 
Societies ROs?
3 1




Ratifĳication of IMO/ILO instruments 4 1
Implementation of IMO/ILO/EU standards 5 8
EU infringement procedures 1 1
Quality System Does the flag State hold and implement 
quality management system for flag State 
activities?
6 4
Stafff Selection criteria for stafff personnel 1
Training procedures for flag State stafff 
(administrative and surveyors)
3 4
Qualifĳication for flag State stafff 3
Quality of stafff 1 3
Accidents Implementation of safety recommendations 
from accident investigations
2 1
Conduct accident investigations & 
follow-up
2
Fleet Monitoring (3) Frequency of flag State inspections 5 4
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Category Sub-Category Element Freq. Imp.
General Active monitoring and certifĳication of 
maritime training centers
1
Criteria for selecting shipowners 1
Size of the administration compared to the 
size of the fleet
2 1
Transparent procedures to implement 
“safety fĳirst” policies
1 1
Number of equivalence of derogation 1
Activities in international fora (e.g. IMO) 1
Owners nationality 1
Clear organization profĳile and organigram 1
Results of IMO audit 1
Table 18.2 Afffĳinity diagram results. (cont.)
columns reveal the items deemed necessary by the participants. The resultant 
classifĳication into categories and subcategories emerged through the data 
analysis. The relationship among subcategories and variables were discussed 
in plenary. Additionally, participants were asked to classify the fĳive most im-
portant elements from all the identifĳied items in the afffĳinity diagram exercise. 
As a result, the last two columns illustrate how many times a single element 
appeared in the afffĳinity diagram (Freq.), and how many experts perceived the 
specifĳic element to be important (Imp.).
The results given in Table 18.2 support the fĳindings seen in Figure 18.1 con-
cerning the bi-dimensional nature of FSP. In addition to the broad categori-
zation into fleet performance and administration performance, the second 
column indicates the main subcategories in which the two domains can be 
classifĳied. As can be seen, the elements in the diffferent subcategories under 
administration performance are more complex than the elements under fleet 
performance. However, among the subcategories in administration perfor-
mance, participants highlighted the importance of two subcategories in par-
ticular, RO delegation and monitoring, and fleet monitoring, to determine the 
performance of a maritime administration. One of the participants in FG I 
noted, “If the flag state does not have efffĳicient tools to monitor what the RO 
does or how the company actually implements their procedures on board, 
something (related) to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code to 
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other tools, then probably the performance is low because of no monitor.” The 
participants of the two focus groups reported that PSC performance is the 
main subcategory for determining fleet performance.
As described above, the left section of the table summarizes the strength 
of the identifĳied elements in terms of frequency and importance. The table 
shows that within fleet performance, the elements number of defĳiciencies/in-
spections (Freq. 6; Imp. 6) and the number of detentions/inspections (Freq. 
6; Imp. 6) have been ranked as the most frequent and important. Within fleet 
performance, the second most frequent element is the number of accidents 
(Freq. 3; Imp. 2).
Comparing the fĳindings in the category of administration performance, the 
elements indicated as important by the participants are Implementation of 
IMO/ILO/EU standards (Freq. 5; Imp. 8), followed by quality system (Freq. 6; 
Imp. 4), training procedures for flag state stafff (Freq. 3; Imp. 4), frequency of 
flag State inspections (Freq. 5; Imp. 4), and fĳinally quality of stafff (Freq. 1; Imp. 
3). Participants made a clear diffferentiation between ratifĳication of interna-
tional conventions and their implementation. The element implementation of 
IMO/ILO/EU standards (Freq. 5; Imp. 8) is more frequently highlighted than 
ratifĳication of IMO/ILO instruments (Freq. 4; Imp. 1).
 Port State Control
Table 18.3 represents the general attitude of the participants toward the use of 
PSC and the WBG list as a tool to measure FSP. The left side of the table sum-
marizes the positive aspects of PSC while the right side shows the negative 
ones. The words highlighted in italics in the table indicate aspects concerning 
the WBG list.
A comparison of the two sides of the table shows that the negative elements 
outnumber the positive ones, suggesting that PSC has some inconsistencies to 
be considered. Among the negative elements, special attention should be given 
to the subjectivity of the inspection procedures, suggesting an overreliance on 
expert or professional judgment—something that some participants referred 
to as lack of harmonization. This may afffect the possibility of the comparison 
of inspections results and it appeared to be a common problem when discuss-
ing PSC in general. Overall, the inspection process itself was depicted as not 
thorough enough to adequately detect certain types of non-compliance. One 
of the participants in FG I remarked that there were certain pitfalls of non-
compliance with regulations that the inspectors would “never be able to see.” 
This participant further commented that because some of the non-compliance 
is not visible, inspectors should look to materials such as drawings, standards 
of equipment, or policy controls to see where they have been improved, but 
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he/she noted, PSC is “not deep enough for that.” However, based on the overall 
perceptions, it is safe to indicate that PSC seems to be the only easily acces-
sible indicator to determine fleet performance, but it is not the only indicator. 
As a participant in FG II summed up, “But there are other indicators of how 
flag States are set up and how they delegate, and how they control and how 
they implement.”
Table 18.3 Positive and negative aspects of PSC and the WBG List.
Positive Aspects Negative Aspects
• It is the most practical indicator.
• It is a safety net from substandard 
vessels.
• It is a defensive line that sorts the 
bad from the very bad.
• It is a good output to understand 
how vessels perform.
• It is almost the only indicator we 
have.
• It is not the best indicator, but it is 
efffective to measure fsp.
• It is a proactive measure.
• It is transparent.
• It is independent (external).
• It is not deep enough to verify 
compliance.
• It is subjective and relies too much 
on expert judgment.
• It has a limited coverage; not all 
vessels are subject to PSC.
• There is lack of harmonization in 
PSC implementation.
• There are diffferent inspection 
qualities among PSC regimes.
• It is a reactive measure.
• It is fallible.
• It lacks efffectiveness.
• It is a sample inspection; it does not 
inspect all vessels.
• It does not cover domestic vessels.
• It underestimates detentions for 
flags with big fleets.
• It should have more subcategories, 
not only white, grey, and black.
• It is static; it should be updated every 
week and be dynamic.
• It was created for targeting purposes, 
not to determine performance.
• It does not consider the number, 
nature, and severity of the 
defĳiciencies.




The stated aim of this study was to explore FSP by collecting experts’ percep-
tions and to develop a common understanding of the concept. This relates to 
the concept of FSP as a bi-dimensional concept, the implication of FSP in the 
context of PSC, and future options for further research on FSP.
 Fleet and Administration: Two Sides of the Same Coin?
The emergence of a clear categorization of FSP into administration per-
formance and fleet performance represents a new approach to the topic 
( Figure 18.1). When considering the diffferent approaches to FSP indicated dur-
ing the literature review, some scholars have combined both aspects of fleet 
and administration performance,26 while others have concentrated entirely 
on the tangible output of low performance of vessels.27 However, consensus 
among the participants could not be found on whether the fleet performance 
mirrors the performance of the administration and, ultimately, FSP. The debate 
followed two main streams. On the one hand, some participants argued that the 
fleet performance is the natural output of flag States’ control on their vessels. On 
the other hand, other participants highlighted that the responsibility of keep-
ing the vessels in compliance with international standards lies primarily with 
the shipowner. In a context where vessel defĳiciencies, detentions, and accidents 
are used to measure FSP, it appears challenging to draw the line at whether re-
sponsibilities apply to the flag State or shipping company. For this purpose, the 
authors accept the approach suggested by Takei where “persistent pattern of 
infractions by individual vessels gives rise to the presumption that the flag state 
has not exerted its best effforts,” whereas isolated infractions  cannot be consid-
ered flag States’ responsibility.28 In practice, limiting the complexity of FSP to 
fleet performance alone was deemed advantageous, but not exhaustive.
A second point raised in the discussion can be summarized by the follow-
ing question: to what extent can one measure administration performance if 
part of the activities is delegated to an external organization, namely an RO? 
According to applicable international rules and standards, a flag State may del-
egate statutory obligations such as surveys and certifĳication to authorized or 
recognized organizations, which invariably are classifĳication societies.29 This 
26 See n. 14, n. 16, and n. 19 above.
27 See n. 21 above.
28 See n. 14 above.
29 International Maritime Organization (IMO), “IMO Instruments Implementation Code,” 
Res. A.1070(28), 28th IMO Assembly (December 4, 2013).
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feature of delegation, in fact, generated uncertainty among the participants of 
the focus groups. Some experts argued that ROs’ performance is independent 
of FSP, while others underlined the pitfalls of their public/private role when 
surveying ships.30 The practice of delegating authority does not suggest that 
a flag State washes its hands of its responsibility, but rather suggests quite the 
opposite. According not only to the RO Code,31 but also to relevant EU legisla-
tion, flag States “must supervise, monitor and evaluate the work of those clas-
sifĳication societies acting on behalf of them.”32 For this reason, the subcategory 
RO delegation and monitoring was included in the category of administration 
performance and indicated by more than one-third of the participants.
Overall, it seemed clear that a link between fleet performance and FSP 
exists. While one could argue that the responsibility of compliance with in-
ternational maritime safety standards pertains to the shipowner, it should 
be emphasized that oversight and enforcement still remain the fundamental 
responsibilities of maritime administrations. Performance can only be opti-
mized if both sides deliver on their respective mandates. It takes, as it were, 
two to tango. The magnitude of oversight exercised by a maritime administra-
tion likewise produces efffects on the quality of its fleet.
Hence, in order to cover the full spectrum and complexity of flag States and 
their responsibilities, the other side of the coin should be contemplated. The 
assessment of the administration per se, for example, through the IMO Mem-
ber States Audit Scheme (IMSAS),33 should lead the way to a new generation 
of assessment of FSP based on the combination of elements from both admin-
istration and fleet performance.
30 N. Lagoni, The Liability of Classifĳication Societies, Hamburg Studies on Maritime Afffairs 
(Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany: Springer, 2007); J.M. Silos et al., “the role of the classifĳica-
tion societies in the era of globalization: A case study,” Maritime Policy & Management 40, 
no. 4 (2013): 384–400.
31 IMO, “Code for Recognized Organizations,” IMO Doc. Res. MSC.349(92) (adopted on 
June 21, 2013), Report of the 92nd Session of the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO Doc. MSC 
92/26/Add. 1 (June 28, 2013), Annex 1.
32 H. Jessen, “Commentary on Regulation EC/391/2009 on common rules and standards for 
ship inspection and survey organisations and Directive 2009/15/EC on common rules and 
standards for ship inspection and survey organisations and for the relevant activities of 
maritime administrations,” in eu Maritime Transport Law, eds., H. Jessen and M.J. Werner 
(Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2016), pp. 685–730.
33 L.D. Barchue, “The voluntary IMO member state audit scheme: An accountability regime 
for states on maritime afffairs,” wmu Journal of Maritime Afffairs 8, no. 1 (2009): 61–70.
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 Port State Control
PSC represents the most used indicator to evaluate FSP through the WBG list 
published annually by at least two regional MoU on PSC, namely, the Paris 
MoU and the Tokyo MoU.34
Numerous weaknesses highlighted by the participants (Table 18.3) are cor-
roborated by academic publications.35 These weaknesses may influence the 
consistency and coverage of the adopted measure. For example, discrepancies 
in harmonization and overreliance on expert judgment may introduce an ele-
ment of uncertainty in the inspection results, which could ultimately bias the 
risk profĳile of vessels. Additionally, the depth of the inspection and the exclu-
sion of other parameters such as type, seriousness, and number of defĳiciencies 
make us question whether data collected from PSC inspections affford people 
in the fĳield the basis to assess, in qualitative terms, the complexity of FSP as a 
whole.
Nevertheless, many participants emphasized the role of FSP inspection in 
the attempt to evaluate performance. First, PSC results are publicly available 
through the “name and shame” policy adopted by several MoUs. This implies 
that PSC results, unlike other measures suggested in Figure 18.1, are transpar-
ent and readily accessible. One could also argue that accidents are publicly 
accessible. However, the authors feel that the underreporting of maritime acci-
dents, incidents, and near-misses is an issue that still needs to be managed and 
that accident reports are not often available to the general public.36 Second, 
PSC inspections are performed 365 days a year, which makes the considerable 
34 Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (January 26, 1982); Tokyo Mem-
orandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacifĳic Region (December 1, 
1993) [Tokyo MoU].
35 M. Bloor et al., “Unicorn among the cedars: On the possibility of efffective ‘smart regula-
tion’ of the globalized shipping industry,” Social & Legal Studies 15, no. 4 (2006): 534–551; 
S. Knapp and M. van de Velden, “Visualization of diffferences in treatment of safety in-
spections across port state control regimes: A case for increased harmonization effforts,” 
Transport Reviews 29 (2009): 499–514; O.F. Knudsen and B. Hassler, “IMO legislation and 
its implementation: Accident risk, vessel defĳiciencies and national administrative prac-
tices,” Marine Policy 35 (2011): 201–207; H. Sampson and M. Bloor, “When Jack gets out of 
the box: The problems of regulating a global industry,” Sociology 41, no. 3 (2007): 551–569; 
M.Q. Mejia Jr., P.K. Mukherjee and R. Akselsson, “The ISM Code in the context of Swedish 
port state control statistics,” Ocean Yearbook 21 (2007): 405–426.
36 M. Hassel, B.E. Asbjørnslett, and L.P. Hole, “Underreporting of maritime accidents to ves-
sel accident databases,” Accident Analysis and Prevention 43 (2011): 2053–2063; G. Psarros, 
R. Skjong and M.S. Eide, “Under-reporting of maritime accidents,” Accident Analysis and 
Prevention 42 (2010): 619–625.
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amount of data available an added value to develop quantifĳiable indicators. 
To date, its accessibility and transparency makes PSC the only available and 
quantifĳiable indicator readily applicable to determine FSP.
 Quality of the Research Study
Validity, reliability, objectivity, and generalizability are considered to be core 
concepts in evaluating the quality of research. In recent years, however, a 
large body of research suggests that those concepts traditionally used might 
not be the best fĳit to deem the quality of qualitative inquiries.37 Therefore, 
 alternative criteria for determining the soundness and quality of research have 
been developed by Guba and Lincoln,38 among others. The criteria credibility, 
 dependability, confĳirmability, and transferability are applied in great detail in 
this study.
To establish credibility and confĳirmability of the results, the manuscript 
was submitted to the thirteen focus group participants and, at the same time, 
to two disinterested maritime experts with flag and port State experience. In 
parallel, to ensure a high degree of dependability, three diffferent researchers 
were involved in the coding process and the results discussed together. Finally, 
to provide transferability, thorough information regarding the boundaries, the 
participants, the context, the methods employed, and the length of the study 
are described to the reader.
 Limitations and Future Research
This study represents the pilot for a broader study that will include validation 
from a large population and, more importantly, a quantifĳication phase. This 
exploratory study has proposed the fĳirst elements necessary to develop an 
 instrument for measuring how well flag States meet their obligations under in-
ternational conventions. It explicitly advocates a combination of criteria from 
both the merchant shipping fleet and the maritime administration.
37 D. Davies and J. Dodd, “Qualitative research and the question of rigor,” Qualitative Health 
Research 12 (2002): 279–289; M. Hammersley, “The issue of quality in qualitative research,” 
International Journal of Research & Method in Education 30, no. 3 (2007): 287–305; M.C. 
Hoepfl, “Choosing qualitative research: A primer for technology education researchers,” 
Journal of Technology Education 9, no. 1 (1997): 47–63; C. Stenbacka, “Qualitative research 
requires quality concepts of its own,” Management Decision 39, no. 7 (2001): 551–556; 
K. Yilmaz, “Comparison of quantitative and qualitative research traditions: Epistemologi-
cal, theoretical, and methodological diffferences,” European Journal of Education 48, no. 2 
(2013): 311–325.
38 E.G. Guba and Y.S. Lincoln, Fourth Generation Evaluation (London: Sage Publications, 
1989).
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One of the main limitations of this study relates to the interpretation of the 
subject itself since it has been exclusively associated with the main responsi-
bilities stated in the international legal framework. This stand in the discussion 
was taken in order to fĳind common ground among researchers and increase the 
readability and interpretability of the concept under investigation. Business, 
fĳinancial, and environmental performance, among others, are all diffferent con-
cepts that may complement FSP in other domains, but are not discussed here.
A second limitation is that the focus groups’ results are collected based on 
the perception of policy-makers only, which makes the sample limited to a 
single stakeholder group. The current study recommends enlarging the sample 
of the research to other groups of stakeholders such as shipowners, classifĳi-
cation societies, seafarers, and others. In addition, these fĳindings are limited 
to EU policy-makers who enjoy a favorable environment due to the fact that 
in case of non-compliance, EU maritime legislation is directly enforceable 
by the European Commission. Although this may not present an issue due to 
the  experience of the participants with non-EU maritime administrations, it 
is suggested that the policy-makers sample be expanded to take into account 
other international actors and entities.
A secondary objective of the study is to supplement the measurability of 
FSP in future research and help in the development of a specifĳic taxonomy. 
For this reason, the reliability and validity of the items listed under Table 18.2 
should be tested in further studies.
The next step in this research endeavor will take into consideration three 
additional focus groups representing diffferent stakeholders such as ship-
owners, classifĳication societies, insurance companies, as well as internation-
al and national policy-makers. At a later stage, once the main fĳindings are 
 aggregated into categories and subcategories and validated by a larger popula-
tion, the elements that are quantifĳiable in terms of output will be identifĳied 
and  appropriate measurable performance indicators will be developed (e.g., 
number of  surveyors, number of ships inspected, and number of defĳicien-
cies, etc.). In cases where an element is not measurable but deemed neces-
sary, expert judgment methods such as Delphi or multi-criteria analysis shall 
be considered.
 Conclusion
In the last decade, the topic of FSP and the demand for new indicators has be-
come increasingly popular. The WBG list developed and published by the Paris 
and Tokyo MoUs has, by default, become the most widely accepted benchmark 
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to determine FSP. However, the computational issues of the formula and the 
excessive simplicity of its criteria call into question the depth and thorough-
ness possible for using the WBG list. Hence, the call for a comprehensive set 
of indicators to go beyond the WBG list has found support from international 
policy-makers and shipping industry.
It is evident that PSC represents the only transparent indicator currently 
available to determine FSP. However, the focus of the WBG list alone is too 
narrow to determine the full spectrum of FSP, and there may be factors outside 
the influence of a maritime administration that may have an impact on fleet 
performance. Elements such as the practice of delegating authority, overseeing 
of the fleet, and implementing international conventions are part of a long list 
of elements deemed complementary to broadening the concept of FSP.
The general results of the study suggest that the traditional approach to 
FSP, the one based on fleet performance, should be diversifĳied and include a 
higher degree of complexity by considering factors such as maritime adminis-
trations’ performance. The participants of the two focus groups suggested that 
FSP is bi-dimensional in nature and encompasses a wide range of elements 
belonging to vessel and administration performance.
Apart from looking at diffferent options to determine more quantifĳiable indi-
cators, it is necessary to address factors that result in uncertainty with respect 
to PSC results. Elements such as lack of harmonization, diffferences in quality 
across the regimes, and subjectivity of inspection practices may hamper the 
efffectiveness of such an instrument to measure FSP. A thorough and parallel 
investigation of PSC’s main problem drivers could help to make PSC results a 
more reliable indicator for FSP. Nonetheless, the main outcome of this pilot 
study is the shift from a unidimensional concept for FSP to a bi-dimensional 
one, and to lay the foundation for further research, including quantifĳication.
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A B S T R A C T
Port State Control (PSC) is the major global strategy for fighting substandard shipping since the signature of The
Hague Memorandum in 1978. In the last years, the increased volume of trade, the enlarged number of main
international conventions and the highlighted differences among the various Regimes have posed new
challenges to the modern system of PSC, which may need to find its new course.
This paper examines the point of view of key maritime stakeholders with regard to the EU PSC regime. Elite
interviews (n = 14) were conducted with subject matter experts ranging from policy makers, to industry and
seafarers’ representatives. The study aims to determine factors leading to difference in treatment among EU
Member States. The study concludes that PSC in Europe seems to be the most efficient and reliable of the
regional agreement on PSC. However, some discrepancies during the inspection process and outcome can be
highlighted due to differences at the inspector and Member State level.
1. Introduction
Since the emergence of the various regional agreements, Port State
Control (PSC) has become a robust and omnipresent reality in the
maritime day-to-day operations, or what Bloor et al. (2006) define as
an ‘enforcement agency’. On March 2018, the shipping industry will
approach the 40th anniversary of the Amoco Cadiz disaster, which
accelerated the emergence of those agreements for coordinated ship
safety inspections. Accidents such as the Aegean Sea (1992), Braer
(1993), Estonia (1994), Erika (1999) and Prestige (2002), caused a
strong political and public outcry for more stringent regulations
regarding safety of ships and protection of the maritime environment.
In line with this appeal, regional cooperation and coordination for ship
inspections were established and responded to the general belief that
many of the existing flag States were ineffective to thoroughly fulfil
their obligations on their vessels (Anderson, 1998; Bloor et al., 2006;
Özçayır, 2009; van Leeuwen, 2015).
The Hague Memorandum had been just signed when two weeks
after, the Amoco Cadiz ran aground off the coasts of France spilling
more than 200,000 t of oil and making clear, out and loud, that
shipping failed in coping with new challenges and, more importantly,
in self-controlling its vessels (Anderson, 1998; Bell, 1993; Mansell,
2009; Özçayır, 2004; Vorbach, 2001). It was at the Ministerial
Conference held in Paris in 1982 that 14 European states conceived
the first regional coordinated system of ship inspections by signing the
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris
MoU) in the attempt to stem the proliferation of substandard shipping.
However, it was not until 1995 that PSC became a European Union
(EU) initiative with the implementation of Directive 1995/21/EC on
PSC which made the Paris MoU system mandatory for EU Member
States (MSs). The Directive represents the predecessor of the current
legislative instrument, in force since 1st of January 2011: Directive
2009/16/EC, as amended by Directive 2013/38/EU.
Since its introduction, the areas of application of PSC have greatly
increased. While enforcement provisions have been included in recent
conventions, such as the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) or the
Ballast Water Management (BWM) Convention, inspection results are
also widely used to determine Flag State performance resulting in the
compilation of a Black-White and Grey (BWG) list. However, despite
the major efforts, discrepancies in harmonization efforts were found by
different studies (Anderson, 2002; Bloor et al., 2006; Cariou et al.,
2009; Hjorth, 2015; Knapp and van de Velden, 2009; Knudsen and
Hassler, 2011; Ravira and Piniella, 2016; Sampson and Bloor, 2007)
asserting that PSC ‘does not have uniform application in all different
regions and sometimes not even within the same MoU’ (Özçayır, 2009).
This article does not aim to be a historical review of PSC; it is taken
for granted that the increased use of coordinated and harmonised ship
safety inspection efforts has profoundly impacted the shipping industry
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and increased safety standards (Anderson, 2002; Cariou et al., 2008;
Hare, 1997; Özçayır, 2009; Vorbach, 2001). Rather, the purpose of this
article is to investigate what are the main factors contributing to the
disparities in harmonization among EU MSs by focusing on Directive
2009/16/EC, as amended. According to this objective, ten elite inter-
views with fourteen key experts in the maritime domain were con-
ducted covering a large spectrum of policy-makers (European
Commission, EMSA, Paris MoU Secretariat), ship-owner representa-
tives (BIMCO, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, INTERMANAGER),
classification societies representatives (IACS) and seafarers’ represen-
tatives (Nautical Institute, CESMA).
2. Literature review – A glance at the past
Two of the main reasons to develop regional cooperation for PSC
were undoubtedly the need for sharing information between states
about the safety records of vessels and to avoid that a vessel was
inspected at every port within the same region (Hare, 1997). At the
same time, this was underpinned by providing harmonised rules and
standards for inspection procedures. By setting a common standard,
MoUs’ goal is to avoid unilateral action by Port States which could have
a negative impact on the neighbourhood ports within the same region,
reducing their commercial attractiveness (Molenaar, 2007), and dis-
torting the market (Knapp and Franses, 2007a). In parallel, discre-
pancies may influence the outcome of performance measurement such
as the BWG list (Perepelkin et al., 2010), by differing safety records and
targeting factors.
Issues in the harmonization and standardization process have been
identified since the emergence of the first MoUs. While major academic
studies have focused on the legal basis for Port State jurisdiction
(Anderson, 1998; Bang, 2009; Bell, 1993; Keselj, 1999; Molenaar,
2007; Özçayır, 2004; Payoyo, 1994) and the improvement of the
targeting system (Anderson, 2002; Cariou et al., 2009; Cariou and
Wolff, 2015; Degré, 2007, 2008; Sage, 2005), inconsistencies in the
application of PSC were already highlighted by Plaza (1994). In the
study conducted by Sampson and Bloor (2007), the perception of
inconsistencies in inspection practices between different countries in
different MoUs emerged during stakeholders interviews and field
studies. Differences in treatment were also underlined by Knapp and
van de Velden (2009) and Knudsen and Hassler (2011), which
concluded that a degree of harmonization and uniformity across the
various PSC MoUs is far from being reached. Nevertheless, studies
targeting inconsistencies within the same region are scarce (e.g., Cariou
et al., 2009) and none of those regard the EU as their main focus.
Özçayır (2009) was concerned by the lack of uniform application of
inspection standards. The author suggested that if, on the one hand,
insufficient funds and lack of personnel are the main contributors for
differences among states, the subjectivity of PSC Officers (PSCO) for
detaining vessels on the basis of their professional judgment represents
a major drawback rooted in their background and training. This aspect
of discretion in PSCOs is re-evoked and reinforced by Bloor et al.
(2006) in the results of an ethnographic-inspired study which involved
3 maritime authorities, more than one hundred observations on board
and around 30 interviews with key stakeholders. In their study on
cross-national (rather than within-national) differences in inspection
practices, the background of the inspector emerged as one contributing
factor.
Following the stream of PSCO's background and training, Knapp
and Franses (2007b) suggested that the probability of detention
appears to be slightly higher if the inspection is conducted by an
inspector with engineering background compared to nautical back-
ground. Similarly, Ravira and Piniella (2016) analysed the influence of
the professional background of PSCOs within the framework of the
Spanish Administration. The authors concluded that both professional
background and the use or lack of teams for the conduction of an
inspection has an influence on the inspection outcome.
While the literature has shown that some inconsistencies may be
found in the various regions, this study focuses on those which emerge
within the same region and, specifically, the EU region. Lastly, this
article aims not only at unrevealing disparities, if any, but also to the
underlying contributory factors.
3. Methodology
The reported findings are derived from an interview study designed
to accommodate ten elite interviews with fourteen participants.
3.1. Elite Interviews and purposive sampling
An elite interview is a type of interview mainly used in political
science to understand hidden elements of policies and/or legislation by
interviewing high-officials or people holding a prestigious role in
society (e.g. politicians, civil servants, legislators, etc.) (Boucher
et al., 2013 citing Dexter 1970; Richards, 1996). For this reason ‘elite
interview samples tend to be a lot smaller’ (Richards, 1996). A
purposive sampling was deemed appropriate for this study due to the
narrow research focus and the specific and unique context/case (Miles
et al., 2013).
The key requisite for the choice of participants was to cover the
wide spectrum of stakeholders involved in PSC. The demographic could
not be presented in this paper and will not be shared to the readers for
confidentiality reasons and due to the high-profile of the interviewees.
All information that could be shared is presented in Table 1.
A semi-structured interview was chosen in order to unveil a broad
amount of themes/areas to be explored during the interview. The
interview guide (Appendix A) was developed and tested with one
representative of the United States Coast Guard with long-standing
experience in PSC inspections and one senior researcher in the area of
communication and sociology. The interview is part of a larger study on
Port State Control. This paper focuses on questions relevant to Section
4 and Section 5 of the Interview Guide in Appendix A.
Prior to the interview, all participants were informed of the average
time for the interview (30–45 min). The interviews started by present-
ing the overall scope of the study and by providing information on the
participants’ rights. Thereafter, the informants were asked to sign a
consent form and complete the demographics sheet. The interviews
were recorded with permission.
3.2. Critical case study
The focus of this paper on the Paris MoU lies in the peculiar nature
of the regime which makes it arguably a ‘critical case’ scenario
(Goldthorpe, 1968). In their study on whether empirical evidence
would support the emergence of the notion of embourgeoisement, the
Table 1
Elites participating in the interviews, their Organization and Background.
Participant ID Organization Background
P1 European Commission Law
P2 EMSA Master Mariner & PSCO
P3 EMSA Other & PSCO
P4 BIMCO Master Mariner
P5 INTERTANKO Master Mariner
P6 IACS Naval Architecture
P7 INTERMANAGER Master Mariner
P8 NAUTICAL INSTITUTE Master Mariner
P9 INTERCARGO Naval Architecture
P10 CESMA Master Mariner
P11 Paris MoU Secretariat Master Mariner
P12 Paris MoU Secretariat Master Mariner
P13 CESMA Master Mariner
P14 CESMA Master Mariner
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authors designed the most favourable setting. They argued that should
embourgeoisement not be found in the most favourable setting, it
would be safe to say that it would be unlikely to occur in less-favourable
settings. In other words ‘if it happens here, it will happen anywhere’ or
‘if it doesn’t happen here, it won’t happen anywhere’ (Patton, 2015; p.
275).
Similarly, the nature of the Paris MoU itself suggests that the
regime constitutes a critical case study for four main reasons:
1. Since the Paris MoU is the first regional agreement on PSC signed in
1982, the level of experience and maturity is higher than other more
recently signed MoUs.
2. While MoUs are, ipso facto, gentlemen's agreements, the Paris MoU
is supported by the EU Directive 2009/16/EC as amended, which is
legally binding for all the EU MSs.
3. Lastly, the Paris MoU benefits from a set of tools such as a targeting
database system (THETIS), an online distance-learning programme
(DLP), an inspection support software (RuleCheck) and others,
which have only recently been adopted by some other MoUs.
4. All other MoU's have observer status in the Paris MoU meetings and
trainings, and routinely receive for information all Instructions,
Guidelines and other information. Although these arrangements are
reciprocal, they are highly conducive to the dissemination of the
Paris MoU way of working.
For these four main reasons, it is presumed that if discrepancies can
be found in the Paris MoU regime, it is likely that those can be found in
more recent MOUs.
3.3. Data analysis
All audio-recordings were verbatim transcribed and anonymized.
All collected data and transcriptions were entered in MAXQDA 10
software and analysed using template analysis.
In essence, the method structures the collected data through data
coding aiming at identifying the main themes of the study. This method
works well in studies where a comparison between different groups
within a specific context is performed (Patton, 2015). The term
‘template analysis’, however, does not refer to a clear and uniquely
identifiable method but rather a ‘group of techniques for thematically
organizing and analysing textual data’ (King, 2004). It suggests
identifying some a priori codes which then will be modified and
updated through in vivo codes during the analysis.
Since the study follows a deductive-inspired approach, the analysis
did not begin with a tabula rasa, but with a set of pre-defined
categories or codes, known as template (Table 2). They were later
refined and revised with the in vivo codes. An extract is shown in
Appendix B and pertains to Section 4 and Section 5 of the interview.
The a priori codes were derived from previous literature and were
discussed with three experienced Port State Control Officers (PSCOs).
Given the pragmatic approach underpinning the research philoso-
phy of this study and the intended recipients of the findings, the
authors adopted an output oriented approach (Patton, 2015; Reynolds
et al., 2011) to determine the quality of the findings in terms of
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Trochim
and Donnelly, 2006). For this purpose, an analytical triangulation has
been conducted through a review by inquiry participants and an
independent expert audit review (n = 3).
4. Results & discussion
The following section provides the results and discussion of this
study with a focus on the challenges/discrepancies that can be found in
the Paris MoU regime. In the original template (Table 2), the a priori
code “Challenges/Discrepancies” was changed into “Challenges/
Discrepancies Paris MoU” to distinguish the Paris MoU from the other
regions of the World. However, the “Challenges/Discrepancies” high-
lighted for other MOUs have not been included in this paper as well as
other clusters such as “Background History”, “Effectiveness of PSC”
and “Areas of Improvement” because it is not in the scope of this
article.
4.1. An overview of discrepancies and challenges in the European
Union region
Fig. 1 shows the main themes and how often certain codes can be
found in the interviews’ transcriptions. The more often the code has
been assigned to a participant, the larger the square. The size of a single
square is determined by its relation to all other squares in the matrix
and gives a general overview of the distribution of the segments for all
codes and participants (the figure can be read both vertically and
horizontally).
Contrarily, Fig. 2 illustrates the distribution of the codes for the
individual participant (the figure must be read vertically) which
indicates for every participant (P stands for participant) which were
the most used codes and the size of the square is compared to the other
squares in the same column. (confusing)
In general, the software counts how many times a code has been
used, regardless of the length of the sentence and number of words.
This means that the following two quotes are both regarded as one
code:
“I think they made a huge difference. And it would be very wrong to
not accept that. They ach-achieved something which is maybe more
important for me. There is a standardization, there is cooperation,
there is a body where we can lodge our complain, where we can have
a discussion. It's not arbitrary like it was ‘you can’t-you can’t talk to
me, I am guru and I know what I am talking about’. So they
definitely achieved that. By doing that, if you look at the safety
record of shipping industry it's bloody excellent. And compare us
with air industry and you would be surprised. We are really, really
good and Port State Control must be congratulated on that.”
(INTERMANAGER)
And:
“Some countries ahem have an elaborate system which requires that
the Port State Control Officer almost finishes like ahem a university
degree in Port State Control before Master's Degree before he's
allowed to work as a Port State Control Officer.” (EMSA)
This is because the objective of the visualization is to show how
often a certain topic has been discussed by the participants, regardless
of the size of the sentence.
The two figures are divided according to their stakeholder group:
Policy Makers (P1 – P2 – P3 – P11 – P12), Seafarers representatives
(P10 – P13 – P14 – P8 – P7), Industry's representatives (P7 – P4 – P5
– P9 – P6). Due to the current active role of P7 in two stakeholder
groups, the participant has been included in both seafarers and ship-
owners’ representative groups.
As shown in Fig. 1, Participants 2 and 7 were the most active in
highlighting discrepancies in Europe, mainly focusing their attention
Table 2
A priori codes used for the data analysis.
1st level code 2nd Level code
Background history N/A




Effectiveness of PSC N/A
Areas of improvement N/A
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on Background of PSCOs, Differences between MSs, MSs level and
Training of the PSCOs; the results of both participants alone represent
31% of the overall coded segments. An outcome which might suggest
that these actors are particularly involved in these themes. In addition,
the most frequently discussed themes among the participants were:
Attitude/Approach on board, Background of PSCOs, Difference be-
tween MSs and Training of PSCOs.
In general, policy makers were the most active group in focusing on
the discrepancies in the regime. This might be a consequence of the
availability of non-public information they have access to through the
management of the regional PSC database THETIS, by training PSCOs
and by conducting visits to the various MSs on the implementation of
the PSC Directive. Topics such as Training of the PSCOs, Team/No
Team on board and the influence at the MSs level (e.g. resources,
national or local legislation, etc.) were thoroughly addressed by policy
makers while the same cannot be said for other stakeholders. This is
also why the former tend to have a more critical approach towards the
harmonization and uniformity of the MoU while industry (with the
exception of INTERMANAGER) and seafarers had a very positive
attitude towards the Paris MoU and its equal treatment. An outcome
which was interpreted by one of the participants as an outcome of the
regime's reputation:
“I think the Paris MoU still today is regarded as the most effective
region which I think it's not the case. What we have created is an
area around us, a maritime area, where there is a big a high level of
self-control by shipping companies, by flag States, by ships in
general. Because of the reputation of the Paris MoU. So that is the
indirect effectivity, you have created a name for yourself and we still
use that reputation […] So (ahem) to say it in normal words (.) ships
get away with issues (.) detected and all, where they should not. And
in the past would not have gone away with it, so (ahem) the
inspectors have become more relaxed to dealing with problems”
(EMSA).
Fig. 3 organizes the findings in a brief diagram where the three
main clusters found are summarised in: Inspector Level, MS Level
and Differences Among MSs. While the details of the findings will
be further explained in the next sections, it is crucial to conceptualise
the meaning of the figure. The two clusters on top of the figure (input),
namely Inspector Level and MS Level, encompass the main factors
identified by the interviewees which could lead to discrepancies during
a Ship Inspection. Conversely, the bottom of the figure, namely
Differences Among MSs, illustrates the output of a PSC inspection
where the two clusters on top had a negative influence on the
inspection process (output).
4.2. Member states level
At the MS level the participants have highlighted some factors, or
better, local factors, which could negatively influence a PSC inspection.
Those are:
• Use of Teams on Board
• Resources (Human& Financial)
• Local/National Legislation
• Training of PSCOs
• Internal Administrative Structure
• Political Influence/Support
Fig. 1. Discrepancies and Challenges in the EU region (overall).
Fig. 2. Discrepancies and Challenges in the EU Region (participants).
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Some of those local differences were already suggested by Plaza
(1994) and further by Bloor et al. (2006) and Knudsen and Hassler
(2011).
Among the various legal acts through which the EU achieves its
goals, Directives and Regulations are the most common. While both
legislative acts are binding for the EU MSs, the level of flexibility
changes greatly. A Directive sets out a goal or result that then the
individual MS is still free to choose how to pursue its implementation
through transposition into national legislation. Conversely, a
Regulation must be applied entirely into national legislation through-
out the union without further transposition (Coleman and Jessen,
2016). In other words, a Directive ensures a higher degree of flexibility
for MSs which may leave wide gaps in the implementation process
(Falkner et al., 2004). It is therefore assumed that the choice of
enacting common PSC procedures by means of Directive 2009/16/EC,
as amended, represents the origin of part of the highlighted disparities
in the implementation and enforcement efforts. This has also been
highlighted by some of the policy makers during the interview study.
Since Resources, Local/National Legislation, Internal
Administrative Structure and Political Influence/Support have mainly
been discussed in relation to Training of PSCOs and Use of Teams on
Board, those two factors are explored in more detail in the following
sections.
4.2.1. The use of teams – an issue of resources?
The use of teams of PSC officers on board to perform a PSC
inspection was indicated as a factor that could lead to different
inspection outcomes compared to single PSCO inspections. Knapp
and Franses (2007b) suggested that the inspector background is
reflected in particular deficiencies while Ravira and Piniella (2016)
strongly advocate for multidisciplinary team on board. However, some
participants from the policy making group have highlighted that the
decision of using teams of two or more inspectors is not part of the EU
legislation and therefore is a decision of the MS whether to avail of one
or more PSCOs during a single inspection (P11-P12-P2-P3). This
decision is strongly influenced by the availability of resources of the
country (financial and human resources), by the internal organization
of the country, the distance between ports, the presence or absence of
regional PSC offices, among others.
“[…] in some countries it depends on the distance to travel. You
send one person in a car for four hours or do you send two?” (Paris
MoU Secretariat).
With regard to the travelling distance that needs to be covered by
the PSCO to inspect a vessel, some participants suggested to investigate
the existence of a travelling policy within the country compared to the
miles of coastline or the travelling time from one port to another
compared to the miles of coastline.
It seemed clear that inspections conducted in isolation do not only
accentuate the cultural and/or background differences, but leave the
subject exposed to the ship's crew and the shipowner. The use of a team
dims the effects of external pressure on the inspectors while allowing
for interaction between the team members (peer review and comple-
mentary expertise). This interaction tends to mitigate negative effects
connected to the use of professional judgment in uncertain/unclear
situations.
4.2.2. A (non-)harmonised training policy
Same as for the decision to make use of teams for PSC inspections,
the training of PSCO is a national prerogative. In their annexes, the
PSC Directive (Annex XI) and the Paris MoU text (Annex VI) determine
the professional profile of the inspectors and establish the so-called
“minimum criteria” for PSCO. Those criteria, such as having an
appropriate qualification from a nautical institution and having
completed a minimum of one year of service as a flag State inspector,
have become mandatory for EU MSs so that PSCO would have
appropriate theoretical knowledge and practical experience of ships
and their operation. While the Directive establishes the minimum
criteria, the Paris MoU has developed the Paris MoU Policy on the
training of the new entrant PSC Officers and the professional
development scheme for PSC Officers which establishes a convergent
training policy for both new and experienced PSCOs. Although this
Fig. 3. Input and Output of a discretionary ship inspection system.
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policy determines a thorough professional development scheme and a
syllabus, it neither specifies how to conduct the training nor the
number of hours necessary to accommodate the various elements of
the policy. As pointed out by several policy makers, the implementation
of the training policy is still a national responsibility and cannot be
enforced by the EC. It is not included in the text of the Directive, which
would make it legally binding.
“What training is implemented nationally? Because actually on a
national level we don’t really know how they do it. It's their
responsibility […] Let's say on the other side as soon as they are
port state control officer from that moment on they become either a
new entrant in our training policy or they are the experienced
PSCOs and they go for the professional development scheme. That's
all laid out, what are the requirements, what are the minimum
standards, what is the material (ahem) so that's let's say something
that we are much better able to monitor” (Paris MoU Secretariat)
According to the group of the Policy Makers, the participants were
almost unanimous in suggesting that training procedures among EU
MSs are not harmonised. Some considered the training policy of the
different MSs as a ‘black hole’ (P1), while others made a clear-cut
difference between those countries with developed training schemes
and those with a ‘training on the job’ policy:
“Some countries (ahem) have an elaborate system which requires
that the Port State Control Officer almost finishes like (ahem) a
university degree in Port State Control before Master's Degree
before he's allowed to work as a Port State Control Officer […] there
are other countries where they hire a new guy who is then left alone
from day one. And only has to call back to the office when he has a
problem. Which is a massive difference of course and this is then
(ahem) visible in inspection results, it is visible in reactions of
companies towards inspection and it's damaging or not to the
reputation of the organization, the Paris MoU in general or the MoU
in general” (EMSA)
However, with other stakeholders, with the exception of
INTERMANAGER and IACS, the topic of training was rarely men-
tioned.
The participants convened that a harmonised training policy is the
most effective tool to ensure common treatment. In fact, it was
suggested that the national attitude towards training has a deep impact
on the way PSCO approach their job, what methodology they learn and
apply, what knowledge of the relevant conventions they have, etc. In
order to develop a comprehensive picture of the training commitment
of the various MSs, the total number of training hours (both desk and
practical training) per person, provided to new and existing personnel,
should be investigated through the reports compiled by EMSA at the
end of the visits to MSs investigating the implementation and enforce-
ment of Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended.
4.3. Inspector level
The second main cluster of codes, which summarizes some of the
circumstances that may determine discrepancies in the output of the
inspection process, entails the inspector level. In detail:
• Background of the PSCOs
• Cultural influence
• Professional Judgment
• Attitude/Approach on Board
Since Cultural influence, and Attitude/Approach on board have
mainly been discussed in relation to the Professional Judgment and
Background of the PSCO, these two factors will be explored with more
detail in the following sections.
4.3.1. Professional judgment
Discretion, subjectivity, individuality, professional judgment and
other equivalent concepts have broadly been interpreted as one of the
circumstances leading to difference in treatment across countries and
ports (Bloor et al., 2006; Özçayır, 2009; Sampson and Bloor, 2007).
The definition suggested by Coles (2002) states that professional
judgment is exercised when a practitioner, in this case the PSCO,
makes judgment calls in an uncertain situation. The text of the Annex I
of the Paris MoU itself states that:
“The Port State Control Officer will (…) use his professional
judgement in deciding whether and in what respects the ship will
be further inspected” (Paris MoU, 2017)
and also, in the PSC Committee instructions on “Guidance on
Detention and Action Taken”:
“The PSCO will exercise professional judgment in determining
whether to detain the ship until the deficiencies are rectified or to
allow it to sail with certain deficiencies without unreasonable
danger to the safety, health, or the environment, having regard to
the particular circumstances of the intended voyage” (Paris MoU,
2016)
Some participants have expressed severe criticisms on the over-
reliance on expert judgment which inherently does not contribute to
the harmonization process. Others, such as some industry and sea-
farers’ representatives, seem to appreciate the flexibility which would
not be achievable if other strategies would be applied (e.g. checklists,
etc.).
Overall, two main issues can be raised. Firstly, professional judg-
ment may undermine the main objective set by Directive 2009/16/EC,
as amended, which is to enforce rules and standards of international
applicable conventions. Allowing for subjectivity can cause inconsis-
tencies in decision outcomes (Hawkins, 1992 as cited in Bloor et al.,
2006). Secondly, the exercise of professional judgment implies that the
PSCO must be a professional. The existence of minimum criteria for
PSCO has already been clarified above. However, inconsistencies in the
training policy of MSs and different professional backgrounds may
affect the level of professionalism matured by the PSCO.
Several factors may influence expert judgment: prejudices, cultural
attitude, professional background, training, ego, personal opinions
among others (P1 – P2 – P3 – P6 – P7 – P8 – P9 – P11 – P12 –
P13). Some of these factors, for example, were identified also in a study
conducted by Carter (2006) on the variance of police behaviours.
Taking into consideration the input provided by the participants, a
mitigation could be achieved by means of a soft or hard approach. The
soft approach focuses on harmonising the training policy pertaining
inspection procedures, detention criteria and convention requirements.
Conversely, the hard approach would suggest more prescriptive
procedures and, ultimately, the use of checklists during inspections.
4.3.2. Background of the PSCOs
The background of the inspector has dominated the discussion in
all interviews. It seemed clear that whether nautical, engineering or
naval architecture, the background has a leading role not only in
determining the outcome of the inspection itself (e.g. detaining or not
the vessel, type of deficiencies found, etc.), but sometimes even on the
attitude and approach on board. As a criterion, it was pointed out that
since an engineer finds himself/herself more comfortable in the Engine
Room as well as a Captain finds himself/herself more comfortable on
the Bridge, the inspections and eventual deficiencies would reflect their
proficiency in these arenas:
“You’ve done 30 years as a deck officer therefore your Port State
Control is always limited to an inspection of the bridge. You’re never
going to the Engine Room” (IACS)
Or also:
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“[…] if you are if you are, say, you are technical background. Your
comfort zone is engine room. Ok? So our so you-the tendency is if I
am a ships ‘captain, as a Port State Control I’ll tend to spend more
time on the bridge because I know what hole I can find wrong. The
opposite can happen if you’re engineer you will spend more time in
the engine room. If you’re a naval architect, you might spend more
time on the structural issues rather than (ahem) the operational
issues related to… and not more on navigation. He will might look
into the ship structure and the (ahem) the steel work et cetera.”
(NAUTICAL INSTITUTE)
This issue could be avoided by sending two inspectors with different
background to perform a PSC inspection. It seemed clear that if the
inspection would be conducted by an individual (and not a team) with
one of the background mentioned above, the type of deficiencies and/or
the areas visited on board could be the result of their professional skills
developed before becoming a PSCO. Conversely, inspectors lacking a
seafaring background have the tendency to conduct the inspection by
the rules, having less technical and operational knowledge (P2-P4-P13-
P8) yet a very good knowledge of the inspection procedures of their
MoU (P2-P3).
Following the discussion on the background, a difference in
approaches and attitudes has been underlined. Experts have indicated
that ex-seafarers seem to be more indulgent towards the ship and the
crew; it is easier to “get away with deficiencies” (P4). This might be
explained by being more empathetic with the crew and by believing in
the skills and the capability of the crew to fix deficiencies on their own
(P2). To summarize, two inspection approaches have been identified:
the first is where the PSCO on board tends to determine whether the
vessel is safe to sail (approach more related to PSCOs with a seafaring
background), while the second is to find deficiencies strictly following
guidelines and procedures (approach more related to PSCOs lacking
seafaring background, P2-P4-P8-P7-P6). However, this different per-
ception may suggest that PSC has different perceived objectives
according to the group of stakeholders dealing with it. Policy Makers
seem to aim at finding substandard ships and increase the safety
standard of the vessels sailing across EU waters by using common
procedures which is in line with the rationale of the Directive, IMO
Resolutions and the MoU text. Contrariwise, ship-owners seemed
keener on targeting issues and in making sure that the general
demeanour of PSCOs was to verify the seaworthiness of the vessel
rather than compliance with the international legislation. While this
approach may seem more reasonable, it does not take into considera-
tion the main objective of PSC: determining compliance of vessels with
applicable international rules and standards.
4.4. Differences between EU member states. Diverse structure and
knowledge towards a north-south slope?
While the legal texts of the different MoUs are virtually identical,
the enforcement of these provisions may change due to financial
resources, training capabilities and/or infrastructures (Bang and
Jang, 2012; Knudsen and Hassler, 2011; Plaza, 1994). Shipowners’
and seafarers’ representatives were almost unanimous in defining the
Paris MoU as the best PSC regime where discrepancies are infrequent.
However, slight differences between EU MSs have been highlighted
(Sampson and Bloor, 2007); this is true especially when the debate
pertains southern and northern countries in what has been called
‘north-south slope’ (P2). Some participants, such as P4-P2-P6-P7, have
portrayed the southern countries of Europe as the keenest on detaining
ships while in the north of Europe, MSs tend to perform an inspection
‘less by the rules’:
“Let me say that the barrier for where you are detained is less in the
South and higher in the North. In the North, you can in more cases
talk your way out of it” (P4 - BIMCO).
PSC in Northern countries has been considered more robust in
terms of maritime knowledge since PSCOs are generally ex-seafarers.
However, a structured approach towards procedures seems challenging
to be achieved. The consequence is that the perception of quality is
higher for seafarers and industry (P4-P7) but not for policy makers.
Conversely, in Southern countries, the subjectivity of the inspectors
and the lack of seafaring experience may play a larger role in the
conduction of inspections. However, whereas seafaring knowledge may
be lacking, adherence to structured procedure seems easier to achieve.
This way, the perception of quality seems higher for policy makers but
not for seafarers and industry.
4.5. Quality of the research
In recent years, some authors have suggested that validity, relia-
bility, objectivity and generalisability may not be the best suitable
criteria to evaluate qualitative inquiries (Hammersley, 2007; Hoepfl,
1997; Patton, 2015; Yilmaz, 2013). For this reason, alternative criteria
such as those of credibility, dependability, confirmability and transfer-
ability were initially developed by Guba and Lincoln (1989) and
adopted for this study. The overall work was subject to an analytical
triangulation conducted through a review by inquiry participants an
independent audit review (n = 3).
In detail, to establish high level of credibility, the manuscript was
submitted to three independent experts which evaluated the metho-
dology and the quality of the findings. At the same time, to determine
confirmability, the manuscript was submitted to the 14 participants to
collect their views and potential post-comments in the paper discus-
sion. Dependability was achieved through a code-recode procedure
throughout the analysis of the data after waiting at least two weeks
from the initial coding. Lastly, to provide transferability, thorough
information regarding the participants, the context and the methods
employed are illustrated to the reader.
4.6. Limitations and future perspectives
It should be noted that this paper has been primarily focused on the
identification of discrepancies and challenges (if any) in the Paris MoU
region, targeting EU countries only, and does not address other areas
explored during the interview study.
Although the use of elite interviews is highly beneficial to gain
insights into the decision-making process, to provide information non-
recorded in official reports and to shed light on hidden elements in the
area under investigation (Richards, 1996), the results can be affected
by biases. Overall, issues of accessibility of the participants and the
power relationship between interviewer and interviewee may shape the
data and the reliability of the data collected (Boucher et al., 2013).
While no accessibility issues were reported in the study, Berry (2002)
suggests that the most efficient way to steer the conversation is for the
interviewer to become an expert in the subject; experience which is
covered by the authors of this paper. Moreover, the authors favoured
semi-structure interviews instead of fully open-ended interviews (as
generally suggested for elite interviews) to ensure a higher degree of
transferability and dependability.
The findings of this study are restricted to individuals/experts
which have a broad knowledge of the topic under investigation and also
hold a position of prestige in the hierarchy of the contacted agency,
entity, company or association. This also suggests that due to their
public/private roles, the participants may have refrained to give strong
statements and opinions. It is suggested for future studies to expand
the scope of the study to other subject-related experts such as PSCOs,
Administrators and multiple seafarers. In addition, it must be taken
into consideration that the participants may have wanted to cover only
some issues rather than others by focusing their attention on topics
they are more involved into.
On a higher level, since EU policy makers are embarking on the
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revision of the relevant legal framework, the findings of this article may
highlight areas needful of amendments for a new Directive on PSC and
steer the regime towards a new course.
5. Conclusions
The body of literature dealing with PSC in the last years has greatly
focused on demonstrating whether differences in treatment would exist
among MoUs. However, few studies have discussed whether differences
appear within the same MoU. This article complements other scientific
work by highlighting the main factors leading to differences in
approach at the inspector and MS level in the EU region.
According to the results, it is fair to say that the Paris MoU appears
the most effective and reliable of the regional agreement on PSC. This is
true especially for seafarers’ and shipowners’ representatives while
policy makers maintain a more neutral assessment.
Nonetheless, a difference in maritime knowledge and structure of
the inspection process was identified between Northern and Southern
EU countries. PSCOs from the former group of countries tend to have a
thorough maritime knowledge due to their professional background.
Still, they lack a structured ship inspection approach due to over-
reliance on experience and expertise. On the contrary, PSCOs from the
latter group of countries seem to rely more on a structured ship
inspection approach due to their lack of seafaring experience.
Despite the positive achievements reached in 40 years of coordi-
nated PSC by the EU, some strategies were suggested to overcome the
differences identified. Above all, advocating for a single training policy
for PSCOs, multidisciplinary teams on board and more structured
inspection procedures appeared the main mitigation approaches
suggested by the participants. In addition, it is our belief that the
introduction of a different legal system, such as a Regulation, would
prevent transposition and application concerns and favour harmoniza-
tion. The authors hope that this study and its findings can contribute to
the corpus of reference materials that will inform EU policymakers as
they embark on a recast of the relevant legal framework. An initiative
which could represent a new point of departure for EU Port State
Control.
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Appendix A. Interview guide
General objective: What is the perception of PSC among diverse actors within the maritime domain?
1. Demographic:
• What is your age?
• What is your nationality?
• What is your current position/occupation?
• What training/qualifications do you have that are of relevance to your current position or occupation? (e.g. Master degree, etc.)
• How long have you worked in this position or occupation?
2. Inquiry about the participant's general perception on Port State Control, covering objectives and effectiveness:
• When discussing about PSC regimes, how would you define their primary goals/objectives?
• What aspects would make you consider effective a PSC regime?
3. Inquiry about the challenges/differences, if any, among PSC regimes across the World. Determine in what aspects and what factors:
• Do you believe differences exist among PSC regimes across the World?
• Follow up with probing questions such as “in what aspects?” – “what factors would influence these aspects?”
4. Inquiry about PSC in the European Union. Determine the general evaluation of the PSC regime and what aspects and/or factors would
determine challenges/differences in the current regime:
• How do you evaluate the overall PSC regime in Europe in reaching its objectives?
• How would you consider the application of PSC in Europe in light of consistency?
• According to your professional experience, in what aspects PSC is applied less/more consistently?
• What factors would influence these aspects?
• Do you think that the inspector background could influence the inspection outcome? In what way?
• Do you think that the inspector training could influence the inspection outcome? In what way?
• How would you evaluate the detention criteria across Europe?
5. Inquiry about what would be needed to be changed in the current PSC Regime in Europe.
• What aspects would you modify in the current PSC regime in Europe?
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General probing questions used in the study:
• Could you elaborate more on that?
• What could be the influencing conditions?
• What do you mean by […]?
• I’d like to hear more about […]?
• May I ask you to think back and elaborate more on that?
• According to your professional experience […]
Appendix B. Extract of the final template
1st level code 2nd Level code 3rd Level code




Difference between MSs Inspection Outcome/Detention criteria
Inspection procedures
MSs Level Use of teams on board
Training of PSCOs
Political influence and/or support
Internal Administrative Structure
Resources
National or Local Legislation
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Challenges and successes of the European Directive on Port State 
Control: a holistic analysis
As a response to the strong political and public outcry for more stringent 
regulations regarding safety of ships in the wake of a series of maritime disasters 
in the 1980s and 1990s, the European Commission adopted a number of 
Directives on Ports State Control (PSC) that has made the provisions of the Paris 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on PSC binding on all EU Member 
States (MSs). Directive 2009/16/EC, as amended, which entered into force on 
January 2011, is the latest version of those Directives. Aside from specifying 
targeting, inspection, and detention procedures, this piece of legislation 
establishes that each Member State (MS) shall be inspected every five years by 
the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to monitor the level of 
implementation and enforcement of the Directive. We analysed 25 inspection 
reports prepared by the Agency in connection with MSs inspections, to determine 
levels of implementation, compliance, and harmonisation with the provisions of 
the Directive 2009/16/EC. This article summarizes the main shortcomings and 
observations as identified in the inspection reports and concludes that while the 
Directive has been properly implemented by the MSs, there remain areas where 
harmonisation is yet to be achieved. In detail, this article detects gaps between 
policy and practice for EU policy makers which aim at ensuring a level playing 
field in Europe and avoid safety competition among countries. 
Keywords: Port State Control, Implementation, European Union Law, Maritime 
Policy, Harmonisation
1 Introduction 
Maritime safety and marine environmental protection are promoted through an 
international legal framework that consists primarily of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, and a number of safety conventions adopted 
under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). These 
international instruments provide comprehensive standards that serve as bases for the 
formulation of domestic laws that regulate the design, manning, equipment, operation, 
management, maintenance, and disposal of ships (Mejia Jr., 2005).
At the regional level, the above framework also served as one of the bases for the 
adoption in 1993 by the European Union (EU) of “A Common Policy on Safe Seas.” 
The EU’s Common Policy included a “coherent action programme on priority measures 
to be taken by the Community and its Member States to enhance maritime safety and 
pollution prevention” (Council of the European Communities, 1993). However, 
growing frustration with the seemingly endless string of serious maritime accidents in 
the final decades of the 20th century1 and the perceived lethargic pace of change in the 
international legal framework at IMO (Nengye and Maes, 2012; Tan, 2005; van 
Leeuwen and Kern, 2013) prompted the European Commission (EC) to adopt a series of 
legislation2 designed to induce significant improvements in the level of safety of ships 
of all flags calling in European ports and of all European-flagged vessels sailing around 
the world. This series of legislative acts enabled the EU to address the perceived lacuna 
in the enforcement of global shipping standards. One of the key pieces of legislation 
was Directive 95/21/EC (Council of the European Union, 1995) that established a 
common set of criteria for the control, as well as harmonized procedures for the 
inspection and detention, of ships calling in EU ports. 95/21/EC has been recast several 
times, the latest version being Directive 2009/16/EC (European Parliament and the 
1 Amoco Cadiz (1978), Scandinavian Star (1989), Aegean Sea (1992), Braer (1993), Estonia 
(1994), Sea Empress (1996), Erika (1999), Prestige (2002) to name a few. 
2  The series was based on four pillars:  convergent implementation of existing global 
international rules; uniform enforcement of global international rules by the port states; 
development of navigational aids and traffic surveillance infrastructures, and; reinforcement 
of the EU’s role as the driving force for global international rule making.
Council, 2009)3, in force since 1 January 2011. The Directive drew upon the experience 
of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU), the first 
ever regional agreement on port state control (PSC). 
While IMO is responsible for the development of the international legal framework 
for the shipping industry, the implementation and enforcement of its different elements 
remain the responsibility and prerogative of its member states primarily through the 
exercise of flag state administration and regulatory functions over ships in their registry. 
However, under the so-called open registries, “it is not uncommon for a ship to rarely, if 
ever, visit its port of registry in its service life, thereby keeping it beyond the reach of 
surveyors and inspectors of the flag state” (Mejia Jr. et al., 2007). In such situations, 
when flag states who “have the primary responsibility of safeguarding against 
substandard ships… fail to meet their commitments, port states must act as the last 
safety net in the control system” (Özçayır, 2009). Focusing on compliance with the core 
IMO conventions, port states have joined efforts through regional agreements, known as 
PSC Memoranda of Understanding (PSC-MoUs or simply MoUs), to coordinate and 
optimize effectiveness. The aforementioned Paris MoU was the first of these, having it 
been established in 1982 (Özçayır, 2004).
It has been argued that the non-binding nature of MoUs4 constitute an inherent 
weakness and challenge to their stated objectives (Bang, 2008; Bang and Jang, 2012; 
Molenaar, 2007; Molenaar and Pons, 1996). This weakness has been overcome in the 
European context because Directive 2009/16/EC has made the provisions of the Paris 
MoU binding for all EU Member States (MSs). The PSC regime in Europe is enforced 
by virtue of Directive 2009/16/EC through visits and inspections and, as a last resort, 
through procedures before the European Court of Justice (König, 2002). As a practical 
effect the Directive promoted a harmonised approach to PSC as well as introducing a 
risk-based system for targeting and selection. 
 This article seeks to establish the level of implementation and harmonisation with 
Directive 2009/16/EC as amended by Directive 2013/38/EU(European Parliament and 
the Council, 2013), across EU and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states. 
This is undertaken through a content analysis of the reports of the 2009/16/EC-
3 The Directive was amended by Directive 2013/38/EU to accommodate the Maritime Labour 
Convention (MLC) provisions for PSC. 
4  PSC-MoUs are gentlemen’s agreements rather than legally binding treaties.
mandated visits conducted by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in 25 
EU/EFTA MSs during 2012 to 2016. Observations and shortcomings for every MS are 
aggregated and discussed by magnitude and topic.  The authors conclude that while 
compliance with the objectives are clearly being achieved in many areas specified in 
Directive 2009/16/EC, the EU/EFTA MSs are still not harmonised. Therefore, the study 
highlights gaps between policy and practice and suggest a review of the Directive to EU 
policy makers.
2 Background
The sections that follow cover three main aspects of this study namely, an overview of 
past literature on PSC, a review of the main discrepancies common to PSC regimes, and 
a summary of the enforcement powers of the EC and of the main features of Directive 
2009/16/EC.
2.1 Port State Control
The body of literature covering PSC is quite broad and covers various aspects such as 
elements of law, effectiveness, targeting, discrepancies in implementation, among 
others.
Part of the literature developed during the 1990s acknowledges the emergence of 
regional agreements on PSC as a positive phenomenon and investigates its 
effectiveness. Scepticism was raised in the initial years of the Paris MoU due to the 
perception of a  ‘discriminatory enforcement’ (Blanco-Bazán, 2004) of IMO 
conventions by EU countries. Many scholars explored the extent to which PSC was 
being a successful strategy in decreasing substandard shipping (Bell, 1993; Cuttler, 
1995; Kiehne, 1996; Payoyo, 1994; Plaza, 1994; Vorbach, 2001) many investigating the 
legal basis for PSC and port state jurisdiction (Ademuni-Odeke, 1997; Hare, 1997; 
Keselj, 1999; König, 2002; McDorman, 1997, 2000; Molenaar and Pons, 1996). In the 
early 2000s, when the “enforcement agency” (Bloor et al., 2006) and “third-party 
control” (Mejia, 2005) functions of PSC became clearly entrenched, the literature 
shifted towards new topics and authors evaluated the tangible effects of PSC on 
shipping. Knapp and Franses (2007a), for instance, estimated the effect of PSC 
inspections on the probability of casualties as well as consequent saved costs (Knapp et 
al., 2011). Cariou et al. (2008) determined the effectiveness of PSC in reducing the 
number of deficiencies in subsequent inspections. Others contributed to developing 
and/or testing an improved targeting/selection system (Cariou et al., 2007, 2008; Cariou 
and Wolff, 2011, 2015; Knapp and Franses, 2007a, 2008). van Leeuwen (2015) even 
claimed that the gaps in the implementation process left by flag states had slowly and 
effectively closed because of PSC.
This study embraces the “conventional wisdom” (Bang, 2008) that PSC has played, 
and continues to play, a prominent role in ensuring compliance with international 
regulatory efforts (Ademuni-Odeke, 1997; Bell, 1993; McDorman, 2000; Molenaar, 
2007; Payoyo, 1994), and in increasing the standards of safety (Li and Zheng, 2008; van 
Leeuwen, 2015), pollution prevention (Bang, 2008; Cuttler, 1995), and labour 
protection.
2.2 Discrepancies in PSC
Significant inroads against substandard shipping notwithstanding, PSC has had to 
deal with cross-national discrepancies in implementation since its early stages of 
development (Bloor et al., 2006; Cariou et al., 2009; Keselj, 1999; Knapp and Franses, 
2007b; Knapp and van de Velden, 2009; Knudsen and Hassler, 2011; Mansell, 2009; 
Özçayır, 2009; Sampson and Bloor, 2007). 
As early as 1994, Plaza (1994) had already highlighted how discrepancies were 
becoming evident due to disparities in stages of development and other peculiarities 
among countries in some regions. Anderson (2002) also recognised that “substandard 
vessels trading in the poor regions of the world have a significantly lower chance of 
being detained by PSC.” This may be aggravated by unequal participation of states 
within the same region (Anderson, 2002), lack of resources (Anderson, 2002; Bang and 
Jang, 2012; Knudsen and Hassler, 2011; Özçayır, 2009), and scarce infrastructure, 
technology, and policies (Bang and Jang, 2012). From the point of view of the 
inspector, part of the literature attributes this to the heavy influence of the individual 
PSCO’s subjectivity and professional judgment (Bloor et al., 2006; Özçayır, 2009). 
Others, such as Knapp and Franses (2007b), Ravira and Piniella (2016), and Bloor et al. 
(2006) claim that differences in the training and experience may lead PSCOs to focus 
on certain areas of competence rather than others. 
A question then arises as to why differences in treatment would have to be an issue. 
On a higher level, the development of a harmonised system of inspection and targeting 
procedures is one of the most important goals of PSC regional agreements. Needless to 
say, having different standards for inspection can represent a failure of the system as a 
whole. On a deeper level, the crux can be both technical and economical. From a 
technical point of view, differences can undermine the targeting system, based on 
previous inspection’s results (Knapp and van de Velden, 2009), and weaken the 
effective implementation of international regulations (Bloor et al., 2006; Knudsen and 
Hassler, 2011). From an economical one, discrepancies may promote the so-called “port 
shopping” (Bang, 2008; Keselj, 1999; Knudsen and Hassler, 2011; McDorman, 2000). 
This is a strategic behaviour adopted by some operators which consists of choosing 
certain ports (Knudsen and Hassler, 2011) or certain regions (Bang and Jang, 2012) 
over others, based on divergent enforcement standards. 
2.3 Directive 2009/16/EC and its Enforcement
Directive 2009/16/EC is part of the series of legislative measures adopted by the EC 
under the so-called Third Maritime Safety Package aimed at improving the EU 
maritime regulatory framework. With its entry into force on 1 January 2011, the 
Directive introduced what has been referred to as the New Inspection Regime (NIR) 
featuring an array of requirements and provisions to improve the current system of PSC 
and strengthen its three main components: Harmonisation, Targeting/Selection and 
Inspection (Figure 1).
Figure 1 – Main PSC components
For this and other purposes, a priority and a risk profile are assigned to every vessel. 
The former indicates whether a ship entering into EU ports should not be inspected (No 
Priority), must be inspected (Priority I) or may be inspected (Priority II). The latter, 
whether High, Standard, or Low risk, establishes time windows for inspection. For 
example, a High Risk ship becomes Priority II after 5 months since the previous 
inspection and Priority I after 6 months. These are called periodic inspections. 
However, regardless of the period since the last inspection, in lieu of overriding5 (must 
be inspected) or unexpected6 (may be inspected) factors, ships could be subject to 
additional inspections.
Pertaining its enforcement prerogatives, the EC has assigned EMSA the task of 
conducting visits to MSs in order to evaluate and monitor the effective implementation 
of Directive 2009/16/EC and to monitor the overall functioning of the Union’s PSC 
regime. The rationale behind the visits is to review the infrastructure and legislative and 
administrative provisions adopted by the MS to ensure the fulfilment of the 




3. The Cycle of PSC Inspection – Information System;
4. Personnel – Logistics;
5. Enforcement and Sanctions.
Under the heading Organization, EMSA examines the manner in which maritime 
authorities have organized their national PSC systems. The second area considers the 
General Commitments undertaken by MSs for complying with the main requirements of 
the Directive together with the necessary arrangements, activities, and actions taken. 
The Cycle of PSC Inspection – Information System process considers activities 
undertaken in respect of performing the actual PSC inspection, the procedures followed 
by PSCOs, and the insertion of all relevant information in the database system. The 
examination of the Personnel – Logistics process covers the professional profile, 
5 List of overriding factors in Annex I, Part II 2A.
6 List of unexpected factors in Annex I, Part II 2B.
qualification and competence of inspectors and their compliance with the minimum 
criteria laid down in the Directive. Finally, the Enforcement and Sanctions process 
covers the requirements of the Directive on the right of appeal and for enforcement and 
sanctions. 
Table 1 below shows the 5 different processes, with a detailed description of the 
articles examined. 







5 Inspection system and annual inspection commitment
6 Modalities of compliance with the inspection commitment
7 Modalities allowing a balanced inspection share within the Community
8 Postponement of inspection and exceptional circumstances
9 Notification of arrival of ships
11 Frequency of inspections
15.1 & 15.2 Safety and security guidelines and procedures
16 Access refusal measures concerning certain ships
23 Reports from pilots and port authorities
GENERAL 
COMMITMENT
25 Exchange of information and cooperation
12 Selection of ships for inspection
13 Initial and more detailed inspection
14 Expanded inspections
19 Rectification and detention
21 Follow up to inspections and detentions
15.3 Safety and security guidelines and procedures
24 Inspection database




28 Reimbursement of costs
PERSONNEL - 
LOGISTICS
22 Professional profile of inspectors
29 Data to monitor implementation
18 Complaints
18.a Onshore MLC 2006 complaint-handling procedures





This section outlines the content of the collected documents, and it clarifies how the 
analysis was conducted. 
3.1 Data overview
This study analysed 25 reports inspection produced between March 2012 and April 
2016 by a team of two to three inspectors from EMSA. All the findings were duly 
anonymised and an ID from 1 to 25 was randomly assigned to the concerned MSs. 
Confidentiality was required by EMSA to granting access to the documents and for 
publication purposes. 
Each report has the following table of contents:
• List of Tables;
• List of Figures;
• List of Abbreviations;
• Executive Summary;
• Acknowledgments;
• Cross-Reference for Directive Articles;
• 1. Introduction;
• 2. Background;
• 3. Detailed examination of the port state control system in relation to the 
Directive 
o 3.1 Organisation
o 3.2 General Commitments
o 3.3 The Cycle of the PSC inspection – Information System
o 3.4 Personnel – Logistics
o 3.5 Right of Appeal – Enforcement and Sanctions
• 4. Summary of Findings;
• Appendix A – Visit programme;
• Appendix B – List of persons involved;
• Appendix C – Pre-visit questionnaire on the implementation of the Directive
Since all reports have the same structure and the visits adopt the same methodology, no 
comparability issues were highlighted. 
3.2 Data analysis
The inspection reports, which were regarded as official documents, were analysed to 
perform a systematic and holistic evaluation of the implementation of the Directive in 
the since its introduction. The authors availed of document analysis to analyse the 
inspection reports provided in this study. 
The analytical procedure included selecting, aggregating, interpreting and synthetizing 
the data contained in the documents (Bowen, 2009). In this context, data are the 
number and type of shortcomings and observations recorded. The narrative, content 
meaning, frequency of words and/or the themes were not analysed since deemed not 
within the scope of the study. Particular attention was given to the ‘textual organizations 
of the documents’ (Coffey, 2014) and their structure. 
The analysis has focused on Chapter 4 Summary of Findings to determine number, type, 
description and linked Article of the various shortcomings and observations. All the 
reports were initially skimmed, then thoroughly read before any interpretation and data 
aggregation. Whereas further information was regarded as necessary, the authors 
consulted the applicable subchapters of Chapter 3 Detailed Examination of the Port 
State Control System in relation to the Directive. Lastly, all data were then aggregated 
into their process/area of significance by following the structure and the articles of the 
Directive as previously shown in Table 1.
All findings, observations, and shortcomings were then presented to two EMSA 
officials involved in the MS visits in order to gather further comments, perceptions, and 
insights.
3.3 Quality of the Data and Limitations
The EMSA inspection reports were viewed as authoritative sources which are 
documents produced with ‘an explicit goal of unbiased knowledge’ (O'Leary, 2004, 
p.178) and entail a certain level of credibility, authenticity and representativeness 
(Bowen, 2009). However, even official sources may not be a firm evidence of what is 
reported (Coffey, 2014). The composition of the EMSA team may vary in terms of 
number of inspectors, background, experience and nationality. The authors do not have 
control over the inspection practices of EMSA and it is recognised as limitation that 
discrepancies in the inspection teams may have an influence on the way results were 
produced and included in the reports (O'Leary, 2004, p.183).
Overall, a high degree of stability is given due to the fact that the documents ‘exist 
independently’ of our action (Rapley, 2007, p.9) and the presence of the authors does 
not influence the results but provides further exactness (Bowen, 2009). Moreover, the 
homogeneous structure of the reports ensures that, regardless of the authors analysing 
the reports, the results will remain consistent and accurate (Golafshani, 2003; Yilmaz, 
2013).
4 Results & Discussion
This section provides and discusses the results of this study. It begins with a complete 
overview of shortcomings and observations recorded during the visits (Section 4.1). 
Subsequently, this section continues by exploring specific areas marked by a 
considerable number of findings (Sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). This section then ends 
with a summary on the (in)-adequacies of port state control followed by suggestions for 
policy-makers (Section 4.6).  
4.1 A Summary of the findings concerning compliance with Directive 
2009/16/EC
Table 2 offers an overview of shortcomings and observations recorded during the visits 
conducted by EMSA in the concerned MSs. The left side of the table indicates the 
relevant processes and articles of the Directive scrutinised during the visits. The top row 
indicates the assigned IDs of the 25 anonymised MSs. The columns on the far right 
hand side summarises the number of shortcomings7(S) and observations8(O) for each of 
the articles, as well as the sum total (T) for the two. Shortcomings are represented in 
red, while observations are in orange; where neither shortcomings nor observations 
were found, the cell is left green. In circumstances where two or more findings were 
recorded, the number logged in the cell indicates the total.
As shown in the table, majority of the findings were discovered in Article 24 – 
Inspection Database (23% - 61) followed by Organization (10% - 26), Article 22 – 
Professional profile of Inspectors (10% - 26), Article 15.1/.2 – Safety and Security 
Guidelines Procedures (9% - 25), Article 14 – Expanded Inspections (8% - 22), Article 
9 – Notification of Arrival (7% - 18), and lastly Article 8 – Postponement of Inspection 
7 A shortcoming is a clear violation of provisions stated in one of the Articles of the Directive.
8 An observation is a violation pertaining the application of a procedure outlined in the Paris 
MoU Manual and/or guidelines and/or instructions
and Exceptional Circumstances and Article 5 – Inspection System and Annual 
Inspection commitment (6% - 16). Given their nature and objectives, the Articles were 
grouped into three main areas of interest:
• Inspection Commitment/Information: Articles 5, 8 and 24
• Quality of Inspections: Articles 15.1, 15.2 and 14
• Training of PSCOs: Article 22
Article 9 and Organization were considered to be of a more administrative nature, 
and thus assessed separately (Section 4.5).
It is worthwhile to note that these findings show a twofold outcome. On the one 
hand, many processes of the Directive are fully implemented. Only sporadic, if any, 
findings were recorded in some of the articles, suggesting success in the implementation 
of the legislation at the national level. On the other hand, some processes are deficient 
for the majority, if not all, of MSs involved. This suggests challenges in the 
implementation and harmonization activities of specific areas of the Directive. Article 
15.1/.2 and Article 24, for instance, seem consistently deficient for all MSs, implying 
underlying issues related to the Directive itself. Others, such as Article 22 which 
highlights inadequacies in the professional background of PSCOs or Article 5 
portraying discrepancies in the inspection commitment, may otherwise expose the 
inspection practises to criticism. The following sections undertake thorough discussions 






















































































































































































The cycle of PSC 



































































This section contains a commentary of Article 5 (in combination with Article 6 
and 7), Article 8, and Article 24. 
4.2.1 Articles 5, 6 and 7 -  Inspection commitment & compliance with the 
inspection commitment
Table 2 shows that in respect to compliance with Article 5, 14 (56%) out of 25 MSs 
visited by EMSA between 2012 and 2016 did not meet their annual inspection 
commitment for at least one of the years since the entry into force of the Directive. 
Although the majority of the findings were recorded for Article 5, merit should be given 
to the overall set of requirements and modalities for compliance with the annual 
inspection commitment (or fair share) as laid down in Articles 5, 6, and 7 as a whole. 
Except for specific and exceptional circumstances, MSs shall inspect all Priority I 
vessels and conduct a number of inspections equal to the MS’s annual inspection 
commitment. In this regard, the Directive abandons the previous 25% quota which is 
replaced by a system considering the individual ships calling at ports of the MS 
concerned in relation to the regional commitment. This is calculated by taking the 
average number of inspections required in the previous 3 years in consideration. 
Nevertheless, an allowance is granted for missing such an inspection ratio. Article 6 
provides that this ratio shall not exceed 5% of the total PI ships with a High-Risk Profile 
(HRP) and 10% of the total PI ships other than HRP. 
In case the number of PI calls exceeds the annual inspection commitment, the MS is 
identified as overburdened (OB), and the missed rate of PI inspections shall not exceed 
30% (given that its annual quota is fulfilled). Conversely, if the number of PI and PII 
calls is inferior to the annual inspection commitment, the MS is identified as 
underburdened (UB) and it shall inspect all PI ships and 85% of the PII ships calling at 
its ports and anchorage. 
Non-compliance with the provisions of Articles 5, 6, and 7 has profound implication 
on the foundations and goals of the regime. In case of a missed inspection, for example, 
the interested MS makes the vessel a burden for the next port of call and it allows a 
potential substandard vessel to sail. Similarly, MSs that over-inspect vessels beyond 
their annual commitment, expose the regime to complaints by the industry and distort 
the calculation for the regional commitment. 
It must be made clear that the majority of the shortcomings were recorded in the first 
years of the entry into force of the Directive, suggesting that MSs were still adjusting to 
the new system. What attracts greater concern, however, are those shortcomings 
recorded in recent years, which highlight the struggle by some maritime administration 
to find adequate resources to meet their annual commitment.  
4.2.2 Article 24 – Inspection Database
Article 24 sets provisions for the EC to develop, maintain and update the inspection 
database (THETIS), as well as other general provisions for MSs. Under this article, MSs 
are required to:
• Ensure that information concerning the actual time of arrival (ATA) and the 
actual time of departure (ATD) are transferred in the database;
• Ensure that information related to inspections are transferred to the database as 
soon as the inspection report is completed or the detention lifted. Within 72 
hours, MSs shall ensure that the information transferred to the inspection 
database is validated for publication purposes. 
Table 3 shows the percentage of missing information recorded during the visits. Ship 
Info indicates the percentage of ship calls that, either at ports or at anchorage, were 
not/incorrectly transferred to THETIS by the individual MSs. Reports Validation 
denotes the percentage of reports which were not validated within the prescribed time-
frame. Lastly, ATD/ATA reveals more specifically the amount of ships calling at the 
MSs’ ports where an ATA, but not an ATD, was recorded. It must be noted that not all 
reports cover the last aspect.  











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Ships Info % 5 12 42 15 28 10 5 20 22 0 3 3 0 2 3 30 3 40 11 10 21 7 20 9 20
Reports 
Validation %
0 29 10 6 10 0 0 7 5 11 4 0 4 4 1 20 25 2 4 10 3 0 3 6 5
ATD/ATA % @ @ @ @ 7 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 8 0 0 3 5 9 6 0 0 0 3 6 8
Regardless of the various degree of compliance, some considerations must be made. 
According to subject-matter experts, delays in Reports Validation are quite consistent 
but do not represent a critical factor since it does not affect the inspection priority of the 
ship. In contrast, Ship Info and ATD/ATA can be quite critical. Although some of these 
figures may seem relatively low compared to the overall number of ship calls, 
incomplete, incorrect or missing registration of ship calls have a detrimental effect on 
the inspection commitment calculations and MSs daily operations. An incorrect 
registration of a vessel in port otherwise registered as ‘at anchorage’, influences the 
annual inspection commitment since calls ‘at anchorage’ are not included in the general 
calculation. A missed registration means that a vessel is virtually not in the port. 
Although this may seem a virtual exercise, a missed registration is beneficial for the 
interested MS since the port authority does not have to inspect the vessel and it makes it 
a burden for the next MS. Lastly, in cases of an incomplete registration with missing 
ATDs, ships remain virtually in port even though these may have departed.
It is evident that Article 24 is the challenging to implement and harmonisation in this 
respect is not achieved. However, just like with Article 5, the high value of missing 
information was mainly recorded in the first two years of the entry into force of the 
Directive. The visit reports often noted a decreasing trend in the missing ship call 
information in more recent years. 
4.2.3 Article 8 – Postponement of inspections under exceptional circumstances 
Article 8 provides clear guidance for MSs which may decide to postpone the inspection 
of a Priority I ship under specific circumstances and operational reasons. 
Table 2 shows that 15 out of 25 MSs breached the provisions of the article and 16 
observations were recorded. The majority of the observations indicated that the 
postponement justifications were not used or not properly conducted. In many cases, for 
example, the vessel was either recorded ‘at anchorage’ while in port, ‘call during night 
hours’ while outside night hours or ‘inspection would create a risk’ with no specified 
reason; all circumstances, those, in which a postponement of inspection is permitted 
under Article 8. 
If misused, the postponement of inspection has consequences on the fairness of the 
regime. To begin with, a postponement is allowed only if the inspection may be carried 
out in the next port of call of the ship in the same MS or in another port of call within 
the Union or the Paris MOU region within 15 days, provided the State in which such 
port of call is located has agreed in advance to perform the inspection9. Needless to say, 
the latter scenario imposes a burden on the next MS. Furthermore, a postponement of 
inspection is not counted as a missed inspection which can be an advantage if 
considering the allowed ratio of missed inspections. 
For the above-mentioned reasons, it is clear that failures in the execution of the 
provisions of Article 9 still occur and harmonisation in implementation has not yet been 
achieved.  
4.3 Quality of Inspection
This section contains a commentary of Article15.1, Article 15.2 and Article 14. 
4.3.1 Article 15.1 and 15.2 – Safety and Security Guidelines procedures
Article 15.1 and 15.2 focus on the safety and security guidelines procedures provided by 
Annex VI of the Directive and the Paris MoU for the control of ships. In the preparatory 
phase of the visit, a sample of inspection reports are scrutinised in order to verify 
whether the concerned MS abides by these procedures. The findings reported in Table 2 
9 The only exception to this provision is whether a ship is calling exclusively at night hours and 
the situation is judged dangerous by the relevant authority. 
showed that all MSs, with the exception of MS24, were deficient in implementing and 
following harmonised inspection procedures.  
Table 4 provides further detail and summarizes which specific procedure was not 
followed by the correspondent MS. This is indicated by an ‘x’. Among the several 
findings, subject-matter experts highlighted some of those which can be critical to 
ensure a harmonised PSC regime (italics in the table). A lack of Compliance with the 
ISM instructions, for example, and wrong Attribution of RO responsibility has a tangible 
effect on the calculation for Company and RO performance and it suggests that some 
administrations yield towards avoiding conflicts with ROs. Missing or incorrect 
convention references to detainable deficiencies deprives the industry of appropriate 
feedback in case of detentions and, more importantly, allows discretion by recording 
deficiencies not supported by legal references. Last but not least, both the facts that Not 
all areas were covered during an inspection and that the decision concerning the Type 
of inspection conducted was not always made according to the rules, highlight a lack of 
understanding and/or adequate training in PSC procedures. 
While the magnitude of the observations could not quantitatively be estimated, the 
results of Table 4 indicate that inspection procedures are not consistent among MSs and 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3.2 Article 14 – Expanded Inspection
Article 14 specifies what categories of ships are eligible for expanded inspections and 
the scope of the inspection, including the risk areas to be covered (Annex VII as 
supported by Regulation 428/2010). 
Table 2 shows that the provisions of the article are generally deficient for the 
majority of the MSs examined, specifically 20 (80%) out of 25. Most of the findings are 
related to either missing evidence for not performing an expanded inspection (e.g. local 
limitations related to the terminal, cargo operations, etc.) or to specific items not 
verified during the inspection. Three items were recurrent in the reports:
• The fire drill was not performed;
• On passenger ships, the abandon ship drill was not performed;
• On bulk carriers and oil tankers, the ballast tanks inspection, either internally 
or from the manhole, was not performed.
Beside the impact that lack of compliance with Article 14 bears in terms of 
harmonization, the non-verification of these items may be rooted in factors that are less 
evident. EMSA experts asked to provide comments in this respect have highlighted that 
performing an expanded inspection with a single inspector, especially for demanding 
vessels such as passenger ships, can be challenging and deteriorate the quality of the 
inspection process. Performing and assessing a drill is time consuming for both the crew 
(in terms of working and resting hours) and the inspectors (e.g. check bridge operations 
and communications, the master stations, the cargo areas, etc.), especially if the PSCO 
is performing the inspection alone. Similarly, the visual inspection of ballast tanks, by 
definition, can be a dangerous activity. For this reason, a PSCO may refrain from 
performing this activity especially without the support of a colleague. 
These results lead to a threefold interpretation. First, harmonization for expanded 
inspections practice has not yet been achieved. Second, empirical evidence suggests that 
to perform an effective expanded inspection, the presence of minimum number of 
inspector is advisable and should be mandatory under this article. Third, the Directive 
should take into consideration the recently growing limitations that terminals are posing 
to vessels. 
4.4 Training of PSCOs
This section comments solely on Article 22. 
4.4.1 Article 22 – Professional profile of inspectors
Article 22 provides stringent provisions on the qualifications of PSCOs.10 To be 
specific, the article requires the EC to promote a harmonised Community scheme for 
training and assessment of competences. The scheme was ultimately developed by the 
Paris MoU Secretariat and named “Paris MoU Policy on the training of the new entrant 
PSC Officers and the professional development scheme for PSC Officers” (hereafter 
referred to as Harmonised Community Training Scheme or simply “Policy”) which 
establishes a training policy for both new and experienced inspectors and criteria11 to be 
fulfilled by PSCOs in order to maintain their qualification. While the Policy is detailed 
in terms of subjects to be covered, it neither specifies how to conduct the training nor 
the number of hours necessary to deliver it. This implies that the EMSA team can verify 
the existence of a national training program and records of the training, but cannot 
comment on the veracity or accuracy of its application. 
Referring to the results given in Table 2 above, a harmonised implementation of 
Article 22 has not yet been reached. While only six out of 25 MSs did not comply with 
the minimum requirements for PSCO provisions (MSs 1, 2, 3, 9, 21), 16 MSs did not 
fulfil some of the requirements of the Harmonised Community Training Scheme (MSs 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25); this is mainly related to performing the 
Distance Learning Programme (DLP) modules. Furthermore, two MSs lacked both a 
structured national training program and records of the training, while two other MSs 
were admonished for the deployment of PSCOs across the territory in a manner which 
was not in line with the number of ship calls eligible for inspection.
Several authors have alluded to the influence that the background and training of 
PSCOs may have on the outcome of the PSC inspection being it the type of deficiencies 
10 The minimum requirements for PSCOs are laid down in Annex XI of the Directive
11 These criteria comprise both compulsory activities, such as carrying out at least ten PSC 
inspections per year and carrying out the Distance Learning Programme (DLP) on Paris 
MoU procedures, and others that contributed to gaining the minimum number of points (30) 
required in a five-year period.
detected and/or leniency during inspection procedures (Bloor et al., 2006; Knapp and 
Franses, 2007b; Ravira and Piniella, 2016). Table 5 shows the training hours (practical 
and theoretical) for new entrant PSCOs (NE in the table) and total training hours for 
existing PSCOs (EX in the table) as offered by the national training scheme of the 
various MSs.12 
As clearly shown, national training efforts are not consistent across the 25 MSs. In 
some countries, the theoretical training appears to have a more significant role than the 
practical one (e.g., MS12, MS14, MS15, MS16, MS25), while in others it is the 
contrary (e.g., MS1, MS5, MS9, MS17, MS23). With the exception of some MSs 
(mainly MS1, MS9, MS12, MS14, MS17, MS25) and the very limited efforts for 
existing PSCOs, the majority of the MSs invest less than 500 hours in training for entry-
level PSCOs. The lack of training for existing PSCOs may be explained by the fact that 
MSs rely heavily on training offered by the Paris MoU Secretariat and EMSA. 
Both the results from Table 2 and Table 5 portray dissonant training programmes 
among the 25 EU/EFTA MSs. This imbalance may impact not only the outcome of the 
inspections, but more importantly the key objective of ensuring harmonised inspection 
procedures to vessels entering regional ports and avoid port shopping. 
Table 5 – Training hours for New Entrant and Existing PSCOs according to the MSs’ National Training Scheme.



























































Theoretical (NE) Practical (NE) Total (EX)
12 No data available for MSs 13 - 20 – 21. 
4.5 Other Areas of Concern
This section comments on shortcomings and observations recorded in Article 9 and 
Organization. 
4.5.1 Article 9 – Notification of Arrival 
Article 9 provides that the operator, agent, or master of a ship, which under Article 14 is 
eligible for an expanded inspection and bound for a port or anchorage of a Member 
State, shall notify the port authorities of the concerned MS of its arrival (72 hours pre-
arrival notification). In practice, the article requires companies and/or operators to be 
aware of their vessel(s)’ eligibility to an expanded inspection.
The majority of shortcomings and observations recorded for this article relate 
mainly to the lack of evidence that all ships liable for an expanded inspection provided 
the required pre-arrival notification. Although there is no indication that breaches in 
Article 9 trigger concerns in the context of harmonisation, it is worthwhile mentioning 
that these provisions seem to discharge part of the responsibilities of targeting and 
notification to the shipping company rather than to the MS. 
Two approaches may be adopted to mitigate the high number of findings in this 
process. Either the provisions should be applicable only to the MSs rather than to the 
shipping company. Otherwise, the operator, agent or master of a ship which is entering 
a port of anchorage of a MS, shall always provide a 72 hours’ pre-arrival notification 
and the article should be deleted by the Directive. 
4.5.2 Organization
This process examines the way in which the maritime authorities have organised the 
national PSC system and includes Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Directive. The visit 
includes an overall assessment of the national maritime organization and, specifically, 
the national PSC Organization (e.g., whether centralised or decentralised). 
While the legal conformity verification of the transposition of the Directive into 
national legislation is the sole prerogative of the EC, the only activity conducted in this 
regard during the visits is a sample verification of the operational aspects of the 
Directive as transposed into national legislation. In other words, shortcomings and 
observations in this process mainly indicate MSs which transposed the directive beyond 
the deadline (MSs 11, 14, 20, 25) or those which did not incorporate all amendments or 
relevant instruments into national legislation (MSs 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, 22, 25). 
Other types of observations regarded either issues related to human resources (MSs 16, 
19, 24), unclear processes for amending and implementing IMO Conventions (MS 20) 
or, lastly, limited oversight, coordination and monitoring of PSC activities (MS 23). 
In general, the findings suggest that the Directive has been largely transposed into 
national legislation with minor, if any, issues for 11 (44%) of the 25 MSs examined. 
These are issues that have not been considered serious or critical to the proper 
operational conduct of PSC inspections. However, observations related to problems of 
resources and oversight may have a stronger impact on PSC activities as pointed out in 
other studies (Anderson, 2002; Bloor et al., 2006; Özçayır, 2009; Sampson and Bloor, 
2007), and should be further investigated for short-time and long-time effects. 
4.6  (in)-adequacy of EU Port State Control?
 In order to summarize the main results, the study has found that Articles 5, 8, 9, 14, 
15.1, 15.2, 22 and 24 are the articles where the majority of the findings were recorded. 
The high number of observations and shortcomings suggests that the Directive has not 
yet fostered harmonisation among MSs for these aspects. In detail, three major areas of 
improvement and simplification may be considered by policy makers in a future 
revision exercise: Inspection Commitment/Information, Quality of Inspections, and 
Training of PSCOs.
In general, it is evident that some MSs struggle with meeting their annual inspection 
commitment. Despite the provisions for overburdened (OB) and underburdened (UB) 
maritime authorities, the calculation for the fair share itself can be eroded by an 
unbalanced application of some key provisions. The number of missing information 
reported under Article 24, for example, or MSs that inspect in excess of their annual 
share are factors that have a significant impact on the overall prediction of the fair 
share. As a consequence, some MSs may face undue additional costs in terms of 
resources and the regime may be exposed to criticisms by the industry. 
Another criticality is represented by the designation of OB and UB MSs. To be 
specific, a generic MS is exclusively held to be OB/UB at the end of each calendar year, 
once all PI and PII calls are registered. Thus, MSs are unaware whether the provisions 
under Article 6 (5% for HRP and 10% for other ship risk profile missed inspection 
allowed) are applicable or not. Although the previous year could be taken into 
consideration, this ambiguity does not allow the various maritime authorities for the 
planning of preventive measures. On an even higher level, since it is clear that OB states 
do not inspect PII vessels entirely while UB states are obliged to do so, policy makers 
may even wish to rethink the Priority rationale itself.
From an operational perspective, the higher number of shortcomings and 
observations observed in Article 14, 15.1, and 15.2 reveal a tendency for inspection 
procedures to be applied in a disorderly manner. This outcome is at odds with the 
overarching objective of ensuring common inspection standards in the region. If 
examined in combination with inconsistencies in training practice, as highlighted during 
the commentary of Article 22, these findings call for specific actions to improve the 
adherence with inspection procedures. Despite these considerations, improvements in 
the area of quality of inspections could be achieved either through a more 
comprehensive training policy embedded into the text of the Directive, or a centralised 
training centre for EU/EFTA PSCOs. Another approach could be to introduce a system 
of external and internal peer reviews. The external review could consider a series of 
indicators to identify faulty inspecting behaviours by different port authorities and 
inspectors (e.g., pattern of deficiencies detected by individual ports, type of deficiencies 
determined at t and t+1 inspections, etc.). In parallel, an internal review could be 
adopted through the national PSC Coordinator. 
It is also fundamental to reiterate that Directives, as legislative instruments of the 
EC, have to be transposed into domestic legislation by the various MSs, with great 
latitude for national interpretation (Kurcz, 2001; Twigg-Flesner, 2011). This practice 
may, per-se, impair the process of implementation and harmonisation (Lohse, 2011) 
while a more stringent legal instrument, such as Regulations, may increase the level of 
harmonisation and avoid potential distortion caused in interpretation (Coleman and 
Jessen, 2016; Monti, 2010).
The aforementioned findings not only demonstrate that harmonisation has not yet 
been achieved in some key areas, but point to the need to undertake a revision exercise 
that will, among others, lead to a simplification of some of the Directive provisions.  
5 Conclusions
This study has analysed 25 reports produced by EMSA after inspections to EU/EFTA 
MSs with the objective of determining the level of compliance with Directive 
2009/16/EC as amended by Directive 2013/38/EU. Particular attention was given to the 
implementation and harmonisation of the Directive’s provisions and to identify gaps 
between policy and practice.  
Europe has been at the forefront of regional and organised ship safety inspections 
since the establishment of the Paris MoU in 1982. With the adoption of a series of 
legislative acts on PSC, the EU has made binding for EU/EFTA MSs provisions of what 
was originally a non-binding regional agreement on PSC. The Directive entered into 
force on 1 January 2011, boosting and increasing targeting and selection of substandard 
vessels, inspection procedures, and overall harmonisation in the region. The level of 
harmonisation and implementation more than six years since its introduction is therefore 
extremely important to ensure that the standards specified under the Directive are 
uniformly applied in the region and to highlight discrepancies to be addressed in the 
upcoming revision.
The Directive has been successfully transposed into national legislation by the 25 
EU/EFTA MSs investigated. While many of its provisions have been successfully 
implemented, challenges in some areas remain an obstacle to the overarching objective 
of ensuring common standards in the region. This study has identified Inspection 
Commitment/Information, Quality of Inspections, and Training of PSCOs as some of 
the weakest links in the on-going process of harmonising PSC systems and procedures. 
Port state control has become an indispensable feature in the successful 
implementation and enforcement of the legal framework for maritime safety, security, 
and marine environmental protection not only in Europe, but worldwide. The possible 
amendment of the Directive can only further the cause of PSC harmonization. 
Discrepancies in harmonisation may hamper the achievement of a level playing field 
across Europe and foster safety competition between neighbourhood countries of the 
same region. The authors hope that this study and its findings can contribute to the 
corpus of reference materials that will inform European PSC policymakers as they 
embark on a revision of Directive 2009/16/EC. 
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• The Port State Control Directive has been successfully transposed in all Member 
States.
• A holistic analysis of the implementation of the PSC Directive 2009/16/EC is 
performed;
• Complete harmonisation of the main elements of the EU Directive 2009/16/EC is not 
yet achieved;
• Training of Port State Control Officers, Inspection Commitment/Information and 
Quality of Inspections are the areas were most shortcomings and observations were 
recorded;
• Gaps between policy and practice were identified;
• A review of the Directive 2009/16/EC is suggested to policy-makers. 
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A B S T R A C T
The succession of maritime accidents in the last decades of the 20th Century caused a strong political and public
outcry for more stringent maritime safety regulations and measures. One of the most significant developments in
this regard was the establishment of several regional agreements on Port State Control (PSC) – the first of which
was the Paris MoU – with the specific objective of fighting substandard shipping through coordinated and
harmonised inspection procedures. This article is based on results from 32,206 PSC inspections carried out by the
European Union and European Free Trade Association Member States within the Paris MoU region from 1
January 2014 to 31 December 2015 to assess whether discrepancies among Member States exist after the entry
into force of Directive 2009/16/EC and the introduction of the New Inspection Regime. Further, the study
proceeds by investigating whether PSC team composition and inspector's background influence inspection
outcomes. The study has identified that differences in detecting at least one deficiency and/or detaining a vessel
are significant among Member States. With regard to team composition and background, it appears that the
former correlates to the number of deficiencies and detentions and the latter, though the significance is not
always consistent, to detecting a certain type of deficiencies according to the specific inspector's backgrounds.
The paper concludes by presenting potential policy implications.
1. Introduction
The inspection of foreign flagged vessels in national ports is not a
novel exercise. Provisions for the inspection or control of foreign vessels
by port states have been a feature of enforcement since the 1929 SOLAS
Convention. However, it was not until the emergence of regional
agreements – the so-called ‘Memoranda of Understanding on Port State
Control (PSC MoU)’ – that such practice became a regular element in
the promotion of maritime safety. As mentioned, “the powers used by
Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) are not new; it is the willingness to
use the power which is new” [1, p.1].
As often occurs in the policy making process, the catalyst for an
increased use of port state control (PSC) is to be found in a series of very
serious maritime accidents which occurred in the final decades of the
20th century.1 These accidents highlighted the unsatisfactory degree of
enforcement exercised by certain maritime administration [2–8] and
caused a strong political and public outcry for more stringent regula-
tions regarding safety of ships, protection of the maritime environment
and living and working conditions [1,4].
In response, eight north European states signed The Hague
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 1978, promptly superseded
by a more comprehensive gentlemen's agreement in 1982, the Paris
MoU [7,9,10], in order to stem the proliferation of substandard vessels
across European waters. The Paris MoU served as the archetype for
other MoUs which were established in other regions during the 1990s
[10] 2. It also served as the backbone for the three PSC Directives
adopted by the European Union (EU) since 1995.
The main purpose of regional enforcement is to “drastically reduce
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substandard shipping in the waters under the jurisdiction of Member
States” (MSs) by developing, among other factors “common criteria for
control of ships by the port State and harmonising procedures on in-
spection and detention” [11]. However, issues in the harmonisation
process have been identified since the emergence of the early MoUs
[2,12–17] that may result in different inspection output, either deten-
tions or deficiencies, depending on the inspecting port authority.
Asymmetrical inspecting behaviours can undermine the effective im-
plementation of international regulations [2,14] and distort the level
playing field within the region.
This paper inquiries into the adequacy in EU Port State controls as
reflected by either relative homogeneity or heterogeneity in inspection
outcomes depending on where vessels are inspected. For that purpose,
the study relies on a dataset from the European Union with detailed
records from approximately 48,000 inspections and 130,000 defi-
ciencies detected during the time frame 1 January 2014 to 31 December
2015. A unique feature of the database is that it includes com-
plementary information on the number and background of PSCOs who
carried out inspections, giving us the possibility to investigate whether
these elements may be correlated to any inadequacies in the PSC in-
spection regime.
The data is analysed in the following manner. First, an investigation
is performed on whether single EU countries record a higher number of
deficiencies and detention compared to others. An econometric analysis
is used to control for the fact that vessels inspected in different coun-
tries do not have the same observable characteristics. Second, an ex-
ploration of whether inspection outcomes are correlated to the number
and background of PSCOs present on board at the time of inspection is
implemented. Overall, the results show that discrepancies in harmoni-
sation have been encountered and that accounting for PSCO's char-
acteristics have an influence on inspection outcomes.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a brief review of the literature concerning PSCs and presents some
research hypotheses. In Section 3, a description of the data sample is
provided and econometric results are discussed in Section 4. Finally,
conclusions and potential policy implications are presented in Section 5.
2. Background
During the first years of its implementation, the Paris MoU under-
went some criticisms as it was perceived as a ‘discriminatory enforce-
ment’ of International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions [18].
This led several scholars to verify the effectiveness of PSC
[2,4,7,12,13,19–29] and its legal foundation [6,10,21,30–34]. Ac-
cording to these investigations, it is nowadays conventional wisdom
that PSCs contribute to ensuring compliance with international reg-
ulatory efforts [6–8,19,35] and increase safety standards [5,36], pol-
lution prevention and standards for seafarers on board vessels [20,21].
Despite the numerous positive effects observed, even at the early
stages of the introduction of regional initiatives on PSC, cross-national
differences have emerged in inspection practices and results, whether
number of deficiencies or probability of detention. Discrepancies in
inspection practices have a profound impact on the credibility of the
regional MoUs on PSC. These can distort the market [16] by promoting
the so called “port-shopping” phenomenon [10,14,21,35], a strategic
practice by some operators who choose certain ports/regions [14,15]
over others because of their less stringent safety enforcement standards.
Moreover, differences can undermine the targeting system that relies on
the accuracy of inspection results [16]. Reasons for discrepancies can be
multiple and diverse.
In the context of international law, an MoU is not a treaty but an
administrative agreement [4,15,37] which implies that its provisions
are, de jure, non-binding for the signatory parties. In the case of the EU,
however, the provisions of the Paris MoU have been made mandatory
and enforceable for EU MSs through the issuance of Directive 2009/16/
EC. Clearly, an administrative agreement that does not contemplate
binding provisions may allow for differences in application while hard
law, such as the EU Directive, may presuppose a more harmonised
approach.
On a country level, regional differences may be induced by the
various stages of development and peculiarities within different regions
[12]. Differences across Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU, Caribbean MoU, Viña
del Mar Agreement, AMSA and the USCG were identified by Knapp and
Franses [16] and Knapp and van de Velden [38]. On a cross-national
level, differences were identified within the Tokyo MoU [22], between
India, Russia and the UK [2,39] and also among Australia, India, South
Africa and Russia [17]. However, aside from a recent interview study
from Graziano, Schröder-Hinrichs and Ölcer [40] focusing on dis-
crepancies within the EU region, no empirical study based on PSCs have
investigated cross-national differences in the EU following the entry
into force of Directive 2009/16/EC.
Considering the reason why discrepancies may appear, Anderson
[13] suggested that the lack of appropriate resources and unequal
participation of states in the same MoU are factors to be taken into
consideration. Anderson [13] also calls into question the diversity in
resources, whether manpower, financial, or technological as well as the
lack of specific action plans for proper enforcement. Knapp and Franses
[16] argue that various port authorities seem to adopt different in-
spection philosophies in the detention of vessels which translates to
perceived cross-national differences.
On a more operational level, ship-related elements play a prominent
role on the inspection outcomes. Authors have identified age, ship type,
flag of registry as determinants of the number of deficiencies recorded
[24]. In spite of the fact that those elements proved to be significant
predictors of the inspection results, differences across inspecting au-
thorities, even when controlled for, remain and are still responsible for
the number of deficiencies and probability of detentions [16,17]. A
supplementing conclusion can be reached if considering subjectivity
and reliance on professional judgment as inherent contributing ele-
ments to cross-national difference [2,4,40]. More specifically, some
authors have suggested that further investigations should be conducted
on the influence that the background of PSCOs and the number of in-
spectors on the inspection team have on inspections results [16,41].
This paper contributes to the body of literature investigating cross-
national differences of PSC practices within the EU as a region. Its first
aim is to assess whether particular EU countries record a higher number
of deficiencies or higher detention rates. For that purpose, an econo-
metric analysis is applied as there may be differences in the char-
acteristics of the vessel inspected among countries. Following the pre-
vious empirical evidence of [16,17,23,24,28,29,39], two research
hypotheses are formulated.
Hypothesis 1. PSCs may lead to country differences both in number of
deficiencies and in rates of detention within the EU region even when
the characteristics of the fleet inspected are controlled for.
Moreover, in line with [16,40,41], an investigation is performed on
whether the number of inspectors allocated for an inspection and the
background of inspectors can help in understanding the potential cross-
national differences in PSC outcomes.
Hypothesis 2. PSC outcomes can be influenced by the number and
background of inspectors within the EU region.
Numerous studies take for granted that the mandatory nature of the
European PSC regime, by virtue of Directive 2009/16/EC, translates to
a more effective PSC inspection system compared to other PSC MoUs
[5].
3. Data and descriptive statistics
The hypotheses were tested using PSC inspection data carried out
within the EU and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) region
within the Paris MoU framework. Originally established in 1982, the
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Paris MoU includes 27 maritime authorities covering the coastal waters
of the European states and the North Atlantic from North America to
Europe.3 These authorities agreed to implement a harmonised system of
PSC in the aftermath of the Amoco Cadiz accident in 1978. In this fra-
mework, only the 25 EU and EFTA countries belonging to the Paris
MoU have been included in the study since they abide by the provisions
of Directive 2009/16/EC. Canada and the Russia Federation were ex-
cluded from the original dataset.
The selection of vessels to be inspected is based on results from a
ship risk profile calculator and a company performance calculator.4 The
influential parameters are the type of ship, whether the ship is older
than 12 years, the flag and its performance (from white to black high
risk), whether the flag is IMO audited, whether all certificates are issued
by flag, the recognized organization and its performance (from very low
to high), whether the organization is EU recognized, and the ISM
company performance (from very low to high).5 The ship risk profile
also depends on historical parameters from the last 36 months: at least
one inspection, all inspections with 5 or less deficiencies, and number of
detentions. A high risk profile is assigned to ships whose score is at least
5 points.
Based on a ship's risk profile, the Inspection and Selection Scheme
determines the scope, frequency and priority of inspections. According
to the risk profile of ships, the PSC Database THETIS informs the PSC
authorities of the priority of a ship entering their ports, whether No
Priority (ship should not be inspected), Priority II (PII - ship may be
inspected) or Priority I (PI - ship must be inspected). Ships become due
for periodic inspection in the following time windows: for high risk
ships (HRS), the ship is PII during the first 5 months following the last
Paris MoU inspection and PI after 6 months. For standard risk ships
(SRS), the ship is PII during 10 months following the last inspection and
PI after 12 months. Lastly, for low risk ships (LRS), the ship is PII during
24 months following the last inspection and PI after 36 months.
Each inspection leads to a report, publicly available on THETIS, that
includes the following information: date of inspection, type of inspec-
tion (initial, expanded, more detailed inspection), country of inspec-
tion, ISM company performance, vessel flag of registry, flag perfor-
mance (white-grey-black list) and risk profile (high, medium, low).6
The database also includes information on the year when the vessel was
built (from which the age at the time of the inspection is calculated),
ship's total length and ship type (general cargo, oil tanker, container,
etc). A unique feature of the dataset is that it also includes the in-
spector's identification number.7 As discussed later, this will allow to
account for the background of inspectors when explaining PSC out-
comes. Due to this specific information on inspectors, the various
Members States are anonymized in the dataset.
For each inspection, the number of deficiencies and the number of
deficiencies leading to detention are reported. The PSC outcomes are
defined in the following manner. DEF is a binary variable equal to one
when, following an inspection, a specific vessel had at least one defi-
ciency detected (and it is equal to 0 otherwise). DEFN is the number of
deficiencies recorded. DET is a binary variable which takes the value of
one when a vessel is detained and is equal to 0 otherwise. For each
deficiency, each type of deficient or defective item is also recorded.
The empirical analysis is based on an exhaustive dataset provided
by the EC with inspection as observation unit. It covers all inspections
carried out from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2015.8 Overall, the
sample comprises 32,206 PSC inspections. Out of these, 10,076 are
initial inspections (31.3%), 17,431 more detailed inspections (54.1%),
and 4699 expanded inspections (14.6%). An initial inspection is a visit
on board of a ship in order to check the certificates and documents
listed in Annex 10 of the MoU text, the overall condition and hygiene of
the ship, if the vessel meets generally accepted international rules and
standards and to verify, whether deficiencies found by an Authority at a
previous inspection have been rectified. A more detailed inspection is
carried out whenever there are clear grounds for believing, during an
inspection, that the condition of the ship or of its equipment or crew
does not substantially meet the relevant requirements of a relevant
instrument. An expanded inspection includes a check of the overall
conditions, including human element where relevant, in 14 different
risk areas.9
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the sample. The
proportion of inspections with at least one deficiency is 53.5%. The
average number of deficiencies detected during an inspection is 2.4
(with a standard deviation of 4.0). The proportion of inspections
leading to detention is equal to 3.4%. As expected, the PSC outcome is
strongly affected by the type of inspection. The proportion of vessels
with at least one deficiency is 29.3% for initial inspections, but around
65.0% for more detailed and expanded inspections. By definition, de-
tention follows a more detailed or an expanded inspection and the
conditional detention rate is 5.0% in both cases.
General cargo is the type of vessel that is the most frequently in-
spected with 29.9% of inspections, followed by bulk carrier (18.3%).
There are substantial differences in PSC outcomes depending on the
vessel type. There are more deficiencies detected for general cargo
(62.7%), passenger vessels (58.3%) and bulk carriers (58.3%).
Detention is also much more frequent for general cargo (5.9%) and to a
lesser extent bulk carrier (3.5%) than for other vessels. The average age
of vessels subject to inspection is 15.1 years. There exists a positive
correlation between inspection outcomes and age at inspection. Having
at least one deficiency is found for 45.9% of vessels aged between 5 and
10, but 71.6% for vessels older than 30 years.10 In the same vein, flags
of registry performance is playing on the likelihood of having more
deficiencies and a detention. The average number of deficiencies is 2.1
for the white category, 4.0 for the grey category, 5.7 for the black
medium risk category and even 8.1 for the black medium to high and
high risk categories.
To detect potential disparities across the various locations where
inspections are taking place, let n be the total number of inspections
and nj that for country j. The average proportion of vessels with any












This corresponds to a weighted sum of the average proportion of
vessels with any deficiencies in each country DEFj.
Fig. 1 sheds light on heterogeneity in the number of inspections nj
between the various countries and for the 32,306 PSC inspections
carried out by the 25 different EU and EFTA countries. Due to anon-
ymization, the various Members States are relabeled using codes ran-
ging from MS1 to MS25. The average number of inspections per country
is 1288, with a standard deviation of 991. It ranges from 138 (MS11) to
3 The current member states are Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. For further details on the Paris MoU,
see www.parismou.org.
4 These calculators are available online at https://portal.emsa.europa.eu/web/thetis/
calculators.
5 The International Safety Management (ISM) Code is a mandatory international
standard for the safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention.
6 Inspection results can be found at https://portal.emsa.europa.eu/web/thetis/
inspections.
7 Access to the data used in this paper was made possible through an agreement with
the EC.
8 In this administrative dataset filled in by maritime authorities, there is no issue of
missing data. Data are re-checked by national coordinators once filled in the system. In
case of mismatches, the data are verified once more by EMSA personnel dealing with ship
inspection support.
9 See https://www.parismou.org/inspections-risk/library-faq/inspection-types.
10 The proportion of detained vessels is higher for vessels older than 30 years (8.5%)
compared to vessels aged between 15 and 20 years (4.1%).
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3520 (MS23). There are large country differences by type of inspec-
tions. The average is 403 for initial inspection (with a standard devia-
tion of 339) and 697 for more detailed inspections (with a standard
deviation of 546).
Fig. 2 represents the various PSC inspection outcomes for each
member state. The data shows large differences in the region. The
average proportion of deficiencies ranges from 69.2% when vessels are
inspected in MS4 to 20.4% in MS12. This proportion exceeds 60% in 8
member states (MS4, MS10, MS19, MS2, MS25, MS1, MS21, MS13),
while it is below 30% in 5 states (MS12, MS7, MS6, MS24, MS20). On
average, the number of deficiencies per inspection is larger when in-
spections are carried out in a port located in MS19 (4.2), MS10 (3.8)
and MS2 (3.5).11 The probability of detention is more likely when in-
spections are conducted in MS4 (11.8%), MS10 (6.9%) and MS11
(6.7%). Conversely, there is no detention when vessels are inspected in
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the sample.







Initial inspection 29.3 0.7 0.0 31.3
More detailed inspection 64.1 3.0 5.0 54.1
Expanded inspection 66.4 3.6 5.0 14.6
Type of vessel
Bulk carrier 54.8 2.5 3.5 18.3
Oil tanker 39.4 1.3 1.4 7.7
Chemical/gas tanker 42.9 1.4 1.5 11.3
Containership 47.6 1.7 1.6 10.8
General cargo 62.7 3.3 5.9 29.9
Passenger 58.3 2.5 1.8 2.2
Ro-ro 52.3 2.2 2.0 7.7
Other 52.9 2.1 3.1 12.2
Age at inspection
0–5 37.8 1.1 0.9 16.5
5–10 45.9 1.6 1.9 27.1
10–15 51.4 2.0 2.3 15.6
15–20 61.3 2.8 4.1 14.7
20–30 65.5 3.5 5.7 13.5
30+ 71.6 4.5 8.5 12.5
Flag Performance
White 51.1 2.1 2.7 91.2
Grey 69.3 4.0 8.8 4.3
Black medium risk 82.7 5.7 12.1 2.9
Black medium to high
risk
94.7 8.1 15.7 1.6
All vessels 53.5 2.4 3.4
Note: DEF is for any deficiency, DEFN is for number of deficiencies, and DET is for detention.
Fig. 1. Number of inspections, by member country.
Note: MS1-MS25 refer to the different inspection
countries. Source: data from EU region 2014–2015,
authors’ calculations.
11 The lowest figures are in MS7 (0.4), MS12 (0.7), MS24 (0.7) and MS6 (0.7).
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MS6 and MS12. In addition, detentions are not necessarily higher in a
country where more deficiencies are detected on average. For instance,
in MS11, the detention rate is 6.7% while the average number of de-
ficiencies is 1.4.
From a descriptive viewpoint, a variance decomposition analysis is
implemented to assess the extent to which differences in PSC outcomes
stem from differences between countries (due to differences in the
average outcomes of countries) or differences within countries (due to
variation in the outcomes for each country). Let DEFji a dummy vari-
able indicating whether inspection i occurring in country j leads to the
report of any deficiencies. Denoting by V (.) the variance operator,
V DEF( )ji can be expressed as:
= + −V DEF V DEF V DEF DEF( ) ( ) ( )ji j ji j (2)
The first term V DEF( )j is the between variance and refers to dif-
ferences in the average proportion of having any deficiencies between
countries. The second-term −V DEF DEF( )ji j is the within variance and
corresponds to differences in the PSC outcome observed in any given
country with respect to the average level of that country.
For the likelihood of having a deficiency detected, the contributions
of the between and within terms to the total variance (equal to 0.248)
represent 6.5% and 93.5%, respectively. Very similar results are found
for the number of deficiencies with weights equal to 5.3% and 94.7%
for the between and within variances, respectively. These findings
stress that although there are differences in the average PSC outcomes
between countries, there are still large differences in PSC outcomes
within each country. This pattern is consistent with two main ex-
planations. On the one hand, there may be some lack of consistency in
inspection procedures under the authority of each individual port state.
On the other hand, there may be some heterogeneity in vessels calling
within each country. In the next Section, the role of vessels’ char-
acteristics is taken into account using an econometric analysis.
4. Results
4.1. Differences by country of inspection
The average number of deficiencies detected within a given country
can be higher if vessels inspected in this country are, on average, in bad
condition. To account for this effect on the various PSC outcomes, linear
probability models for DEF and DET and an OLS regression for DEFN 12
are estimated. In addition to country of inspection dummies, the fol-
lowing list of control variables is included in the various regressions:
type of inspection, type of vessel, age at inspection and flag of registry.
Table 2 focuses on the influence of country of inspection and reports the
Fig. 2. Results of inspections, by member country.
Note: MS1-MS25 refer to the different inspection
countries. Source: data from the EU Region
2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
12 Similar conclusions were reached using Probit models for DEF and DET .
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corresponding marginal effects for each outcome.13
Estimates show that almost all country of inspection fixed effects are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This means that, net of the
type of inspection and of vessel characteristics (type, age, flag), there
are still differences across countries of inspection, a result similar to
[16,17]. Turning to the likelihood of having at least one deficiency
detected (column 1, Table 2), all marginal effects are negative. This
implies that the probability for a vessel of having at least one deficiency
detected is higher when the inspection is carried out in MS1. The gap is
impressive for some countries. Compared to MS1, the probability of
having a vessel without deficiency is more than 40 percent points lower
in MS6, MS7, MS12, MS20 and MS24.
Similar results are found for the number of deficiencies (column 2,
Table 2). Compared to MS1, inspections completed in MS3, MS6, MS7,
MS12, MS18 or MS24 are associated with less deficiencies (with a gap
exceeding 2.5 deficiencies per vessel). The situation is different for
detention (column 3, Table 2). Compared to the reference country MS1,
the probability of having a vessel detained increases by 6.1 percentage
points when the vessel is inspected in MS4 and by 3.3 percentage points
in MS14. Conversely, detention decreases by 4.8 percentage points
when the vessel is inspected in MS2 and by 3.6 when inspected in MS3.
The comparison of the three PSC outcomes (DEF , DET , DEFN )
shows that there is an impact from being inspected in a country instead
of another, though there is no clear hierarchy. On the one hand, some
countries such as MS10, MS19 or MS25 rank higher compared to MS1
in terms of all three PSC outcomes. Specifically, MS19 ranks third in
terms of any deficiency, it ranks first in terms of number of deficiencies
and it ranks fifth in terms of detention. Differently, MS11 ranks 18th in
terms of any deficiency and number of deficiencies but it is ranks
second for detention. If these empirical findings confirm the first hy-
pothesis on PSC country differences, both in number of deficiencies and
in rates of detention, they also confirm that vessels’ characteristics
impact PSC outcomes. The R2 associated to the model explaining the
probability of having any deficiency is more than three times higher
with both vessels’ characteristics and inspection country dummies (R2
= 0.221) than with country dummies only (R2 = 0.065). The same
ratio is around 4.3 both for number of deficiencies and detention. As
expected, vessels’ characteristics are the most important factor ex-
plaining the PSC outcomes.
For instance, age is positively related to deficiencies or detention.
Compared to the reference age category which is less than 5 years old,
the probability of having a vessel detained increases by 4.7 percentage
points when the vessel is more than 30 years old, and by 2.1 percentage
points for the number of deficiencies. Also, Passenger and Ro-Ro vessels
are subject to less detention and deficiencies compared to the “other
vessels” category, while general cargo are more often detained and with
more deficiencies detected.
In order to assess the within-country differences, a variance de-
composition based on the regression estimates was calculated from the
random effect regression which describes the number of deficiencies
DEFji. Let Xji be the control variables and β̂ the estimated coefficients.
The predicted number of deficiencies,
=DEF Xβˆ ˆji (3)
is decomposed in a between observed varianceV DEF( ˆ )j , which refers to
the average differences between countries, and a within observed var-
iance −V DEF DEF( ˆ ˆ )ji j , which refers to the differences in deficiencies
with respect to the average level within each country of inspection. A
much larger contribution of the within variance (88.7%) compared to
the between variance (11.3%) is found, meaning that even net of the
vessel characteristics, substantial heterogeneity remains in the PSC
outcomes within each country of inspection.
4.2. Number of inspectors
This subsection investigates whether the number of inspectors al-
located to carry out an inspection could explain the cross-country dif-
ferences identified in the previous section and in former studies
[16,17]. As reported in Fig. 3, there are indeed large disparities in the
number of inspectors mobilized for an inspection. For the whole
sample, more than one-half of inspections (56.8%) were carried out
using one inspector. They are two for 36.9% of inspections and three
and more for 6.3% of inspections.
More inspectors are mobilized for more detailed and expanded in-
spections. The proportion of inspections with exactly two inspectors is
31.4% for initial inspections, 37.3% for more detailed inspections and
47.5% for expanded expansions. The decision of engaging one or more
inspectors on board is not part of the EU legislation and is a sovereign
decision remaining in each individual member state. This flexibility
may be positive since MSs are in a position to allocate the number of
inspectors on the foundation of financial circumstances, personnel and
territorial extension.
Fig. 4 shows some statistics on the average number of inspectors per
inspection for each member country and by type of inspection. These
averages are calculated because of the correlation between the number
of inspectors and the type of inspection evidenced in Fig. 3. Again, there
are large differences by country. For initial inspections, the average
number of inspectors per inspection ranges from 1.0 in MS16 and MS20
to 1.8 in MS8 and 2.1 in MS2. Almost the same rankings are found for
more detailed inspections, with the lowest averages in MS20 (1.0) and
MS16 (1.1) and the highest averages in MS8 (1.9) and MS2 (2.2). For
expanded inspections, the highest average numbers of inspectors are
found in MS8 (2.4), MS4 (2.6) and MS7 (2.7) and the lowest are still in
MS16 (1.1) and MS20 (1.1).
Table 2
Estimates of inspection results – marginal effects for member countries.
Source: data from the EU Region MoU 2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
Country of inspection DEF (in %) DEFN DET (in %)
MS1 Ref Ref Ref
MS10 −10.8*** −0.6*** 1.7***
MS11 −29.9*** −2.3*** 3.3
MS12 −48.5*** −2.6*** −3.2***
MS13 −11.4*** −1.0*** 2.8***
MS14 −13.4*** −0.7*** 3.3***
MS15 −28.6*** −2.3*** −3.5***
MS16 −24.3*** −1.2*** 1.6
MS17 −11.0*** −0.9*** −0.6
MS18 −39.3*** −2.5*** −2.3***
MS19 −8.6*** 0.3* 1.7**
MS2 −21.7*** −1.7*** −4.8***
MS20 −41.1*** −2.1*** −1.1**
MS21 −22.0*** −1.9*** −2.4***
MS22 −14.7*** −0.4* −0.9
MS23 −14.2*** −0.6*** 0.8*
MS24 −44.7*** −2.6*** −2.1***
MS25 −6.2*** −0.3** 1.6***
MS3 −29.1*** −2.7*** −3.6***
MS4 −13.8*** −1.0*** 6.1***
MS5 −31.4*** −2.0*** −2.1***
MS6 −42.7*** −2.6*** −2.8***
MS7 −43.9*** −2.7*** −2.0***
MS8 −16.8*** −1.6*** −0.2
MS9 −14.5*** −0.7*** 1.0**
Type of inspection YES YES YES
Type of vessel YES YES YES
Age at inspection YES YES YES
Vessel flag YES YES YES
Number of observations 32,206 32,206 32,206
Note: estimates from linear probability and linear regression models. Significance levels
are 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
13 Detailed results for all covariates with coefficients, t-values and marginal effects are
available from the authors upon request.
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Fig. 4. Number of inspectors per inspection, by
member country and type of inspection. Source: data
from the EU Region 2014–2015, authors’ calcula-
tions.
Fig. 3. Number of inspectors, by type of inspection.
Source: data from the EU Region MoU 2014–2015,
authors’ calculations.
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The number of inspectors is likely to influence the PSC outcomes. A
higher number of inspectors affords the inspection of more specific
areas within the same amount of time spent on board the ship. For
instance, a single inspector with a deck background might spend 20 min
inspecting the navigation bridge and life-saving appliances and then
another 20 min to sweep through the engine room, cargo spaces, and
marine pollution prevention related logs and records. On the other
hand, a team of three inspectors could concentrate the same 40 min on
only one or two specific areas. This invariably leads to closer ex-
aminations and therefore higher probabilities for noting deficiencies
and even ordering detentions.
Fig. 5 confirms the relevance of such an assumption. The mean
number of deficiencies detected is 4.6 when three or more inspectors
are mobilized against 2.8 when there are two inspectors and 1.9 when
there is only one. The gap is even larger when examining the impact on
the detention rate, which is 13.8% with three inspectors against 4.3%
for two inspectors and 1.7% for one. Interpreting these results remains
nonetheless difficult as they may be subject to the issue of reverse
causality. As explained above, the decision to dispatch one or more
inspectors on board depends on the MS according to the travelling
distance from the office to the port, the internal organization of the
maritime administration, the national policy and the size of the vessel,
among other reasons.
Table 3 assesses whether the number of inspectors has an influence
on PSC outcomes once vessel characteristics are introduced as ex-
planatory variables in the various regressions. When considering the
whole sample of inspections (panel A), the probability of having any
deficiencies is 8.8 percentage points higher when there are two in-
spectors rather than one and even 13.4 percentage points with three
inspectors. In the same vein, the probability of having a vessel detained
is 3.8 percentage points higher with two inspectors (rather than one)
and 14.0 percentage points with three inspectors. Detailed results per
type of inspection confirm the positive correlation between the number
of inspectors and the PSC outcomes, with large marginal effects for
detention.
The results are in line with the second hypothesis as well as with
former studies. In their study on the Spanish Maritime Administration,
Ravira and Piniella [41] strongly advocated for multidisciplinary teams
on board given the enhanced likelihood of detecting deficiencies as well
as a more efficient decision-making process. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the data obtained does not provide any information on the time
and effort spent by each inspector during each inspection. So, at that
stage, it can only be concluded that the number of inspectors assigned
to each inspection is one element explaining the country differences in
PSC outcomes observed in our data. However, the study is not able to
explain through which mechanisms this effect operates.
4.3. Background of inspectors
As the database includes an inspector identifier, additional in-
formation on the educational background of the 845 inspectors in-
volved in the 32,206 inspections was collected through the ques-
tionnaire that each MS fills in during the preparatory phase of the five
years’ cycle of visits. Those visits monitor compliance and performance
of MSs with regard to the PSC Directive [11] following the provisions of
Article 30. There are 24 initial different educational backgrounds that
were grouped into the five following categories: seagoing (deck), sea-
going (engine), architect/engineer, other university degrees, and
others/unknown.14
Out of the 845 inspectors, 33.4% have a seagoing (deck) back-
ground, 23.4% have a seagoing (engine) background, 11.2% are ar-
chitects or engineers, 19.1% have another university degree and 12.9%
are in the other/unknown category. At the country level, there exist
large disparities in both the total number and background of inspectors.
The average number of inspectors per country is 33.8, with a standard
deviation of 35.9. The number of inspectors ranges from 2 in MS16 to
120 in MS14. Five countries have 60 inspectors or more: MS10 with 65,
MS8 with 93, MS23 with 106, MS25 with 100, and MS14 with 120. In
MS14, 75.8% of inspectors have a university-related degree while those
with the same background represent 17.0% in MS25. In that country,
40.0% of inspectors have a seagoing (deck) background against 2.5% in
MS14.
To study the relationship between the inspector's background and
Fig. 5. Results of inspection, by number of in-
spectors. Source: data from the EU Region
2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
14 Information for 35 inspectors (4.1% of inspectors) could not be obtained. The de-
tailed categories are: Seagoing (deck); Seagoing (Radio Officer); Seagoing (Deck – Radio),
Seagoing (engine); Naval Architect – Seagoing (deck), Architect or engineer (Naval
Architect: Naval Architect; Naval Engineer; Marine Engineer (MSc)), Other University
(Law and Economics, the other Engineers not related to Maritime; Nautical Science;
Nautical (University Degree); Nautical - Marine Technology (MSc) and Others (0 or un-
known).
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the PSC outcomes, the data is transformed so that the unit level is now
the inspector. In this new sample, a vessel inspected by two inspectors
therefore contributes to two observations. This way, a sample of 48,636
individual inspections is obtained.
The results illustrate little variation for the proportion of vessels
having at least one deficiency (DEF), and for the average number of
deficiencies (DEFN), according to the inspector's background. The
average number of deficiencies is for instance 2.6 for inspectors with
seagoing (deck) background, 2.9 with seagoing (engine) background
and 2.7 for architect or engineer. Concerning detention, the likelihood
is somewhat higher for inspectors being either architects/engineers
(5.6%) or with other university background (5.8%) than inspectors with
seagoing (deck) background (3.8%). At a more detailed level, inspectors
with a background in either law or political sciences have a higher
probability of being part of an inspection leading to a detention (8.4%
and 7.6%, respectively).
Next, regression models are estimated to study the influence played
by the inspector's background on PSC outcomes. Table 4 reports only
marginal effects of the inspector's background.15 For all outcomes, the
background has in general a very small effect in magnitude on the final
PSC outcome. The largest effect on the number of deficiencies is for
instance equal to 0.2 for initial inspections. When considering all in-
spections, the likelihood of having a vessel detained is higher when
inspections are carried out by inspectors with a seagoing (engine)
background (+0.5 percentage point) and by inspectors with a back-
ground of architect or engineer (1.0 percentage point). Those results are
similar to Knapp and Franses [16] who estimated the probability of
detention for inspectors with nautical background versus those with
engineering background as oscillating between 1% and 3%.
A last concern is whether the background of inspectors has an influ-
ence on the type of deficiencies registered during the inspection. As shown
in the last column of Table 5, the most frequent deficiencies are related to
certificate and documentation (15.8% of total deficiencies), fire safety
(14.0%), safety of navigation (12.3%) and labor conditions (10.2%). A
Chi2 test shows that the type of deficiencies and the background of
inspectors are not independent. For instance, inspectors with either a
seagoing (deck) or seagoing (engine) background report more often defi-
ciencies related to safety or navigation. The reverse pattern is found for
inspectors being either architect or engineer or having other university
diploma. Architects or engineers more often report deficiencies related to
labor conditions, while inspectors from other university backgrounds more
often report deficiencies related to certificate and documentation.
Table 6 shows the estimated probability for an inspector to report a
given type of deficiency.16 Again, linear probability models are used to
take into account the role of vessel characteristics. When the country of
inspection is not controlled for (panel A), some significant impacts re-
lated to the background of inspectors (other or unknown backgrounds
being the reference category) are found. For instance, deficiencies re-
lated to certificates and documentation are more likely for inspectors
with a background from other university. Deficiencies related to safety
of navigation are more frequent when inspectors have a background in
seagoing (deck) or seagoing (engine).
However, these results are not any longer significant when the
country of inspection is controlled for (panel B). The results which are
consistent across panel A and B are related to fire safety-related defi-
ciencies which are less likely for inspectors with a university degree,
labor conditions-related deficiencies which are less likely for inspectors
with a nautical background while living and working conditions-related
deficiencies are more likely for these inspectors. Finally, as expected,
inspectors with a seagoing (engine) background are more likely to de-
tect propulsion and auxiliary machinery-related deficiencies.
It is clear that, beside their background, PSCOs may be influenced by
bureaucratic and cultural practices in their country, the extent of their
training, the administrative and political support of their administration
among other factors already discussed in the literature.
Table 3
Marginal effect of number of inspectors on inspection results.
Source: data from the EU Region 2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
Variables DEF (in %) DEFN DET (in %)
A. All inspections (N=32,206)
One inspector Ref Ref Ref
Two inspectors 8.8*** 1.0*** 3.8***
Three and more inspectors 13.4*** 2.7*** 14.0***
Controls YES YES YES
B. Initial inspections (N=10,076)
One inspector Ref Ref
Two inspectors 8.9*** 0.3***
Three and more inspectors 6.0** 0.2**
Controls YES YES YES
C. More detailed inspections (N = 17,431)
One inspector Ref Ref Ref
Two inspectors 8.4*** 1.3*** 5.7***
Three and more inspectors 16.5*** 3.9*** 21.0***
Vessel characteristics YES YES YES
D. Expanded inspections (N = 4699)
One inspector Ref Ref Ref
Two inspectors 11.4*** 1.3*** 4.5***
Three and more inspectors 14.1*** 2.6*** 11.2***
Controls YES YES YES
Note: estimates from linear probability and linear regression models. Significance levels
are 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Each regression also includes type of inspection, type
of vessel, age at inspection, vessel flag and state of inspection as explanatory variables.
Table 4
Marginal effect of background of inspectors on inspection results.
Source: data from the EU Region 2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
Variables DEF (in %) DEFN DET (in %)
A. All inspections (N=48,636)
Seagoing (deck) Ref Ref Ref
Seagoing (engine) −1.7*** −0.0 0.5**
Architect or engineer −0.8 −0.0 1.0***
Other university −1.2 −0.1* 0.2
Other or unknown 2.0** 0.1** −0.1
Controls YES YES YES
B. Initial inspections (N = 13,787)
Seagoing (deck) Ref Ref
Seagoing (engine) −3.9*** −0.1***
Architect or engineer 0.4 0.0
Other university −2.9* −0.1**
Other or unknown 1.8 0.2***
Controls YES YES
C. More detailed inspections (N = 26,196)
Seagoing (deck) Ref Ref Ref
Seagoing (engine) −1.1* 0.0 0.4
Architect or engineer −2.1** −0.1 1.0*
Other university −1.5 −0.1 0.2
Other or unknown 1.9* 0.1 −0.4
Vessel characteristics YES YES YES
D. Expanded inspections (N = 8653)
Seagoing (deck) Ref Ref Ref
Seagoing (engine) −1.2 −0.1 0.4
Architect or engineer 0.4 −0.0 1.8*
Other university 1.3 −0.0 0.3
Other or unknown 3.0* −0.0 −0.3
Controls YES YES YES
Note: estimates from linear probability and linear regression models. Significance levels
are 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Each regression also includes type of inspection, type
of vessel, age at inspection, vessel flag and state of inspection as explanatory variables.
15 The list of explanatory variables includes type of inspection, type of vessel, vessel
age, flag of registry, country of inspection and number of inspectors when the vessel is
inspected. 16 The focus is restricted to the 10 most frequently reported types of deficiencies.
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5. Concluding comments and policy implications
The rise of the various memoranda of understanding since 1982 has set
the ambitious aim of harmonising the enforcement standards within the
region where the MoU was established [42]. However, the limits and
complexity faced trying to achieve this goal has been highlighted by
several publications in the past thirty years [2,4,10,14,17,22,38,39,43].
Taking as a reference the EU region, the purpose of this paper was to
determine whether single EU countries record a higher number of defi-
ciencies and or detention net of the characteristics of the vessel inspected.
Also, an attempt was made to determine whether discrepancies in the
output of an inspection are influenced either by the team composition at
the time of the inspection or by the background of the PSCOs.
With regard to the first aspect, results have made clear that some of
the differences in terms of detecting at least one deficiency and/or
detaining a vessel are significant with some MSs showing a probability
40% lower of reporting zero deficiencies compared to others. Such
findings raise doubts on whether the establishment of harmonised
procedures on inspection and detention, as stated in the Article 1 of the
EU Directive on PSC [11], is being achieved. Moreover, the results
enable policy makers to flag those countries which are struggling with
the implementation process of harmonised standards and, in view of
reviewing the 2009/16/EC, ascertain overhaul strategies.
Results also emphasize that differences in PSC outcomes are much
more important within each MS than, on average, between MSs. This
result holds even when the characteristics of inspected vessels are taken
into account. Still, there may exist substantial heterogeneity between
ports where vessels are inspected within a given country. This could be
due to the endemic traffic characteristics, whether in terms of size or
type, of some ports compared to others. Hence, it would be beneficial to
investigate more closely inspection's differences between ports within
the same MS, especially for bigger MSs with significant length of
coastline and number of ports. A topic, this, which could be addressed
in further studies after being able to access specific ports data which
could not be retrieved as part of this investigation.
Considering the team composition element in the inspection pro-
cess, the results confirm, at the European Union level, the findings of
previous studies [40,41]. The analysis clearly shows that the likelihood
of detecting deficiencies and detaining vessels is higher if the number of
inspectors on board is more than one. Finally, the extent to which in-
spectors report certain types of deficiencies according to their back-
ground is investigated, as suggested already by some authors
[16,40,41]. While the significance is not always consistent, it is clear
that some backgrounds are more likely to detect certain types of defi-
ciencies. For example, inspectors with a seagoing (engine) background
are more likely to detect propulsion and auxiliary machinery defi-
ciencies compared to other inspectors.
A potential drawback of this study is that it sheds light on correla-
tions between the role of inspectors and PSC outcomes. As previously
emphasized, the interpretation of some results is subject to reverse
causality issues. If for instance two or three inspectors are system-
atically chosen when vessels are presumed to be in bad conditions, then
the positive correlation between the number of inspectors and the
number of deficiencies sounds obvious. What matters is knowing
whether choosing ex ante a higher number of inspectors increases in a
causal way the number of deficiencies during the inspection or whether
assigning an inspector with some specific background indeed leads to a
higher number of reported deficiencies.
A simple empirical strategy to further examine the relevance of
causal effects is to turn to randomized experiments. Starting from a list
of vessels to be inspected, a randomized allocation of either the number
of inspectors (either one, or two, or three) or the background of in-
spectors would provide the ideal framework. Once inspectors are ran-
domly selected, then a comparison of the PSC outcomes between dif-
ferent groups of vessels (those being inspected by one inspector only
versus those being inspectors by exactly two inspectors for instance)
will provide the causal effect of the number of inspectors. Such random
experiments can certainly be implemented at low cost by port autho-
rities and would provide very useful information. A random allocation
of inspectors between ports could be of interest to assess whether PSCOs
have an influence on the differences observed within each EU MS.
However, this exercise could be easier for smaller MSs while challen-
ging for MSs with a significant length of coastline.
In conclusion, discrepancies in harmonisation have been en-
countered. In the first part, differences across MSs have raised doubts
encompassing the PSC system as a whole. However, particular attention
should be given to some neglected areas such as team composition and
inspectors’ background. Despite the valid grounds for an arbitrary team
composition by MSs, the harmonisation of such process should be
considered in future policy considerations. These results would benefit
any policy study that might consider recommending a review of
Directive 2009/16/EC.
Table 5
Type of deficiencies by background of inspectors.
Source: data from the EU Region 2014–2015, authors’ calculations.
Type of deficiencies Background of inspectors Proportion
Seagoing (deck) Seagoing (engine) Architect or engineer Other university Other or unknown (in %)
Certificate and documentation 15.4 15.1 16.4 17.7 16.1 15.8
Fire safety 14.3 13.1 12.7 14.9 15.8 14.0
Safety of Navigation 13.1 13.3 10.0 10.2 11.1 12.3
Labor conditions 9.9 9.1 12.1 10.3 12.4 10.2
Life saving appliances 8.8 8.5 7.3 8.4 9.0 8.5
Emergency systems 4.9 5.2 6.2 6.1 5.9 5.4
Pollution prevention 4.9 5.4 5.9 5.3 4.7 5.2
Living and working conditions 5.2 6.3 3.8 4.8 2.9 5.1
Propulsion and auxiliary machinery 4.5 5.5 5.6 4.0 4.6 4.9
Structural conditions 4.6 4.4 5.0 4.0 4.7 4.5
ISM 4.3 4.3 4.4 5.0 4.2 4.4
Water/weathertight conditions 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.1 3.7 4.3
Radio communications 2.5 2.4 2.5 1.7 2.1 2.3
Alarms 1.0 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.1
ISPS 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.2 0.7 0.7
Other 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.7
Cargo operations including equipment 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4
Dangerous goods 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
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